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Bildt Looks Forward to 'Harmony' in Bosnia

AU2111203795 Paris AFP in English
2000 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Nov 21 (AFP)—Carl Bildt, European Union negotiator in former Yugoslavia described Tuesday [21 November] the deal in Dayton, Ohio, between Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia to end four years of conflict as the "beginning of peace".

Speaking after the arrangement was announced by U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington, Bildt, who co chairs the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, said: "What has been achieved here in Dayton has been achieved with difficulty. But the important thing is that it has been achieved.

"Important as it is, it represents but the beginning of peace. We must be all deeply aware of the challenges and difficulties in the days, weeks, months and years ahead," he said in a statement released in Geneva.

Bildt said agreements would be signed in Paris followed by meetings in London to discuss how the different parts of the package can be implemented.

"Implementation is now the key to peace," added Bildt. "To disarm and demobilize. To start rebuilding a ruined economy. To understand that reconciliation is the road to a future harmony in Bosnia."

He continued: "All this will be difficult. It will also require a massive effort by the international community to both secure the immediate military implementation and to help with the decisive political humanitarian and economic implementation."

Bildt added: "The European Union has already outlined a broad and comprehensive program of help and assistance and support for all of Bosnia and for cooperation with all of the region."

Central Europe Resolved To Join NATO

96ES0012A Paris LE FIGARO in French 4-5 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by Bernard Osser and Laure Mandeville: "Central Europe Worried but Resolute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest, the prevarication of the Western governments, which are listening very attentively to Russia, has created a malaise.*

Even if they do not admit to it, the countries of Central Europe are monitoring Boris Yeltsin's faltering heartbeat very closely. But they are deliberately turning a deaf ear to Moscow's *nyet* on their membership in NATO. In whose name should Russia be able to upset their timetable for joining the Atlantic alliance and the European Union?

"Our position," Bela Szombatl, Hungary's ambassador to Paris, explains, "is that we should join these two institutions as quickly as possible. No one has the right to veto our policy as an independent state."

Whether in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, or Bratislava, convictions remain unshaken. The artificial division created by the Cold War cannot be allowed to last much longer. East Europe must get out of the European "gray zone" left by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and hitch onto the Western democratic camp and the security system that protects it. Moscow should not have a say in the matter. The era of the communist diktat is over.

When, concerned over "Russian anxieties," the West explains that care must be taken not "to humiliate Russia" before the legislative elections in December and the presidential elections in June 1996, the Central Europeans diplomatically acquiesce and say that they wish to strengthen bilateral ties to their big neighbor to the east. "A democratic Russia has nothing to fear from NATO," Czech President Vaclav Havel says. In an interview with LE FIGARO a few days ago, Polish Foreign Minister Wladislaw Bartoszewski went further: "Our entry into the alliance will only widen the zone of stability in Europe. Russia ought to be delighted."

Developing this same idea, Witold Waszczykowski, the diplomat responsible for the NATO file in Warsaw, adds, "Russia sees NATO as a Cold War machine. It forgets that its only stable and secure border is the one it shares with Norway. Poland's membership in NATO would mean that Russia would no longer have to watch its border with Poland as closely as its southern and eastern borders."

The Kaliningrad Missiles

However, despite these soothing, rational words, neither Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, nor Slovaks hide their anxiety or their annoyance.

They are anxious about Russia. An expert report on NATO expansion, edited by former Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski and published in Warsaw, states that "Poland is not currently threatened." But it goes on to say that "Poland and Europe are still living in the shadow of the Cold War." The public is frightened by the possible emergence of a new military doctrine at the Kremlin. The major Polish newspapers have published a map showing the Russian nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad pointed at Warsaw and Krakow.

The very attitude of Russian politicians is a source of perplexity. "Russia," Witold Waszczykowski says, "is behaving like a sick, hunted man who, despite having the doors of the whole world thrown open to him and being invited everywhere, keeps on saying 'they are out to get me.'" "Moscow is suffering," he adds, "from a sort of persecution complex. We may never be able to convince the Russians. There are sick people for whom there is no cure."

Under these conditions, the countries of Central Europe find it hard to understand the West's lack of firmness. "In the confrontation between the interests of Central Europe and those of the Kremlin, the Western position is favorable to Russian interests," the Polish report says.

Jacques Chirac's support for increased Russian participation in discussions on European security, announced during Boris Yeltsin's visit to Paris, was interpreted as a French retreat on the question of NATO expansion. A minitempest reportedly shook diplomatic circles in East Europe after the Chirac-Yeltsin meeting on 21 October. "If France wants to be the West's mediator with Russia, which I absolutely do not believe, I wish it good luck," the Polish foreign minister said last week in response to questions from somewhat alarmist Polish reporters.

A Hungarian observer comments along the same lines: "If the Franco-Russian dialogue enables Russia to come to terms better with the expansion of NATO, then we are for it. But if it has the opposite effect, we are against it."

The French argument that discussions on European security ought to be broadened to encompass more than a NATO-based vision of the matter is hard to swallow. Central Europe wants security guarantees, guarantees that only the Atlantic alliance and, behind it, the United States can offer.

"We are not against the Western European Union," a Czech diplomat explains, "but it must be recognized that, for the time being, it does not amount to much." "Surprised" that France and Russia have established a bilateral commission to reflect on a new architecture for European security, he adds, "I do not understand why the French are playing the 'Yeltsin card.' It seems clear to me that the Russian president is finished, physically and politically."

Destabilized by Moscow's protests and a little disappointed by the West's putting the brake on, the Central Europeans continue to exhibit "moderate optimism." Wladys Bartoszewski, for example, summarizes the general feeling well when he says he still hopes for NATO membership "in about 1998, once the Russian and U.S. elections are over."

Polish specialist Witold Waszczykowski puts the matter in perspective: "Poland's membership in NATO will no longer have the same importance," he says. "When the West has invested $50 billion in Poland, and when Texaco, Bull, and ELF [Essence et lubrifiants de France] are solidly established in the Polish market, the West will be forced to defend Gdansk. The integration progress has already begun. Russia's *nyet* will not change anything!"

Greek President Addresses National Assembly

AU2211122995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0830 GMT 22 Nov 96

[Address by Greek President Kostandinos Stefanopoulos to the Bulgarian National Assembly in Sofia—live; in Greek with consecutive Bulgarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. National Assembly Chairman, ladies and gentlemen deputies:

From the rostrum of the Bulgaria National Assembly, this temple of Bulgarian democracy, in the name of the Greek people and of all the Greek political forces, I offer homage to the Bulgarian people and its struggle to enable Bulgaria to assume its due place among the democratic European states. As the first president of democratic Greece to make an official visit to free, democratic Bulgaria, I experience feelings of sincere joy and great satisfaction in being given an opportunity to make contact with you and with the friendly Bulgarian people. Undoubtedly, it is no accident that Bulgaria is the first neighboring country that I have visited since assuming my presidential duties. Quite the contrary, this marks the peak of the privileged relations that our two countries maintain and the warm friendly relations between the Bulgarian and Greek people, who, as it always happens, realize that there is great benefit in developing our relations even further, in the most varied ways, which our two countries' government must support and expand.

The cordial atmosphere in which my talks have been held here in Sofia with President Zhelev, Prime Minister Videnov, and the chairman of the National Assembly, provide the best proof of the high level of Greek-Bulgarian relations. I hope and wish that my visit to Bulgaria will contribute to the further strengthening, deepening, and expansion of our cloud-free relations and to forging these relations, which are now in a state of consistent and steady progress, for decades in the future. Our relation have withstood the challenges of our times and the extensive regional and world changes. No factor and no motive is capable of altering the basic facts that form the foundation of Greek-Bulgarian relations, on the basis of which we are developing our links today and in the future, drawing strength and confidence from the mutual trust that has been established both at the government level and between our two peoples. [applause]

The quality of Greek-Bulgarian relations and our frequent bilateral contacts at all levels help to ensure peace and security in our region and open up broad prospects for the common harmonious development of our two countries and peoples in a Balkan and European context.

Mr. Chairman, Bulgaria's European identity and future prospects constitute a political, economic, social, and geostrategic fact. Your neighbor Greece, more than any other member state of the EU, realizes and understands the need to avoid any delay in the process of Bulgaria joining the European structures. We do not spare our efforts in supporting the view before the competent organs of the EU that today, more than ever, Bulgaria needs the EU, while the EU cannot be complete without Bulgaria. [loud applause] Within the framework of its capabilities, Greece is ready and resolved to serve as a conductor of the Bulgarian aspirations toward this goal. [applause] I would like to stress that this standpoint is supported by the entire Greek political world. This viewpoint is not only based on friendly feelings, but represents a basic political and strategic choice made by Greece, because Greece believes that the social, economic, and political security of the Balkan countries and the Balkan region as a whole can enjoy security only as members of a united Europe. We are consistently, firmly, and systematically pursuing a policy aimed at creating a united Balkan region that, with the joining of Bulgaria and Romania, will become part of a united Europe.

The expansion of the EU with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania, as I had the opportunity to emphasize from the rostrum of the Romanian Parliament two weeks ago, will undoubtedly help to strengthen the economic, trade, energy, and geopolitical role of the EU in the Balkan, Black Sea, and Aegean regions. Accordingly, it is a question of choice that serves the long-term interests of the EU, corresponds to the striving of the entire Bulgarian nation, of which I have been convinced by this National Assembly, and makes a basic and decisive contribution to strengthening security in the Balkans and throughout Europe. We support [words indistinct] that all independent Balkan states that have assimilated and are applying European standards of conduct should become part of a united European region. The Balkans must cease standing in opposition to extra-Balkan factors and must join the united Europe of which we dream. We will steadfastly oppose the inconsistent views that are characteristic of certain circles in Central Europe and outside Europe, who believe that, for one reason or another, we must draw a dividing line between Central Europe and the Balkan peninsula. We deny and reject this view, which is unacceptable from the cultural viewpoint, has no basis in history, and is strategically dangerous. [applause] Since this is our common view and represents our basic political line and historical choice, Greece and

Bulgaria are determined to march together to ensure a better future through multilateral cooperation at many levels, from which will be to the benefit of both the Bulgarian and Greek people, as well as benefiting peace and security over an extensive part of the Balkan region.

From this rostrum, I reiterate most strongly and officially that Greek commits itself to helping Bulgaria in its efforts to join the European and euro-atlantic structures to such an extent and at such a time that Bulgaria itself will determine. [applause] I declare and confirm our help in promoting Bulgaria's cooperation with NATO and the Western European Union. [applause] When Bulgaria decides to join NATO and to what extent, Greece guarantees her full and unconditional support. [applause]

I note with satisfaction the speedy development of our economic and commercial relations. These links are based on mutually beneficial cooperation, the fruits of which are already beginning to become apparent. The task that we have set ourselves, of achieving the figure of $1 billion in our trade exchange, is desirable and achievable. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria's European perspective represents a basic parameter and determines the long-term framework of our economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

Ladies and Gentlemen, National Assembly Deputies, Greece and Bulgaria are guided by identical views in the discussion of the following issues: We condemn the fait accompli policy, the use or threat of the use of force in international relations, the occupation of foreign territories under any pretext whatsoever, the violation of the basic rights and freedoms, and attempts to change international treaties unilaterally. Bulgaria and Greece have agreed on the need of the following: to settle misunderstandings on the basis of international law and practice; to work together to promote a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis through talks and arguments, so as to avoid the continuation of problems that are controllable and [words indistinct] tension; for concrete measures to be taken to compensate for the losses that the countries in our region have suffered in connection with the sanctions imposed on the FRY, so as to turn the Balkans again into a region of understanding and cooperation.

In this connection, I would like to voice my great joy and satisfaction with the announcement disseminated by the mass media on the initialing of an agreement that will mark an end to the bloody conflict that over so many years has tormented Yugoslavia and created a threat for the entire region. I merely state that the agreement to be reached should really go towards the national wishes and interests of the countries concerned, and not be the result of pressure or the threats of sanctions by the strong in the world, who very often pay no attention to the aspirations of the peoples. I am certain that both Greece and Bulgaria will gain very great benefit from the end of this fearful war, and that both our countries will assist in the postwar reconstruction of this devastated part of Yugoslavia.

The plan to transport crude petroleum from Novorossiysk to Burgas and from there along an oil pipeline to Alexandroupolis in the Aegean will guarantee the shipment of petroleum to Europe under the best commercial and economic conditions, and will also contribute to the development of the region and the attraction of fresh investments that will have a positive effect on the development of this region. Greek-Bulgarian cooperation in the fields of transportation, telecommunications, communications, and the energy industry constitute and will continue to constitute a principal factor for a progressive strategy for our region as a whole. [passage omitted]

Greece, and northern Greece in particular, is increasingly becoming a center of international business and investment capital aimed at the Balkan countries. The ports of Salonika, Alexandroupolis, and Kavala are playing and will play an increasing role in trans-Balkan and trans-European trade, directed at one end across the Danube bridges to the domestic European market, and at the other toward the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa. I hope that soon investors, with state support, will be in a position to ensure the operation of new commercial ancillary routes, starting from the ports of northern Greece, which will help to stimulate the economy and the economic security of the entire region. An important contribution in this direction will be the creation of new border checkpoints and the building of new perpendicular highways linking Kavala and Drama with Gotse Delchev, Plovdiv, and Sofia; Xanti with Smolyan and Plovdiv; and Alexandroupolis and Komotini with Kurdzhali and Khaskovo. [passage omitted]

Mr. Chairman, five years have passed since the historic changes that took place in Europe. The West, and especially the EU, will have to respond to a greater extent and more effectively to the efforts of the democracies in Central and East Europe to overcome the difficulties that they face. The message that Athens sends to Sofia is that the Greek people and politicians are on the side of Bulgaria and the friendly Bulgarian people in efforts they are making toward joining a united Europe by natural means. It is time for the Balkans and the Balkan peoples to cease being identified with the unrest and alarms that they stirred up in the past. Our peoples have already traveled an immense distance from the time when the Balkans were regarded as Europe's powder keg. The great ideas and principles, such as democracy, equal rights, development, and cooperation, law, justice, parliamentarism, liberty, security, and stability must (?really take root) throughout the Balkan region. We are all very much aware of the strength of these principles, and we are all determined to apply them in practice, because they contain the messages and dreams of today and tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Supports 'Positive Cooperation'

AU2111194995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 21 November Prime Minister Zhan Videnov met Greek President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos. The common opinion was expressed that positive cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece in all areas must continue, Prime Minister Videnov said after the meeting.

According to the Greek head of state, all political forces in both countries support the efforts of the state institutions to implement specific initiatives of the two countries based on common interests.

It is anticipated that Bulgaria and Greece will sign several important bilateral treaties by the end of the year, Prime Minister Videnov said. He expressed hope that his Greek counterpart, Andreas Papandreou, will recover soon and will make his visit to Bulgaria, a visit the Bulgarian prime minister expects to give a specific expression of the positive results of the joint work of Bulgarian and Greek statesmen and experts.

The issue of more rapidly integrating Bulgaria in the EU also was discussed in the meeting between Prime Minister Videnov and Greek President Stefanopoulos.

This morning the Greek head of state visited Plovdiv, where he met Petko Stalev, manager of Plovdiv Oblast, and Spas Gurnevski, Plovdiv Mayor. The guests viewed sites in Plovdiv and met with Greek students in the city.

In the afternoon President Stefanopoulos laid a wreath at the monument of the unknown soldier in Sofia, and 30 minutes ago at Hotel Sheraton the reception given by the Greek ambassador in honor of President Stefanopoulos began.

Tsochev: Extension of Yamburg Agreement Possible

AU2111101895 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Nov 95 pp 1, 5

[Report by Albena Ivanova: "Gas Will Flow From Yamburg for a Further 10 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During his talks in Moscow, Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev obtained his Russian counterpart's agreement in principle to sign a 10-year agreement extending the Yamburg agreement that expires at the end of 1996. Kiril Tsochev announced this himself on his return from Moscow last night. The Kremlin will guarantee to supply 3.75 billion cubic meters of gas per year at market prices. The two sides will sign this agreement at the fourth session of the Mixed Bulgarian-Russian Economic Cooperation Commission, which is likely to be held in Moscow in December, but this date will depend on whether the Russian Federation elections are over by then. Tsochev gave no details on the clauses to be included in the new agreement, but mentioned that the question of a partial barter deal between Bulgaria and Russia is under discussion. It is clear that Topenergy and Gazprom will be the main motive forces for implementing the treaty, but the deliveries will be guaranteed by both governments. [passage omitted]

Deputy Prime Minister Tsochev announced that Russia has confirmed its desire to join a trilateral consortium with Bulgaria and, it is likely, Germany, to construct the Belene nuclear power plant if the plant is accepted as part of the energy strategy that parliament is to consider. He said that projects are also being finalized in the conventional energy supply field, for the supply of fresh fuel jointly with Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, and the return of spent fuel.

The Russian Government will support our application to New Forum, the successor of COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls]. By mid-December the details will also be finalized on deliveries of equipment for ferrous metallurgy to the Kremikovtsi Plant and Stomana ["Steel"] in Pernik.

Deputy Prime Minister Tsochev had a meeting with Russian Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik, to obtain an assurance that the latter will not depart from the positions adopted during their last talks on the shares in the Novorossiysk-Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. It is well-known that Bulgaria insists that Russia should own 50 percent, while Bulgaria and Greece are given 25 percent each.

Concern Voiced Over Russian Tank Deliveries

AU2211074895 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Commentary by Nedko Petrov: "Tank 'Multiplication' and Division of the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to reports that appeared in Moscow on 15 November, Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev is in the Russian capital to agree on the delivery of 105 T-72 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers (APC), and the repayment of $48 million of the Russian debt. If the quoted figures are correct, this will mean that the Russian tanks for Sofia have been "multiplied" by a further five units, while our claims on Moscow have been reduced by $2 million, because the official "transfer down the line" [kaskadirane] of Russian combat equipment was announced two months ago as comprising 100 T-72 tanks, 100 APC's, and 12 Mi-24 helicopters, apart from the official Russian debt of $50 million. The issue lies not with the number of tanks and combat vehicles, which our Army desperately needs, but in the fact that we are being drawn ever more strongly toward Moscow by the deliveries of combat equipment, spare parts, and proposals for joint Bulgarian-Russian production in the field of special products. Whatever stories we may hear from our rulers about full membership in the European Union, association with the Western European Union, and joining NATO, the facts are quite different—by its actions, Moscow is increasingly transforming us back into its former satellite.

It is also true that the policy of "transfer down the line" has enabled Turkey and Greece to renew the greater part of its tank, artillery, and aircraft inventories by deliveries from the United States and Germany. According to the figures declared in the CFE Treaty, Bulgaria is reducing its 2,416 tanks by 1,475 units, while Turkey and Greece are keeping to limits of 2,888 and 1,725 combat units respectively. The question is whether the principle of "transfer down the line" will lessen tension in the Balkans, or again divide our countries from one another as satellites of the great powers.

Officials Discuss Czech Troops to Bosnia

AU2211075895 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "gag": "The Czech Battalion in Bosnia Apparently Will Come Under British Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The combat battalion of the Czech Army, which is to be sent to Bosnia, will apparently be incorporated into the British rapid deployment brigade. This is indicated by the talks conducted this week by military experts and diplomats.

The battalion should be formed of one-half reserve soldiers, either veterans of the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) Croatian mission or of the rapid deployment brigade or the Prostejov elite airborne brigade. Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas said that the Army will be able to complete the training of the unit within three months after NATO confirms its interest.

As Defense Minister Vilem Holan stated during the talks with President Vaclav Havel yesterday regarding the combat battalion for Bosnia, sending 700 troops is being considered with the understanding that the entire operation should cost the republic 1.7 billion korunas [Kc], at most.

The government is willing to release no more than Kc2 billion for the Bosnia operation, of which one-quarter is expenditures for wages. Namely, it is expected that the men would be paid much better than the soldiers of the departing battalion in Croatia. They should be paid $1,700 per month in Bosnia, and the Defense Ministry intends to deposit several thousand korunas into their accounts at home.

A high-ranking diplomat, who wishes to remain anonymous so as not to be accused of bias in favor of the British over the Americans and the French, considers the inclusion of the Czech battalion in the British brigade with elite commando units to be the best of all of the possible alternatives. According to him, the British command more respect in Bosnia than the Americans, and their two battalions have been deployed in Bosnia already, so they have experience from that theater. "Moreover, the Americans will be busy with coordination with the Russian contingent," the diplomat said.

The Army does not expect to use new hardware for its new mission in Bosnia. Nonetheless, all of the vehicles and important instruments must undergo a thorough examination. In this context, Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas recalls the embarrassment when a U.S. transport aircraft brought to the Czech unit deployed in the Persian Gulf war an armored reconnaissance carrier, which the soldiers had to push out of the aircraft because it did not work. "Someone in the Army rid himself of a useless piece of garbage. This must not be repeated in Bosnia," Necas said.

Czech Standpoint on EU, NATO Discussed

MM2211111295 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 22 Nov 95 p 17

[Report by Vincent Boland, incorporating remarks by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus; place and date not given; from the FINANCIAL TIMES survey on the Czech Republic: "Focus on EU Membership"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almost every act of the Czech government since the collapse of communism has had one overriding goal: to see the country return to the European mainstream. This desire is a legacy of Czechoslovakia's short but much-recalled period as a stable and prosperous democracy between the two world wars.

Now that it is again a stable and potentially prosperous democracy there is growing impatience with the glacial pace of the west's drive to fully incorporate emerging European states into western institutions. President Vaclav Havel has warned that Nato is running out of time and paying too much heed to Russian objections to such a move.

The government is more sanguine, especially about the European Union. It asserts that the Czech side has done all it can to earn the credentials for membership. The rest is up to Brussels.

"My task is not to fight for early (EU) membership," says Mr Vaclav Klaus, the prime minister, but "to fight for an early start to the negotiations on membership." That fight will begin in January when Mr Klaus is due to hand the country's application to join to the Italian presidency of the EU.

It is difficult to assess what Czechs want or expect from membership of the EU aside from its symbolic confirmation of the country's "return to Europe". Ministers insist they do not want to simply siphon cash from Brussels to spend at home. They want to see the Czech Republic "contribute" to the EU.

Mr Klaus has spoken of starting "a velvet revolution in Brussels" when the country joins. He has aligned himself with British opposition to federalism and for decision-making to remain in national capitals, and has attacked the EU for its "socialist" tendencies.

Much of this may be posturing but its reasoning is based on the Czech Republic's historical experience of taking orders from elsewhere. Having sacrificed so much to win back sovereignty, Czechs are unwilling to cede too much of it to Brussels.

Nevertheless, a real debate on what EU membership will entail has not yet started. A senior British Foreign Office official observed on a visit to Prague in October that he had not been able to ascertain whether the Czech motivation to join the EU was based on political or economic—or any—criteria.

For the Czechs, it may not be as simple as that.

Nato membership is rather more clear-cut. The security vacuum that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been at the forefront of political concerns and remains so today despite Czech participation in the Partnership for Peace.

The collapse of the Habsburg empire after 1918 created a vacuum that could not be filled by the small states that emerged from it. That process was repeated after the second world war. The first crisis was exploited by Hitler, the second by Stalin. In both cases, Czechoslovakia was a prominent victim.

Now there is a third vacuum, for which many in the region believe the only solution is the eastward expansion of Nato. "The most stable solution for central Europe is the enlargement of western institutions," says Mr Jiri Payne, chairman of parliament's foreign affairs committee. Although he adds that the priority is security, Nato membership is seen as essential to it.

The government pursues a go-it-alone policy in its approach to the EU and Nato and has rejected suggestions of regional co-operation with Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. It is a semi-detached member of both the Visegrad Four grouping and the Central European Free Trade Area, which includes those countries.

Since the split with Slovakia, the two have moved apart rapidly and there is little sign of a lingering special relationship. Although Mr Klaus and the Slovak prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, worked closely on the dissolution of the federation they now find it hard to meet. Lost faxes and unreturned phone calls were blamed for the collapse of a recent summit.

Two other issues are controversial. One is the Czech relationship with Germany. German investment in the country is high but Czechs are wary of becoming a source of cheap labour for German companies, even as the realisation grows that they will inevitably become part of the German-dominated economic zone.

On the German side, there is the question of Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after the second world war. Some Germans want compensation but most Czechs will not hear of it. There were no Sudeten Germans, Dr Payne says, just Czech Germans "who destroyed Czechoslovakia" by collaborating with Hitler. The issue remains an irritant in bilateral relations.

The second issue is the relationship with Russia, which has effectively been cast aside in the Czech drive to the west. Czech-Russian relations were once characterised by *druzhba*, a sort of ideological friendship [illegible] Payne says Moscow still thinks in that context and I'm convinced we don't like this policy."

Working out a new one remains a challenge.

Zieleniec Discusses Czech-German Relations

AU2211110295 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 17 Nov 95 p 12

["Editorially abbreviated" lecture entitled "Czechs and Germans—Neighbors in the Unifying Europe" delivered by Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec as a part of the series "Talks About Neighborhood" at the Charles University in Prague on 16 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is generally known that foreign relations are determined, above all, by long-term interests and objectives, and also by actual needs of the individual states. It is also known that these relations often reflect both the good traditions and the traumas of the past. Moreover, it is no secret that the long-term interests and the long-term traumas occasionally end in an incongruity. This applies even more to relations between neighbors, not excluding the Czech-German relations. The main task of foreign policy certainly is the enforcement of national interests. To conduct "talks about neighborhood" means, however, to talk about foreign policy from several vantage points.

If I use the term "national interests" here, and if I am referring to their enforcement, I can do so thanks to the new chance given to us by the fall of the Iron Curtain and the defeat of communism. A clear formulation of national interests, which we cannot do without in one way or another, no longer means the old reduction of the civic interests to the interests of a beatified totality, decided to implement its idea regardless of anything and anyone. On the contrary, as I understand it, the national interests are based on the real interest of free citizens expressed in its entire complexity and spontaneity; after all, it is a matter of securing them both at home and abroad.

It is important that foreign policy respect these principles, particularly in relations with the neighbors, because those naturally are the most sensitive relations. Such a concept of foreign policy will also facilitate the coexistence of Czechs and Germans without prejudices and ambiguities as the coexistence of the Czech and the

German states. Our common interests rather than collective emotions, healthy reason rather than the old spite must be our guide in the future. We do not necessarily need to love each other; it is more than sufficient if we respect and tolerate each other. It has been precisely the insufficient respect for the fine political substance of our relationship and excess of passions that led to heavy blows in the past. We lived from momentary advantages, used them as if they were here to last, and eventually lost more than we thought we would have to sacrifice for these collectivist goals.

In 1989, history returned east of the fallen Iron Curtain. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of communism and the Soviet empire, and the unification of Germany (unconditionally supported also by Czech policy) brought a thaw also to the "frozen" Central Europe. The Czechs and the Germans have become subjects of history again. The term "Central Europe" is returning to the political glossary. For the political stability of our region, however, the definition of the Central European status is something that all of us—Germans, Czechs, Austrians, Poles, and others—will jointly, hand in hand, have to formulate again.

At one time, as a joke (but not incorrectly), this area was described as what lies between France and Russia, and later as what lies between Russia and Germany. Even a ridiculing name was found for this region: *cordon sanitaire* and *Zwischeneuropa*. Eventually, even in Germany, they began to call it "East Europe" or the "Eastern bloc." The Czechs could hardly have been pleased with this label. Nevertheless, the Germans, too, have their trauma of "East Europe." Mitteleuropa reminds them of the central location, i.e., neither East nor West. It brings in them the image of two fronts not only in war but also in life in peace.

It is only now that Germany as a whole is becoming the West, and its neighbors—not only here in the European center—see in this anchorage the basis for stability in Europe. The views extraordinarily coincide here. The Germans are also aware of the impossibility of joining the modern Europeanism with the position of the so-called power of the Center. This is the basis of the common life interest also of the Germans and the Czechs in Europe at the turn of the millennia.

To finish the work, so the anchorage is permanent, Germany cannot remain the eastern border of the West. Europa must expand and include at least the eastern neighbors of Germany.

Although Germany and France stood at the cradle of European cooperation, at first only in the form of an agreement on quotas in the coal and steel industries, integration soon acquired a much broader scale. Helped by an active contribution from Germans and Germany, European integration became a far-reaching historical project, the objective of which is to overcome the curse of the European national wars by creating a structured space for cooperation and, therefore, also for the emergence and cultivation of common European interests. The more common interests, the fewer conflicting and irreconcilable interests, the fewer reasons for war. Thus, European life today is characterized by endeavors to solve problems jointly and develop the principle of cooperation.

What I said so far undeniably indicates that if it were not for the communist coup in February 1948, we Czechs would have also actively participated in the European integration process from the very beginning. This is implied by our location, our history, our obvious national interests.

Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that immediately after it rid itself of the totalitarian shackles, Czech society decided to spontaneously and actively participate in the European integration process. It is no accident that, in addition to the everday domestic political content, the transformation process in the Czech Republic also has its foreign policy or, better expressed, integration dimension. It is given by our unequivocal conviction that entry into the European Union is not exclusively or especially a question of prosperity but, above all, a question of shared values, shared conviction of the fatal necessity of European integration and the willingness to enforce and protect these common values.

Thus, in addition to their quality per se, Czech-German relations can also be good training for both sides for mastering the process of expansion of the European Union and for the perception of this process as an unquestionable outcome of the values of European civilization.

Of course, this internal orientation of ours is not the only dimension in building good-neighborliness. That is clearly testified to by the year 1989. Both your and our successes would not have been possible were it not for the general agreement on the evil of the past and trust in the present. This elementary agreement gave birth to a new relationship between us, completely different from everything that had characterized our previous human relations and political positions since the middle of the last century, particularly the moment of our regaining the status of a political entity in 1918. So, if we are to maintain this new situation (and our agreement on good-neighborliness calls for it), if we are to find new forms of cooperation and partnership, the just mentioned and revived general agreement must be a permanent source of trust and the main stimulus for actions of the political top echelons both here and in Germany.

Our future discussions should take place with the designation of our joint experience in mind, and joint history. In the process it is necessary to refine and combine the concepts. The young generation must not be traumatized by the historical experience of their parents and grandparents.

As is generally known, our discussion on concepts that would facilitate a dialogue is marked by numerous misunderstandings. The Czech endeavors to draw a line under the past are blamed for intending to draw a thick line also under what would not be very flattering for Czech self-reflection. No one in the Czech Republic is so naive. We know that history moves on and that it cannot be put away in neat files and slots. After all, who should know that better than we—in this geographically painful place of our continent, where various ideological enthusiasts with their absolute truths have conducted their campaigns back and forth for centuries.

If Czech policy states "let us put a full stop behind the past," it is aware of this being, as the word itself says, a dot in a single sentence. It is aware that it is just an expression of the determination of the given political teams not to repeat any of the words, spirit, or intonation of precisely this sentence; not to put other sentences into the old one. It knows very well that this dot cannot be the end of the process but rather the beginning, the first step on a long way together.

It really is a limited and at the same time infinite act. It is the beginning of a search for a broader and finer context. I avoid the word "truth." Those who on both sides so happily and so frequently polemically claim that we have to tell each other the entire truth about the past most often think only of their truth and the untruth of the others. President Herzog was possibly thinking of this in Dresden when he said that "different views on the individual aspects of history will prevail." The interpretation of history is one of the constituent elements of national identity. Therefore any attempt to find an absolute common truth, be it Anglo-French, Russo-Polish, or Czech-German, must end in failure because of the very principle of such a truth.

Precisely because we can hardly reach an absolute agreement on the past, we can—or even categorically must—marginalize the past in our relations by efforts toward a favorable future. The more important an agreement on the present and the future, the less important the problems of the past.

An important part of these efforts is the specific and practical measures to create a congenial relationship between the Czechs and the Germans. As is generally known, contrary to politics, trade links nations. Therefore, I am glad to observe that our economic contacts keep growing. Germany has become our most important trading partner. That can be documented both by our mutual trade statistics and the activity of various institutions and economic entities, like the Czech-German Chamber of Industry and Trade, numerous banks, consulting firms, and joint ventures. The first Czech firms are showing interest in investing in Germany and participating in the privatization of industry in the new laender. We are not forgetting that the entry of the Volkswagen concern into Skoda Mlada Boleslav was an important impetus for the inflow of foreign capital to other sectors of the Czech economy. The Czech national economy thus successfully builds ties to the European and world economies.

The importance of this process for the transformation and development of the Czech economy is undeniable. It is not, however, its only contribution. Namely, the ever broader and deeper economic cooperation contributes to getting better acquainted with each other, more frequent human contacts, and thereby the overcoming of the old prejudices between our nations that are rooted in the past.

[German Green Parliament President] Antje Vollmer with great sincerity compared the present relationship between the Czechs and the Germans in this very hall to a broken symbiosis. "When symbiosis breaks, even the next generation will be a hostage.... This trauma has a long half-life," she said. Yes. The old relation cannot be recovered on the basis of its original dimensions, legal norms, and forms. It is necessary to establish a new relation based on an analysis of the causes of the past tragedies, but also on an analysis of the advantages of the old times wherever we have both recognized them as such.

It is not possible to draw thick lines, and it is not even good to attempt to. Vaclav Havel pointed out in his speech that by mistake one could draw a thick line before a good future. Nevertheless, just as it is impossible to draw a thick line that immediately prevents the past to be a factor affecting the present, it is impossible to turn the wheel of history backwards.

What is possible, however, and what I firmly believe in, is an agreement on the steps that would prevent the past from rendering impossible a good future so that the past would actually become our only future.

All of our activities and endeavors in this period are aimed precisely at this objective. Therefore I proposed a certain "parcel" of joint steps some time ago, which could open the path toward this goal.

It is time, and I would say even a historical opportunity, for the political representation of our countries to express clearly their will no longer to deal with political and legal aspects of the complex periods of our past. The oldtimers as well as the historians are aware of the fact that there have been many such periods in our common history. That is precisely the reason we should not become prisoners of our own past. The greatness of statesmen like Adenauer and de Gaulle lies also in their ability to steer mutual relations toward the horizon of the future despite the complexity of the past.

There is no doubt that the events of this century brought immeasurable suffering and wrongs to many innocent people. Anyone who would not admit that sacrifices and malfeasance occurred on both sides would be consciously myopic. Let us admit that the collective concept of guilt and revenge, be it based on affiliation with a certain race or a certain nation, always harms also many innocent, and only keeps starting new rounds of suffering all the time.

Let us seek further joint steps to reinforce the motivation for moving forward. One of them certainly should be the establishment of a joint fund for the Czech-German future, to which both governments would contribute and that would help develop the Czech-German common interests as much as possible. A part of this fund should certainly be a contribution by which Germany would unconditionally compensate Czech victims of Nazism and that would be used to benefit these people by means of the fund. This fund should also incite a care for the cultural heritage of our ancestors and the future of our posterity. It would be natural to support projects of the cross-border cooperation from this fund, contacts between young people, scientific cooperation, or language instruction.

An important activity of this fund would be support for a Czech-German dialogue in the form of a certain forum, where meetings and discussions between politicians, journalists, historians, and representatives of various groups of Czechs and Germans could take place under the auspices of the two governments. The discussions would deal not only with the past but, as I believe, gradually ever more with the present and the future.

I am glad that the project of this "parcel" is subject to a serious discussion between our states, and I am convinced that we will bring these talks to a successful conclusion. At the same time, I would like to commend the constructive stand of the opposition in both of our countries. It was particularly the active participation of the Czech social democracy in this process that demonstrated its above-party, all-national interest.

Czech-German relations, relations between the Czechs and the Germans, are at their best today as far back as our modern memory goes. Their joint European fate grants them prospects they have never known. So, we have a basis to build on, and we know what we are to build. It is a historical chance of the type on which our history has never been very rich. It is a challenge to our responsibility and will.

Klaus Views Economic Development

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[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Kevin Done and Vincent Boland; place and date not given; from the FINANCIAL TIMES Survey on the Czech Republic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus emerged into the international spotlight after Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution in November 1989. First as federal finance minister and later as prime minister of the Czech Republic, he has dominated the process of economic reform.

Intellectually combative with friends and adversaries alike, he has consistently preached the virtues of the market economy and has implemented what he claims to be "the fastest and most comprehensive privatisation process."

Fond of his status as an economist, he has recently been appointed by President Vaclav Havel—on the recommendation of the education minister—as professor of finance at Prague School of Economics.

He leads one of the most stable, centre-right governments of all the transition states of central and eastern Europe, and appears supremely confident that his Civic Democratic Party-led coalition government will be returned to power in next summer's general election.

Q: What are the big ideas that you will put forward in next year's election campaign?

A: Even if we are in what we usually call the post-transformation stage, the main idea for the coming election campaign is the slogan of continuity; continuity of policies that started three years ago. It is not a time to start with new programmes or new breakthroughs.

Q: Economic growth in the Czech Republic has lagged behind some other countries in central and eastern Europe, such as Poland. Why did it the take the Czech Republic longer to come out of recession?

A: First, I have tried a hundred times to explain to observers from foreign countries, from the western world, that the term recession is a nonsense—it should not be used, it does not explain anything.

In this country, as in all other countries (of eastern Europe), we were dealing with what I prefer to call transformation shake-out, a shake-out of non-viable economic activities, which could exist only in protected Comecon markets, with distorted price structures and with huge subsidies.

The faster those activities were squeezed out and eliminated the better. The deeper the shake-out the better. The social, political and economic transformation—the systemic change—was not about GDP growth.

Our GDP decline was just two years, 1991 and 1992. This is relatively a very, very short period of time.

In 1994, GDP grew by 2.6 per cent. In 1995, until now, it is 4 to 4.5 per cent, and the forecast in the government budget for next year is 4.8 per cent, so for me that is sufficient economic growth.

Artificial attempts to accelerate growth would create more pressures, faster inflation. When you put together inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, the results of the Czech Republic are incomparable. You can take the figures yourself; this is not my self-praise or anything like that.

Q: Are there any particular problems that could interrupt this growth?

A: I do not think so. It seems to me that the only potential bottleneck or problem could be the low unemployment rate. We are afraid that accelerating growth can bring more pressures in the labour market, wage pressures, price pressures and inflation. Disinflation is an important policy of the Czech government.

Q: You are facing paradoxical pressures for both devaluation, from a growing trade deficits and for revaluation from heavy capital inflows. How can you resolve this problem?

A: The combination of a deficit in the trade balance with a surplus in the balance of payments is a quite natural phenomenon of the early post-transformation stage. So this is not a paradox, it is a paradigm. It is quite natural that with the visible acceleration of economic growth and especially the growth of industrial output and construction, you will have an acceleration of imports.

And you have a diversion of exports to domestic consumption, not just to personal consumption, I mean to investments and so on. It is quite natural that during the transformation shake-out companies are not able to find sufficient demand at home, and so they export. Now this year is a surprise for them—there is domestic demand—so some of our very successful exporters of the last few years simply decided to divert part of their exports (to the domestic market).

So the short- and medium-term trade deficit is easily explained, and in my opinion it cannot be avoided. This is my professional view as an economist and not just as prime minister.

At the same time, I think that the credibility of the country is so high that there is a very rapid inflow of foreign capital into the country, which means that the balance of payments is in a visible surplus.

The solution to the equation is relatively simple. In the short to medium term, the trade deficit must be financed using the surplus in the capital account.

Q: What are the implications for exchange rate policy?

A: There is no reason to change. There is no reason to devalue, because that would not solve, in the short term, the balance of trade problem, and a small revaluation would not solve, in my opinion, the rapid inflow of foreign capital.

Q: What is the long-term economic growth potential of the Czech Republic, and how long will it take to catch up with western Europe?

A: Our task is to complete the systemic change; to become a normal western European country in every respect. But definitely I expect much faster economic growth than in the average EU country for the foreseeable future—nothing more, nothing less.

Our GDP per capita in 1994 (using purchasing power parity) was approaching or was at the level of the countries with the lowest GDP in the EU, such as Portugal and Greece.

Q: What are the changes that must happen for the Czech Republic to become in your words "a normal country"?

A: It seems to me that the transformation is more or less over. In a debate with my group of economic colleagues and advisers I asked them: Please, with all your dramatic liberalism in your heads, give me the remaining systemic changes we have to make or announce as next year's targets, as I prepare my speeches for New Year's Eve. Practically we have not discovered anything as a Transformation Measure with a capital T and a capital M.

Q: If systemic change is completed, where do you go from here?

A: We will move to more or less standard debates as in your country. Three-and-a-half years ago, in the last election campaign, the promise was to introduce tax reform. To introduce a totally new tax system after 40 years of communism was the transformation measure. Now we are making amendments to the tax laws and talking about what the rate should be. So we are moving more and more towards standard issues and standard questions.

Q: What is your assessment of the mood of the country, and of the electorate?

A: I think there is a unique stability in the mood and in electoral preferences. This is one of the advantages of the Czech Republic. The economic stability is well known: the fact that we have succeeded in increasing real wages every year with the exception of 1991, the year when prices were liberalised. Take the unemployment figures and the inflation figures: that is economic stability.

Socially, if you look at the relative stability, there are no strikes, demonstrations or confrontations. That is another constant of the Czech situation.

This government is the longest-functioning government in this country since the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the birth of the modern Czechoslovak or Czech state. I hope that stability will continue. I don't expect an earthquake in the elections.

The Social Democrats are getting votes from the small parties on the left. They will probably have more than in the last election. But in principle the balance between the parties of the left and the right will be very similar.

Q: How stable is the current coalition?

A: Coalition is always a problem in every country in the world. Only Britain and the United States have the advantage of not having coalition government. But even in these countries the leading parties are more or less coalitions in themselves. I am not sure whether the troubles in a coalition government are much worse than the problems the prime minister of Britain has inside his own political party.

I always preach transparency and clear-cut rules. Having rivals in a coalition party is probably better than having them inside your own party.

Q: You appear to have adopted a rather Euro-sceptic attitude towards the European Union. Is that not a rather counter-productive approach to an organisation that you wish to join?

A: I disagree with the description that I am a Euro-sceptic. I always argue that I am a Euro-realist, or a Euro-optimist as regards the process of European integration.

For me, European integration, definitely, yes. But from that does not follow that all of us living in Europe have the same idea about the form of European integration. I think that the European Union should be a conglomerate of states.

The basic entity of the European Union should be the state and not the individual European citizen. I am against stronger forms of unification, as are sometimes suggested. I don't believe that the process of European integration should be based on expectations that European feelings will be stronger than the sense of national identity of most Europeans. This is one strong argument.

The second argument is connected with our sensitivity with our past. We probably feel more strongly against headquarters located several thousand kilometres away, governing us and controlling us. Our experiences with Comecon and other entities of the past make us feel more strongly. So we definitely want to have less delegation of authority to supranational entities. All other points are of secondary importance.

Q: How long do you think it will take to gain EU membership?

A: My project first is to submit our application letter in January during my official visit to Italy during Italy's presidency of the EU. My task is not to fight for early membership; my task is to fight for an early start to the negotiations.

How long the negotiations take is not in my hands. I am not able to fight over the moment when the moon comes out this evening. I am able to fight over whether the electricity in this room functions or not.

Klaus on ODS-KDS Merger, Kwasniewski, Mlynar

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[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Jaroslav Skalicky on 21 November; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Setting up of a strong right-wing party in our country, changes in the presidential office in Poland, accusations by Zdenek Mlynar of high treason, and the system of health insurance—these are the topics of the Czech Radio interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today.

[Skalicky] Prime Minister, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Christian Democratic Party [KDS] have approved an agreement on a merger. Would you be in favor of a strong left-wing party being set up so that the political spectrum in our country might become more distinct?

[Klaus] I see no reason that I should give any advice to left-wing parties. They have to manage advising themselves, and, no doubt, the system of a certain concentration of the political spectrum exists independently, whether the leading politicians wish it or not. Simply, the voters decide on this, and I think the task of the politicians is to reflect the feelings of the voters in their actions. I think we have made a correct step as to the KDS.

[Skalicky] After Alexander Kwasniewski was elected president, the postcommunists in Poland gained control over all of the offices of power. Is it, in your view, thanks to them, or is it due to the mistakes of the right-wing parties in Poland?

[Klaus] I would not like to express my opinion about the details of Poland's internal life. You know very well that, likewise, I refuse to express my opinion about the situation in Slovakia, and that is why I would not like to say anything deeper as to what I think about Poland as a citizen or as a person from the sphere of social sciences. But I dare say one thing. Let us say that we are trying our best to invite to an ODS congress our partners from all of the countries, not only from England, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere in the West, but we are trying to find partners whom we would like to invite to our congress from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia. But I have to note that there are no partners like that. The right-wing has simply not formed in those [former communist] countries in some sort of visible political party, there is a vast number of small groupings there that argue between themselves and that have not created firm countercandidates. In my view, it is not the strength of one party but rather the weakness of the other.

[Skalicky] Prime Minister, what is your view about the effort of the Office of Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes to try, in connection with the year 1968, to take to court representatives of the communist regime, last but not least Zdenek Mlynar [Prague Spring protagonist, reform communist and signatory of Charter 77]?

[Klaus] I should like to distinguish very strictly indeed the political side of the matter from the penal side. It is not up to me to judge the legal and penal side of the matter. There exists our police directorate office for that purpose, the office of investigation, our courts, and so on. Therefore I do not want to express any opinion about whether Mr. Mlynar was at some session when the unreal government of workers and peasants was to be set up—it was for us at that time the symbol of evil, it was the symbol and embodiment of evil for all of us who lived through it. No doubt, the investigators or judges will decide it, prove it, and make some sort of a conclusion on the basis of that. So I would be very glad if these two things were strictly separated.

I have always thought, without striving to get to know details, that Zdenek Mlynar was not among those who intended to form the workers-peasants' government in our country. If he was one of them, it is a very new and surprising piece of information for me. I also have to say that this certainly does not improve his reputation in my eyes; just on the contrary and very much so.

The political context of this matter is really something different. It is a totally different matter to assess whether these things should be dealt with by the courts 25 or 27 years after they happened. In this matter, my attitude is somehow softer. Personally, I would not embark on this. [passage omitted]

Culture Minister Submits State Language Bill

AU2211081995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 16 Nov 95 p 5

["From" speech by Slovak Culture Minister Ivan Hudec to the Slovak Parliament in Bratislava on 15 November while presenting the government-sponsored bill on the state language: "Czech Movies Will Not Have To Be Dubbed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitution of the Slovak Republic unequivocally prescribes the institution [institut] of a state language. This bill therefore fulfills a constitutional prerequisite that the existing law on the official language does not fulfill. The use of minority languages is currently regulated by a total of 34 legal norms, including the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The use of the state language is not being regulated by a cohesive legal norm that would govern, independently of the use of minority and foreign languages, this important sphere of our legal system.

Dvorsky Will Be Able To Sing in Italian

It is a basic law defining the framework [for the use of Slovak as the state language], which cannot have, and does not have, the ambition to address every detail. The Ministry of Culture is the central body of state administration, within the jurisdiction of which it is to administer this law and to issue regulations for enacting it. A slew of unbelievable information has appeared in the press, for example, that Peter Dvorsky [opera singer] will not be able to sing Italian arias. This is nonsense. A cultural event conducted in the state language does not rule out the use of another language. It is necessary to read the bill as it is written. Likewise, it is being asserted that all Czech movies will have to be dubbed. The bill states that the use of the law on television [as published] or in audiovisual means will be in the state language or in some other manner meeting the requirement of comprehensibility. This is a clearly formulated definition, the interpretation of which will depend on the regulations for enacting it. If, in its Article 34, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic allows a citizen of the Slovak Republic belonging to a linguistic minority to use his mother tongue in dealings with the authorities, let him use it. This law, however, will oblige him to use the state language as well.

The bill on the state language is also motivated by the endeavor to eliminate the shortcomings of existing legal regulations in this sphere, and to establish conformity with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and with the latest legal regulations and international norms.

The Slovak National Council Law No. 428 of 25 October 1990 on the official language in the Slovak Republic is halfhearted and inconsistent. It considers Slovak to be merely the official language. In contravention of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak nation, it also acknowledges a second, auxiliary, official language — Czech.

This is reflected also in the encyclopedia issued by Harvard University where, under the section Slovakia, Czech is listed as the official language. This runs counter to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, which, in Article 6, establishes Slovak as the state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

The Law Respects Minorities

The life and personal development of each citizen of the Slovak Republic presupposes the right to freely communicate and to express himself in a way that will guarantee the settlement of all his matters in dealings with state agencies and with all institutions satisfying his everyday needs. The means of this communication is language that the citizen has thoroughly mastered, and in which he is able to express himself in a way required by methods and forms of mutual contacts inevitable for the complete comprehension of the spoken and written word and for reading written texts. In other words, the law defends the interests of the citizen and the consumer. The state, as the guarantor of the free life and development of the citizen, is under the obligation to establish prerequisites for each citizen to master a language that will allow him to communicate throughout the state territory. It therefore organizes the system of education and the system of state administration and self-administration so as to establish generally suitable conditions for securing the communication needs of citizens, regardless of their linguistic appurtenance [jazykova prislusnost]. Offices, institutions, and corporations of all kinds active in state, social, and civic life, regardless of who is their founder, must therefore establish conditions and prerequisites for being able to communicate in the state language verbally and in writing, and for being able to execute all their tasks in a manner corresponding to the rules of literary Slovak and its usage. This fully applies also to the equipment and aids they use, which must preserve the generally valid linguistic norms and must correspond to the laws and culture of Slovak as the state language.

Coalition Partners Reject Call To Disobey Law

AU2111132795 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by TASR: "Laszlo Nagy: State Based on the Rule of Law Is Being Built in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banska Bystrica — According to an MTI report, Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray said in Pecs on Thursday, 16 November, that a "fascist law need not be observed," and that he intends to propose to the parties of the Hungarian Coalition that they not observe the Slovak language law, but consciously reject and violate it. Asked whether they would accept Duray's proposal, Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] Chairman Laszlo Nagy and Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] Chairman Bela Bugar, who participated in the NOVEMBER '95 rally in Banska Bystrica yesterday, said that they cannot agree with the proposal.

According to Laszlo Nagy, a state based on the rule of law, and a democratic and open society, are being built in Slovakia, in which basic human rights and freedoms, including the rights of national and ethnic minorities, are being respected. "If we want to build a state based on the rule of law, we must make use of legal means of protest and resort to non-legal means only in a state of extreme threat," the MOS chairman stressed. [passage omitted] It is necessary to use means such as the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic and international bodies and institutions, including the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. "Therefore, I would not speak about any extreme possibilities, as Miklos Duray did," Laszlo Nagy said.

MKDH Chairman Bela Bugar agreed with the view of his coalition partner. At the same time he voiced the conviction that it would be possible to change the law by legal means before it comes into effect. He termed the language law anti-constitutional and in contravention of international norms accepted by the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted] He agreed with Laszlo Nagy's view that changes can be achieved only through the Constitutional Court or the court in Strasbourg. The MKDH chairman expects in Slovakia a development similar to that in France, where the Constitutional Court abolished anti-constitutional articles.

Commentary Examines Passage of Language Law

AU2211080495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Nov 95 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Samel: "Language Law Passed, Problems Remain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a parliamentary battle of almost 13 hours, National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputies approved the law on the state language of the Slovak Republic. The setting was provided by a rally of citizens armed with national flags and streamers. Despite a massive campaign on television and by the Slovak Heritage Foundation, it was more meaningful to count the crowd in tens than in hundreds. The law's passage was greeted with applause and the singing of hymns, but many problems have remained open, and it is certain that they can still easily cause many headaches.

Already the chaotic course of the bill's drafting, marked by a great number of versions and by discussions in parliamentary committees, where deputies were handed out only the law's principles, while the bill's sponsors were basing their arguments on the article-by-article wording of the draft, indicated that the preparation of this law did not exactly follow the standard procedure. The submission of around 160 proposals for modification, too, testified in a certain way to the quality of the bill. The bill has also been significantly politicized. The problem of a language law in a country with a compact minority representing 11 percent of the population, a minority with whose ethnic group the majority nation does not have the best historical experience, is in itself a political issue. While the sponsors of the bill claimed that the purpose of the law was to protect the Slovak language, and sharply protested against politicizing a practical problem, the frequent recollections of the pre-1918 period of Hungarian oppression in the explanatory report must have prompted the Hungarian deputies to ask whether the law did not, after all, pursue yet another intention, to "solve" the usage of their mother tongue. The bill provided for the cancellation of the previous law on the official language, which permitted the usage of the minorities' languages in dealings with the authorities in communities in which the ethnic minority represents at least 20 percent of the population. The new law did not provide any compensation, and has found itself in European bodies. The conflicting reports on the Council of Europe's position on the bill did nothing to calm the situation.

Hence, the bill landed before parliament as a strongly politicized issue, and the coalition deputies expected sharp resistance to it also from the Slovak opposition. This expectation did not materialize, however, because many opposition members declared that the passage of the law on the state language was an act provided for in the Constitution. Therefore, the question became what kind of a law on the state language the NRSR would adopt. In the debate, several problems were successfully eliminated that restricted even the development of the Slovak language, particularly the provision on the universal use of its codified form; some provisions restricting in an absurd way the use of other languages, in church wedding ceremonies, for example; as well as outright absurdities that would bar, for example, the presentation of foreign-language works of music. On the other hand, a general provision has been successfully incorporated allowing the use of foreign-language terms if no equivalent exists in the state language. Without this provision, medical workers, for example, would have been in immense trouble.

The problem of the law's conformity with the Constitution and with international documents remained open. This concerns precisely the most heavily politicized issue — the use of minority languages in official communication. The passage of the law has undeniably created a legislative vacuum, in defiance of the fact that, as everything seems to indicate, a law on the use of the languages of ethnic minorities is being prepared, as provided for in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Such a law simply does not exist today, and its shape is a big unknown. The passage of the law has far from closed the political problem, which can be expected to assume a very specific dimension. Ultimately, the law will probably be dealt with by the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament and the Hungarian Government, too, have manifested their interest in becoming involved in the problem. The problem could have been at least mitigated if parliament accepted one of the modifying proposals, under which the law on the state language was to go into effect simultaneously with the law on the use of minority languages. The present legal situation can be understood as placing members of ethnic minorities in a position of inequality, which, once again, is testing the limits of the Constitution.

One problem that will plague everyone are the sanctions (of up to 500,000 korunas) that will be meted out by the Ministry of Culture with regard to the seriousness of the breach of law. Despite the inclusion of a certain "brake" in the form of the possibility of eliminatig the unlawful state before the ministry resorts to imposing a fine, it is obvious that the vague formulation of the system of sanctions creates room not only for corruption but also for the settling of accounts and for all kinds of pressures, given the fact that the law covers also the mass media sphere.

Far from all the deputies who voted for the bill were satisfied with its shape. No doubt a significant factor determining the decision of many of them was the choice of a lesser evil compared with the public declaration of a stand that some would like to qualify as anti-Slovak.

Meciar Addresses OECD on Economy, EU Demarche

AU2111183895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Nov 95 pp 1, 17

[Report by Jan Skoda: "In Slovakia as in the West, in 2010 at the Latest"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Paris — The main purpose of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's visit to the French capital was to participate in the annual UNESCO conference and to address the OECD Council. [passage omitted]

According to Meciar's words, negotiations on Slovakia's entry into the OECD could start after the OECD Council of Ministers meeting in May or June 1996, and should be over by the end of next year at the latest. The Slovak prime minister stressed that the introduction of the full convertibility of the Slovak koruna and the passage of the new foreign exchange law are prerequisites for the fulfillment of the practical criteria of membership. The Slovak Republic could become a full-fledged OECD member in early 1997.

Vladimir Meciar addressed the OECD Council at length on the positive results of the Slovak economy. "Our aim is to create a pro-investment climate because, even though the present privatization policy supports the establishment of a domestic middle class of owners, these new owners will not make do without foreign capital...," he said, and admitted the low level of foreign investment in the Slovak Republic. He went on to say that his government's strategic aim was to lay the foundations for a policy that will make the performance of our economy comparable with the performance of the advanced Western economies "by the year 2010 at the latest." He also touched upon domestic political issues: "Yes, we do have internal conflicts, which are rooted in a good, albeit not perfect, Constitution." In connection with the EU demarche, he added: "We believe, however, that, given the demanding nature of tasks, encouragement from our partners would be far more productive than the simple pinpointing of shortcomings or even the denial of our abilities and possibilities, which also crops up here and there."

A candid tone dominated the discussion with ambassadors of the OECD member countries represented on its Council. Magda Pospisilova, the prime minister's spokeswoman, provided information on its contents. The Government of the Slovak Republic accepted [prijala] the EU demarche, but it has reservations about the method of communication. Meciar's government regards the demarche method as assuming the position in favor of one side, which has a counterproductive effect on Slovak citizens in relation to the process of the Slovak Republic's integration into the EU. Regarding the conflict with the president, Vladimir Meciar said that the Slovak Republic's attitude toward the EU cannot be founded on a person. He also replied to a question concerning the Democratic Union's petition sheets. According to him, nothing has been decided in this matter, which is why he considers the EU's involvement in this matter premature. The ambassadors of the OECD countries were also interested in questions concerning the position of the Hungarian minority, privatization, and conditions for foreign investment in Slovakia. According to Vladimir Meciar, the privatization of state enterprises will end by May 1996. Four major financial institutions should be privatized by the end of January 1996 — Vseobecna Uverova Banka [General Credit Bank], Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], Slovenska Sporitelna [Slovak Savings Bank], and Investicna Rozvojova Banka [Investment and Development Bank]. Vladimir Meciar also dissociated himself from the [1939-1945] Slovak state. In the afternoon, Vladimir Meciar spoke at the ceremonial meeting of UNESCO held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its founding. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 18 November on page 4 carries a 600-word commentary by Jan Skoda on Prime Minister Meciar's visit to France, entitled "Suspected Associations." Speaking about Meciar's speech to the OECD ambassadors, Skoda observes: "In this unusually balanced speech, which many leaders of his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia would have probably torn to pieces, Vladimir Meciar indicated that he also knows where he is making mistakes. He conceded, for example, that so-called strategic companies have been excluded from privatization, but at the same time he voiced the assurance that we are not opposed to their privatization at a later stage. Or he said that he is aware of the unsuitable commodity structure of exports, which will 'reach its limits relatively soon,' and stressed the essential need for investments in economic modernization. And so on."]

SNS: Demarches Drafted at 'Western Embassy'

AU2111183295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by "ao": "No Contest of Brains in Parliament Thus Far"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava — During the parliamentary debate on the government-sponsored bill on the state language, Vitazoslav Moric, honorary chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS], came up with the assertion that the October demarches of the EU and the United States expressing concern over political developments in Slovakia "were made at a certain Western embassy in Prague, in the presence of Bugar, Schmognerova, Simko, Knazko, and Dzurinda." Because Slovak Television terminated its live relay at the moment when opposition deputies were refuting this assertion, yesterday we asked some of them when they visited Prague the last time.

Brigita Schmognerova (Party of the Democratic Left) said that she last visited Prague half a year ago, and therefore could not have participated last month in the drafting of any demarches. [passage omitted]

Ivan Simko's (Christian Democratic Movement) last trip to the Czech capital was in summer 1994 for an official visit as deputy prime minister. Since the founding of the independent Slovak Republic he has not been to any embassy. [passage omitted]

Bela Bugar (Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement) was in Prague as Federal Assembly deputy two or three years ago. He has not visited Prague since. He regrets very much that it is possible to lie and mislead in the National Council, as SNS representative Moric did on Wednesday [15 November]. [passage omitted]

Editorial: EP Democracy No Model for Slovakia

AU2111180895 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Nov 95 p 1

[Editorial by Anna Korimova; from the "Public Matter" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Political groups in the European Parliament [EP] fear that democracy and human rights in Slovakia are threatened. The approved law on the state language paralyzed them completely. When they recovered from this paralysis, they approved a resolution draft.

Slovakia, consider yourself fortunate!

In Strasbourg they tremble like an aspen leaf for your community. Had it not been for the resolution, we would not even know that our democracy is in a tight spot. We thought that democracy was the people's rule. Alas, this is an error. Democracy is when someone commits fraud and the law turns a blind eye to it. Democracy is the ability to give up one's mother tongue and the readiness to use in one's own country the languages of all the countries of the world represented in the United Nations. Democracy becomes 100 percent democracy only when the election winner passes the scepter of power to the opposition, which, poor little thing, could not get enough votes from the voters.

The democrats in the EP have only one legal obligation — to approve the EU's budget every year. For the rest of the year, they could be basking in the sun on all of the world's beaches. They do not. They prefer to fight for our democracy. Needlessly, Messrs. EP deputies! In Slovakia, we are not going to take you as our model. We do not want to perform nuclear tests. We like it cold, and are not going to set fire to the homes of foreigners living in our country. We are not going to punish politicians who take bribes, but those who do not take them. We are not going to observe the rights of minorities, but we will all learn to speak Hungarian, just as the Germans have learned to speak Turkish and Englishmen to speak French.

Messrs. deputies, you will not succeed in hammering into our heads your idea of democracy. We want to be free at long last. And only he who is his own master is free. Those who do not want to be their own masters can move to your countries. We are not going to prevent them from doing so, nor shall we give them advice. We believe that commanding someone is undemocratic, despite the fact that, in your opinion, we do not have the slightest idea what democracy is.

[On the same day, in the "Commentary of the Week" column on page 3, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA carries an 800-word commentary by Jergus Ferko reviewing the preceding week's events. The commentary includes the following passage on the EP resolution: "Because, once again, the National Council of the Slovak Republic had the audacity to decide on something as a sovereign parliament, a previously prepared storm was immediately unleashed (after all, the 14 Hungarian Coalition deputies did not run their feet off in vain recently getting to Strasbourg). The EP's scandalous resolution, organized by the Hungarian and Magyarized [madaronsky] core of the Slovak opposition, demonstrated once again how susceptible the West — our alleged teacher of democracy — is to viewing Slovakia through the optic of political racism. The resolution also bears witness to the continuing incompetent interference in our internal affairs through the infamous method 'about us, without us' being used in the contemporary 'demarchiades' [demarsiady]."]

'Lobbying' Fails To Avert EP Resolution

AU2111133495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Nov 95 pp 1, 17

[Report by "lm": "European Parliament Approved Resolution on Observance of Democracy in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Jozef Sestak Was 'Lobbying'

Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, met a number of European Parliament [EP] deputies yesterday in an effort to ensure that the EP not consider the draft resolution expressing concern over the development of the situation in the Slovak Republic. "We approached a number of deputies from the Socialist and Liberal groups," Jozef Sestak stated. Together with the Slovak Republic's ambassador to the EU, Jozef Sestak also appeared before the EP delegation that will form the joint 23-member parliamentary committee between the EU and the Slovak Republic. "We explained that this resolution is not in order, regarding both its contents and the procedural aspect. As regards the procedural aspect, a situation similar to that of the demarches is emerging. Instead of the other side being heard out, instead of a dialogue being conducted, we have here a damning resolution." He said that it did not make any sense to issue a resolution critical toward Slovakia only a few days prior to the meeting in Bratislava of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, at which EP deputies could ask questions.

Regarding the contents of the resolution, the state secretary voiced serious reservations about the text, in which there are great inaccuracies as well as assertions contrary to the truth.

Asked about the assessment in Strasbourg of the fact that Common Choice and Democratic Union deputies had voted for the language law, Jozef Sestak said that a number of EP deputies were surprised and startled by this. "They were under the influence of Hungarian political parties, and some EP deputies really lent credence to their argumentation, which is, once again, nonobjective and unreliable. Stating, as the draft resolution does, that the new law on the state language bars 11 percent of the population from using the mother tongue cannot but be called a lie," he said.

Finance Minister on Fulfillment of State Budget

LD2111140795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Interview with Slovak Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik by Ivan Bielko in Bratislava — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar opened in Bratislava this morning the 47th meeting of the Slovak Government. Its agenda includes, for example, a report on the fulfillment of the state budget. [passage omitted] Ivan Bielko reports from the government office:

[Bielko] Good morning. The cabinet has so far discussed a report on the fulfillment of the state budget of the Slovak Republic for the first three quarters of this year. The report was presented by Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, who is in the studio with us. Mr. Kozlik, what is the situation as to the fulfillment of the state budget?

[Kozlik] The government discussed today the state budget situation up to 30 September. It noted good fulfillment — that means on the side of expenditure there are even certain reserves, which are the result of regulation measures. As to incomes, there is a certain increase, and the overall deficit is 2.9 billion crowns, but this deficit also reflects clearing.

[Bielko] There are rumors that a collapse in the supply of medicines looms if the health department does not receive more funds. Are you thinking about redistributing funds so that the health department gets more?

[Kozlik] Talking about this year, the government's aim is to solve the debt situation in health care. On the one hand, we want to solve part of the debt directly from the current budget. I am signing today, on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, an agreement with the General Health Insurance Company [Vseobecna zdravotna pojistovna] where approximately 611 million crowns will be given to health care to eliminate some problems as to obligations in the supply of medicines. Further steps will be taken after signing the agreement on clearing obligations with the Czech Republic. This agreement is in the last stages of preparation, we have the verified text from both sides. It should be an intergovernmental agreement, and the Czech side should pay, within 15 days of signing, three quarters of the clearing balance — that is, approximately 3.5 billion crowns out of the 5 billion crowns — to the account of the state budget of the Slovak Republic.

[Bielko] The last quarter of the year will probably be the most demanding as to state budget expenditure. What deficit do you envisage at the end of the year?

[Kozlik] To mention topical data, the state budget income yesterday was 137 billion crowns and expenditure 144 billion crowns, expenditure being 86 percent. Incomes have been overfulfilled by approximately 93.8 percent. This indicates that we can maintain the expenditure side of the budget. As to the income side, overfulfilment is envisaged. We assume that the overall state budget should fare better than originally expected. [passage omitted]

Prosecutor Asks Kovac To Deny Remark on Judiciary

AU2111173295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by TASR: "Michal Valo: Judiciary Has Not Slipped Out of Parliamentary Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava — In a statement issued yesterday, Michal Valo, prosecutor general of the Slovak Republic, voiced the conviction that Slovak President Michal Kovac did not utter the sentence published in an interview in the Austrian daily SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN on 15 November 1995 that "the judiciary has slipped out of parliamentary control and the state prosecutor is answerable directly to the prime minister." Michal Valo states that the legal position of the judiciary and the prosecutor's office has not changed in any way since the last elections. Judges continue to be elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], in conformity with the relevant articles of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the prosecutor general is appointed and recalled by the president of the Slovak Republic at the proposal of the NRSR. Michal Valo notes that the Austrian daily indirectly accused the president of the Slovak Republic of "purposefully, grossly slandering his own state abroad." If Michal Kovac fails to protest against these assertions, he will concede that the Austrian newspaper was right.

Defense Minister Hails Dayton Agreement

LD2111205195 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We telephoned Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti not long before our program. We asked him about the peace agreement, which has been reassuring to the whole world.

[Begin recording] [Keleti] First of all, we have to emphasize the Americans' effort in reaching this comprehensive agreement. The agreement is expected to be signed at around 2100 Hungarian time.

This agreement and its signing will put an end to a very, very long period, which, we hope, means that a final solution will come about and the conflicts will cease to exist, and that a situation will arise which will create an administration instead of guaranteeing cease-fire under the shadow of arms and will provide a peaceful atmosphere in which Bosnia's reconstruction can also commence.

[Correspondent] I think Hungary will have an important role in reconstruction.

[Keleti] We hope so, because the Hungarian Republic has suffered losses of more than $2 billion in the past few years because it has consistently observed the embargo. Thus, we hope that the international support arriving in the region now will give Hungary the opportunity to participate in this reconstruction, which would also facilitate the recovery of the Hungarian economy. [end recording]

EU Official Reports Hungary Progressing 'Well'

AU2211130095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 21 Nov 95 p 11

[Unattributed report on interview with Hans Beck, head of the Budapest office of the European Commission; place and date not given: "Hungary Is Advancing Well Toward Integration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since becoming an associate member, Hungary has taken a lot of steps that some new EU members have only targeted as goals to be achieved in the transitional period after joining the organization, Hans Beck told us. For example, customs are being gradually abolished between Hungary and the European Union even before Hungary joins the organization, although this is an asymmetrical process because Hungary can only follow the European Union in abolishing customs duties with a certain delay. However, Spain for example, only started abolishing customs after joining the European Union.

Hans Beck thinks it is important that the private sector in Hungary already provides more than 60 percent of the GDP, because this is a sign of market economy development. About two-thirds of Hungary's foreign trade takes place with the EU, while there are EU members that have not yet reached this percentage. Hans Beck appreciated the Hungarian Government's five-year legal harmonization program that includes a separate three-year program dealing with the so-called domestic market legal harmonization. This is particularly important because the European Union is actually a legal community. Hungary adopted more than 15 laws this year that take the EU proposals into consideration, Hans Beck told us, and mentioned the recent customs law. Speaking about the fact that foreign investors are criticizing this customs law, Hans Beck said that Hungary can freely decide on the customs duty concessions to foreign investors. This will only change after Hungary becomes a full member, because then Hungary will have to adhere to the rules in force in the European Union.

At its summit in Copenhagen in 1993, the EU set out the task of ensuring that new members are economically competitive with the old, Beck said in response to the claim that, although formally there are no economic conditions for EU membership, most debate is on the costs for accepting new members. From this point of view, it is a good sign that, according to the survey of the Trade and Industry Chamber in Budapest, half of the enterprises already feel themselves to be competitive, and only 2 percent of the enterprises feel that they need more than five years to prepare for EU membership. EU membership is mostly a political issue, however, rather than an economic one. Therefore, one should not complicate the decision by speculating about the costs. Besides, it is impossible to precisely forecast the expenses. For example, Germany pays more into the EU than it gets back, but no one deals with the profit Germany makes from the single European market. Therefore, economic adjustment is important, but it is not the most important issue of integration—Hans Beck concluded his interview.

Tabajdi Interviewed on Various Minority Issues

AU2211084995 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 18 Nov 95 pp 55-56

[Interview with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary in charge of national minority issues, by Istvan Riba; place and date not given: "The Basic Treaty Might Lose Its Value"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Csaba Tabajdi (43 years old), political state secretary in charge of national minority* *issues, and parliamentary deputy of the Hungarian Socialist Party, sees it as a trap situation that while the West urges the settlement of relations between Hungary and its neighbors, it is not sensitive enough to the legal violations afflicting the minorities. Tabajdi still supports the idea that the minorities in Hungary should have their own parliamentary deputy.*

[Riba] During the Horn government, laws that are disadvantageous for the local Hungarians have been brought to Romania, and the language law afflicting the Hungarians is before parliament in Slovakia. Is it the Hungarian Government's attitude—which is more conciliatory than its predecessor's—which is encouraging the neighbors? What can be achieved, for example, at tete-a-tete meetings like the one held last Friday [10 November] between Prime Minister Horn and Slovak Prime Minister Meciar?

[Tabajdi] In Berlin, Horn indicated more firmly than ever before that he considered the language law unacceptable. I would rather say we have a policy of negotiations. This is necessary to form good-neighborly relations, and also because of the European integration's requirements, although it certainly creates tensions in Hungarian foreign policy because, while we are striving for a settlement through negotiations, this is only shown in words, rather than deeds, at some of our neighbors. However, it would also be incorrect to show overt toughness because we have very limited means with which we can exert pressure on our Slovak or Romanian partners.

[Riba] What kind of receptivity does the West have toward the national minority problems of our region?

[Tabajdi] The West is constantly warning us and our neighbors to settle our relations. This is a rather dishonest attitude, as if we and our neighbors had to cover the same distance. At any rate, if the West finds that conciliation is not progressing at the correct pace than this can undermine our euro-atlantic integration. At the same time, it has to be seen that we cannot sacrifice the Hungarians living beyond the border in the interest of integration. This is not the point, anyway: We must handle the national minority issue in accord with our integration goals. If the views of political forces which consider euro-atlantic integration primary and the Hungarians over the border secondary in Hungarian foreign policy come to the forefront, then there is a danger that these Hungarians will become radicalized or they will resettle in Hungary. We should find a system of arguments with which we could achieve a change of attitude in the West. I would find it absolutely necessary to set up a lobbying network among West-European decision-makers, university lecturers, journalists, and scientific researchers. Actually, a slight change of emphasis can be felt nowadays in U.S. foreign policy and they are talking about the possibility of achieving a certain kind of autonomy in the region.

[Riba] However, our neighbors do not even want to hear of national minority autonomy, not even cultural or local governmental, never mind territorial autonomy! According to Hungarian opposition circles, the government does not support the establishment of autonomies, and Horn did not even mention this at his last talks in Belgrade. Or if he did then we do not know the answer.

[Tabajdi] As I was present, I can testify that he clearly talked about it. The Hungarian Government has to champion the autonomy demands because, in the European countries where the national minority issue seems to be solved, the minorities were given autonomy. It is true, though, that the establishment of autonomy as such is not mentioned in any European document of legal value, all they say is that autonomy "can be given."

[Riba] We managed to have the Council of Europe's Recommendation No. 1201, which contains the right to autonomy, included in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. However, the Slovak Government, contrary to the spirit of the basic treaty, keeps bringing measures against the Hungarian minority. In the light of this, was it worthwhile making the basic treaty?

[Tabajdi] The signing and the ratification of the basic treaty can be accepted both as a historical direction and an actual document. With the draft state language law, the Slovaks are undoubtedly violating the letter and the spirit of the basic treaty. If we cannot stop these deteriorating tendencies within a year, then the basic treaty might lose its value. Bilateral economic cooperation would become more intensive in vain because this will not counterbalance the serious legal violations committed against the minority Hungarians; these are not comparable categories.

[Riba] Last year you said that the former government gave ambiguous support, based on party and personal sympathies, to the Hungarians over the border. For example, the questions surrounding the money sent to Vojvodina created much stir. Have you managed to make the allocation of funds clearer by now?

[Tabajdi] Indeed, it almost took nine months before we managed to forward the Vojvodina funds to their original destination. However, the case of a Transylvanian politician having to return two properties to its rightful owner, namely, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian], still has not been closed. An agreement in principle has already been achieved. We have changed the organization of the Illyes Foundation, which supports Hungarians living abroad by 300 million forints [Ft] from the central budget, and in whose board of trustees all six parliamentary parties are represented; Budapest only supervises it and the funds are allocated by the locally set up boards of trustees. In the board of trustees of the new Handshake Foundation, we gathered people who are skilled in management. The reason is that one-third of the Ft200 million entrusted to this public foundation has profit considerations. It is typical of the attitude of Hungarians over the border that when a Transylvanian company was only given two combine harvesters on rent, this was criticized at high level in the RMDSZ. Unfortunately, it is also true that this year's Ft1.2-billion support given to the Hungarians beyond the border will be 30 percent less in real value next year.

[Riba] Minorities in Hungary are also complaining about the decreasing real value of support and, in addition to this, every local national minority self-government has only received Ft114,000 in support from the state this year. Can they function at all like this?

[Tabajdi] Some self-moderation would not harm the leaders of the national minority self-governments because almost all budgetary items will lose real value next year and their support is in fact an exception. The funds earmarked for national and ethnic minority support in Hungary—disregarding education—is 486 million more next year than the 1995 supplementary budget allocation. The Finance Ministry indeed suggested that it would grant the Ft300 million of assets due to the national self-governments on the basis of the national minority law in a different form, but this has been taken off the agenda by now. The Ft300 million will probably be given to the minorities in the form of shares of a successful company. A perception of lack of money might have appeared in the local minority self-governments because, in the past, they only received money for their operational costs and not for their activities, as the public foundation to distribute money for the latter has only just been set up. In many places, the minority governments' operational costs have also been supplemented by the local governments. The problems mostly appear in the provinces, in small settlements.

[Riba] Very few minority schools now have education in the language of the national minority. Do you think that this is leading to a rapid assimilation of the national minorities?

[Tabajdi] Education in the language of the national minority is a key issue in stopping assimilation. We have few teachers, and infrastructural problems also exist, but the biggest problem is that parents are reluctant to put their children into a school where all education is in the language of the national minority—they consider learning English, for example, more important than learning the minority language.

[Riba] Is this not what the Hungarian parents living in the neighboring countries also believe?

[Tabajdi] Parents there also want their children to speak the language of the state and other European languages, but not to the detriment of the mother tongue. To achieve the above goal it is not necessary to make education based on the Hungarian mother tongue wither away. Bilingualism or multilingualism based on the mother tongue's dominance is ideal. This can be achieved if the political will exists.

[Riba] When you were member of the opposition, you demanded that the minorities should have parliamentary deputies, the lack of which was a violation of the Constitution through absence. Are you still doing this now, as member of the government?

[Tabajdi] I have continued to press for it. We made modest progress at the six-party consultations: Deputies of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party are already willing to accept the principle of guaranteed mandates. Unfortunately, the Alliance of Free Democrats, which voted against the bill in early 1994, is still against this solution, which it considers alien to the system. The Hungarian political elite will sooner or later have to find a satisfying solution to this important issue.

Opposition Criticizes Slovak Language Law

AU2111101795 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 18 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by Miklos Ujvari: "The Opposition on Government's Responsibility—Csoti Would Recall the Hungarian Ambassador From Bratislava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am bewildered"—Gyorgy Csoti told us. According to the foreign affairs spokesman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], since the signing of the basic treaty with Slovakia, one has been witnessing an attempt in Slovakia to legislate laws that contradict it before the ratification of the treaty. "It is unfortunate that the Slovak Government is advancing in a direction opposite the one that European integration would outline for it"—Csoti said and added that not only the ethnic Hungarians are in danger, but also the Slovak system of democratic institutions. "The Slovak Government is conducting a nationalist, and even chauvinistic policy"—Csoti pointed out.

According to Csoti, it was a mistake to sign the basic treaty, because Meciar's government program clearly showed that it did not intend to improve the situation of ethnic Hungarians living there. "We were right: the signing of the basic treaty occurred in order to gain momentary situation advantages. Now, the Hungarian Government could consider recalling our ambassador from Bratislava"—Csoti said. Gyorgy Csoti participated at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the European Democratic Union in Vienna on 19 November, a meeting that condemned the legislation of the new Slovak language law.

Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], blamed both the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty and the Hungarian Government for the legislation of the Slovak language law. According to Torgyan, the language law directly originates from the basic treaty, because this encouraged the anti-Hungarian actions. "We clearly forecast that the signing and ratification of the basic treaty would lead to the tragedy of the Hungarian nation"—Torgyan pointed out and said that several ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Subcarpathia also admitted that the situation of the ethnic Hungarians has changed very sadly since the signing of the basic treaties. "With the basic treaty, the government 'dwarfed' the possibilities of Hungarian resistance"—Torgyan said, and claimed that the Hungarian Government should now take much firmer steps, because its policy is late and has led to uncertainty in the region. "The FKGP will talk openly in front of the parliament on the concrete steps that must be taken in this situation"—Jozsef Torgyan pointed out.

According to Zsolt Nemeth, deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], the legislation of this language law is a sad moment in the history of East-Central Europe. "This law is a kin of the Jewish laws adopted in Hungary in the thirties"—Zsolt Nemeth pointed out. According to him, the legislation of this law seriously means that the Hungarian Government's neighborhood and minority policy has failed. In Zsolt Nemeth's view, the Hungarian Government could now initiate the abolition of the basic treaty and could also ask the European Union to enact sanctions against Slovakia. "With the stabilization agreement, the European Union accepted political guarantees for the implementation of basic treaties. Contrary to the Council of Europe, to whom the Hungarian Government intends to turn, the European Union provides credits and support to Slovakia, so only this organization is capable of exercising pressure on Slovakia"—Zsolt Nemeth said and added: "If the government fails to take these steps, it is not changing its current policy, a policy that, according to the FIDESZ, has failed. In that case, it is to be feared that the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders will 'get into a different orbit' and the consequences of this are unforeseeable."

According to Sandor K. Keresztes, parliamentary deputy of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], by adopting this language law, Slovakia continues to build the concept of a national state. According to Keresztes, in advancing toward European unity, it is a pity to go through this obsolete station.

"Obviously, the vote was urgent because they wanted to present a fait accompli to the world public opinion before the ratification of the basic treaty"—Keresztes claimed. In his view, however, according to the Vienna Convention, if it is signed, an international agreement is valid even before ratification, so legislative acts that contradict the accepted basic treaty cannot be made in the meantime. "We abstained in parliament at the ratification of the basic treaty and what we feared has now come true. When the Hungarian Human Rights Committee received the Slovak bill in Komarom, we saw that it was surprisingly anti-Hungarian. It is some compensation for us that the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement abstained in the voting procedure. According to the KDNP, referring to the basic treaty, the Hungarian Government must protest the language law in the relevant international forums"—Sandor Keresztes told us.

Multiparty Talks Held

LD2111215895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Another round of six-party coordination talks took place today on possible Hungarian steps following the passing of the Slovak language law. It was said at the meeting that during the remaining weeks of the year, the prime minister and the foreign minister wish to speak at 10 international forums in protest against the language law, which is disadvantageous for the minorities. Erno Kardos reports.

[Kardos] It is important to act against the Slovak language law in a European manner because the international organizations can enforce the assertion of the rights of Hungarians living in the minority and ensure that the restrictive measures are changed, the foreign minister said. [passage omitted]

Gyorgy Csoti of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] welcomed the six-party meeting, and urged the government to recall the ambassador to Bratislava, a serious signal in international diplomacy. According to Csoti, the issue of Hungarians living outside the border cannot be subordinated to the policy of good-neighborliness.

Laszlo Kovacs welcomed the cooperation efforts of the MDF and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. However, he doubts that a foreign policy decision can be reached in the matter with a six-party consensus because of the attitude of the Smallholders and the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]. The government will, however, contact the international organizations concerned in the matter, he said.

Sides Reach Agreement at Ohio Peace Talks

'Main Points' Summarized

AU2111212895 Paris AFP in English 2044 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Nov 21 (AFP) — Here are the main points of the Bosnian peace agreement reached here Tuesday between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The accord is outlined in an umbrella document, 11 annexes and 102 maps:

— Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved as a single state within its present borders and with international recognition. It will be governed by a federal constitution and endowed with a two-chamber parliament, a constitutional court, a presidency, a single currency and central bank.

— The Bosnian state will be made up of two entities: a Moslem-Croat Federation with control of 51 percent of Bosnia's territory and a Serb Republic with authority over the remaining 49 percent. The Bosnian Serbs retain control over the eastern towns of Srebrenica and Zepa, as well as Pale where they are headquartered . The Bosnians secured access to the Sava River, which flows into the Danube.

— The capital city of Sarajevo will remain united under the government of the Moslem-Croat federation but the Serbs will have administrative authority over schools and other local services in some districts.

— An overland corridor linking Serb-held lands in eastern and western Bosnia will remain five kilometers (3.1 miles) wide and the future state of the town of Brcko, in the corridor, will be determined by arbitration. This territorial dispute over the so-called Posavina corridor and the status of Brcko were the last issues to be settled before agreement was achieved.

— The presidency and the parliament will be chosen through free, democratic free elections scheduled for some time next year throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and held under international supervision. Voters will be allowed to cast ballots in their original area of residence.

— Refugees will be allowed to return to their homes. People will be able to move freely throughout Bosnia and human rights will be monitored by an independent commission and an internationally trained civilian police force.

— Convicted war criminals will be barred from holding elected office or serving in the military.

— The accord provides for the deployment of 60,000 peacekeeping troops under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. During the term of their mandate, the peacekeepers will help defend the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

— Serbia recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina and an exchange of ambassadors will follow.

— The United States agrees to introduce a resolution at the United Nations Security Council calling for the suspension of economic sanctions against former Yugoslavia and lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Izetbegovic Interviewed on Details

LD2111234895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon, at the U.S. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, after 21 days of negotiations, reached a peace agreement which guarantees the international sovereignty and unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders. The existence of a single government, parliament, and presidency is envisaged, and Sarajevo will be a united city under the control of the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An agreement has been reached on the organization of free democratic elections, the return of refugees to their homes, and the trials of war criminals.

At the beginnning of the news bulletin, we are broadcasting a telephone interview with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which President Izetbegovic gives more details on the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The interview was conducted by our colleague from Bosnia-Herzegovina Television, Lejla Babovic:

[Begin recording] [Babovic] Mr. President, after a few days of great uncertainty, late this afternoon it was announced that a peace agreement had been reached. What interests us here, above all, is whether we are to withdraw from any territory under the control of the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities.

[Izetbegovic] I think not. From the very start our position has been that we do not withdraw. The boundaries between the entities at most places coincide with the front lines, with the demarcation lines. In some places where we are withdrawing, we are withdrawing to our advantage.

[Babovic] How has the question of the Posavina corridor been resolved? That is, the question of the town of Brcko and the connection between Sarajevo and Gorazde?

[Izetbegovic] As far as the first question is concerned, I can tell you that in the last two days, the uncertainties that you mention had mainly to do with those questions. The negotiations were stalled over the issue of Brcko. Last night they almost failed. Last night when we went to bed, we thought that the negotiations had failed because the Serb side insisted that Brcko must remain a Serb town and that the corridor must be widened. Discussion on these questions lasted for two days and almost literally two nights. The Americans could not help us much because the Serb side was very firm.

Finally, last night we suggested a compromise — that this question alone within the complex of questions to be solved by the peace agreement should remain unresolved for one year, and after a year [?it should go to] international arbitration, which will then suggest a solution to both parties.

[Babovic] Can you tell me how the question of the corridor with Gorazde has been resolved?

[Izetbegovic] Within this agreement, Gorazde will be open with a wide corridor, which at its narrowest point is 8 km wide, and on average is 10 to 15 km wide, sometimes 30 km. Along its southern side it encompasses the town of Ustikolina and crosses to the other side of the River Drina, the right bank of the Drina. A belt of territory remains in our possession — not very wide, but wide enough to enable us to build the two to three planned hydropower plants. So, that is a new piece of land which goes [word indistinct] downstream from Gorazde.

[Babovic] Sarajevo will be unified again.

[Izetbegovic] Sarajevo will remain a unified city. In addition to the areas we hold today, we will get the entire municipality of Ilidza, its largest part. We will get the town of Ilidza and most of the municipality. We will also get Hadzici, Ilijas, and Vogosca.

Therefore, the roads leading north, south — all roads will be reopened. I have to point out that the Olovo-Kladanj road will be reopened. It was closed over a long period of time during the war, but Karadzic's soldiers will now withdraw several kilometers to the east of the road.

[Babovic] Are you satisfied with the way the constitutional principles were resolved?

[Izetbegovic] Perhaps our best results were achieved in that sphere. The state survives as a single country, an integral federal state within internationally recognized borders. It will have a presidency with three members, after elections of course. It will have three presidency members, and two vice presidents. It will also have a government in control of the most important areas. It will have one central bank, and a central monetary institution with a single currency. [words indistinct]

I would just like to add that war criminals will not be able to take part in political life and that they will be prosecuted. A special program for the return of refugees is envisaged. A considerable economic aid package and aid for economic reconstruction is also envisaged. This will be the duty of international donors, and it will probably be organized by the World Bank. The participation of the IMF is envisaged.

We also expect the arrival of NATO forces for the implementation, numbering about 60,000 soldiers, and including an infantry brigade numbering 20,000 troops [words indistinct]. I must stress that they will be deployed throughout the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in the areas controlled by the Bosnian Army, but also in those areas controlled by Karadzic's [word indistinct]. [end recording]

Presidency Announces Referendum

AU2111193195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The state news agency B-H PRESS has obtained the following information about the peace negotiations from the office of President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency:

Last night it seemed that the negotiations would definitely flounder over the problem of Brcko, but early in the morning the U.S. negotiators offered international arbitration for Brcko, which would be reached in a year. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation led by President Izetbegovic could not accept previous demands to give up Brcko. This way, the solution to the Brcko problem has been postponed for a year, when international arbitration will make a decision on this issue. The Bosnian delegation accepted this solution, thus opening up the possibility of an agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The agreement to be signed by the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia contains dozens of pages, a large number of maps, and other material. This agreement provides for territorial links for all the areas under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will not withdraw from any part of its territory. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council will have 51.4 percent of the territory. The aggressor will withdraw from positions around Konjic, while Ilidza, Hadzici, Vogosca, and Ilijas will be returned to the control of the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, as will Sarajevo airport, which implies the lifting of the blockade of our capital city and the establishing of stable land and air traffic. The traffic to the north will also be made easier by the withdrawal of Serb forces from the vicinity of Kladanj and Olovo. According to this agreement, Gorazde and Sarajevo will be linked by a corridor between eight and 15 kilometers wide, and will include Ustikolina.

A bicameral assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the central bank, and a single currency are also a part of this agreement. The signing of this agreement also implies the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina within two or three days of the signing of the agreement and significant economic aid for the country.

The implementation of the agreement will be guaranteed by international forces of 60,000 troops, a third of whom will be Americans. The Serb aggressor's forces will withdraw from Mt. Velez and hand back the TV relay station to be used again.

These are only some of the details of the agreement reached in Dayton. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly will debate it. B-H PRESS has also found out from President Izetbegovic's office that a proposal will be made to hold a referendum on the free territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to consult the people about the solution reached.

Bosnian Serbs React To Ohio Peace Agreement

Serb Defense Minister Praises

LD2211112695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1042 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 Nov — Milan Ninkovic, defense minister in the government of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, has said that the Dayton agreement has deprived the Serbs of some ethnically Serb areas, but this is overshadowed by the signed peace agreement.

"Although I am not familiar with the details of the maps of territorial division, I can say that most Serb areas have been included in the Serb entity, but the Serb side had to make some compromises," Ninkovic said in a statement for the Serb radio Doboj.

He stressed the important role played by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in restoring peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and said that the people of the Serb Republic owe him huge gratitude.

Major Milovan Stankovic, an officer in the Serb Republic army and former commander of the Ozren tactical group, stressed that President Milosevic's role in restoring peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was of immeasurable importance, and that it is a great tribute to him that some ethnically Serb areas, such as the town of Doboj and Mt. Ozren, remained within the Serb entity, or rather, the Serb Republic.

Serb General Praises Milosevic

LD2111222595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2201 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 21 Nov (TANJUG) — Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero, assistant commander of the main headquarters of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army, said in Banja Luka this evening that "peace is something very peaceful, and one should therefore welcome it."

Gvero stressed that at this moment it is important "to do everything to really breathe life into this peace."

Gvero paid tribute to, and congratulated Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "for his persistence in achieving peace and his principled standpoint in the search for a final solution."

Team Member: Accord 'Unfavorable'

LD2111210095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2028 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 21 Nov (SRNA) — An agreement has been reached in Dayton after 21 days of the stop-start peace negotiations, SRNA correspondent Dobrana Radakovic has reported from the Wright-Patterson military base. [passage omitted]

"The plan is very unfavorable for us," a member of the negotiating team of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic stated.

The SRNA correspondent reports from Dayton that last night there was a complete rift between the delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the [Bosnian] Serb Republic over a document which relates to the entry into the Serb Republic of NATO pact forces.

SRNA has learned from reliable sources that at the meeting held last night the delegation of the Serb Republic cast its three votes against the entry of NATO troops into the territory of the Serb Republic, while the FRY delegation cast its three votes in favor of approving the entry of NATO soldiers.

The official minutes record that President Slobodan Milosevic cast his deciding fourth vote in favor of NATO troops entering the territory of the Serb Republic.

According to a statement by a senior official of the Serb Republic, the controversial military document relating to the role of NATO pact troops is unacceptable to the Serb Republic because it freely calls on NATO to occupy the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

Officials of the Serb Republic intend to put the documents, with their imposed solutions, to the Serb Republic Assembly, which will issue a statement setting out its standpoint. [passage omitted]

Plan 'Not Accepted' by Serbs

AU2111212695 Paris AFP in English
2049 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 21 (AFP) — A senior Bosnian Serb official warned late Tuesday [21 November] that the peace accord agreed in Dayton, Ohio does not satisfy "even a minimum" of their demands.

Quoted by the Bosnian Serb official media, "parliamentary speaker" Momcilo Krajisnik said: "The agreement that has been reached does not satisfy even a minimum of our interests. Our delegation has not accepted the plan and we were unanimous on that."

Krajisnik Refuses To Sign Accord

LD2211010195 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian
0000 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegation of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic did not accept the peace plan and did not sign, and will not sign, such maps, nor the agreement itself, the president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, has told SRNA.

The maps are bad and humiliating; they are blackmailing us, and we can only regret that there was not more patience and willingness to allow us to find a better solution, Krajisnik said, adding that the Serb Republic delegation had warned President Milosevic and the other [Serbian] part of the negotiating team that no one had the right to sign the plan, because it gave away much more than was gained.

Our delegation did not attend the meeting at which the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the co-chairmen, and the two other sides reached an agreement on the plan, which did not satisfy even the minimum of our interests and strategic goals adopted by the [Bosnian Serb] assembly, Krajisnik said.

There is no need for panic among the people, because all members of our delegation share this view, and we will inform our citizens and the assembly about it.

Krajisnik Explains Opposition

LD2211064295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
0054 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dayton, 21 Nov (SRNA) — The delegation of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic saw the maps only ten minutes before the final ceremony, and we were not in a situation to give our suggestions on possible corrections, the president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic has told SRNA. "The maps envisage a corridor for Gorazde, and giving most of Serb Sarajevo to the Croat-Muslim entity, which is a grave mistake," Krajisnik said.

"At the beginning of the negotiations we drew a map together with President Milosevic and the other [Serbian] part of the delegation, incorporating Krupa Na Uni [Bosanska Krupa], Sanski Most, [Bosanski] Petrovac, Drvar, Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, and parts of Sipovo and Jajce in the 49 percent of the territory belonging to the Serb Republic. We demanded a 20-kilometer wide corridor in Posavina, and this was reduced to the current width. We solved Gorazde in a satisfactory way, providing for a Muslim link with the rest of their territory," he said.

According to Krajisnik, the delegation of the Serb Republic was later excluded from the map drawing work, and members of the negotiating team were constantly being told that the maps were not complete, that the Americans would propose a solution, and that those taking part in the negotiations would decide on them later.

"When we finally saw the results we said explicitly that no one had the right to accept them on our behalf," Krajisnik said, recalling that the Dayton agreement was only initialed, and that it could only be signed in Paris.

"I have spoken with President Karadzic, and he is the only one who has the authority to empower someone to sign the agreement. The situation is clear — the initials are of no significance if the legal representatives of the Serb Republic do not verify them in Paris, and we will not do that if the basic minimum of Serb interests is not satisfied," he said.

Krajisnik rejected speculation according to which the Serbian president could legitimately adopt decisions on behalf of the Serb Republic, and that the assembly of the Serb Republic was not empowered to annul his decisions.

"This is an attempt to take advantage of an agreement reached with [Serb Orthodox] Patriarch Pavle. President Milosevic is a member of the joint delegation, and his vote is decisive only in the event of a stalemate. He had promised to protect the vital interests of the Serb Republic, such as Podkozarje and Podgrmecje [previously Serb-held areas in western Bosnia], to use his influence to secure the widening of the corridor, and for other goals. That is why we cannot separate rights from responsibilities," Krajisnik said.

Officials of the Serb Republic intend to put the documents, with their imposed solutions, to the Serb Republic Assembly, which will issue a statement setting out its standpoint. [passage omitted]

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"I have spoken with President Karadzic, and he is the only one who has the authority to empower someone to sign the agreement. The situation is clear — the initials are of no significance if the legal representatives of the Serb Republic do not verify them in Paris, and we will not do that if the basic minimum of Serb interests is not satisfied," he said.

Krajisnik rejected speculation according to which the Serbian president could legitimately adopt decisions on behalf of the Serb Republic, and that the assembly of the Serb Republic was not empowered to annul his decisions.

"This is an attempt to take advantage of an agreement reached with [Serb Orthodox] Patriarch Pavle. President Milosevic is a member of the joint delegation, and his vote is decisive only in the event of a stalemate. He had promised to protect the vital interests of the Serb Republic, such as Podkozarje and Podgrmecje [previously Serb-held areas in western Bosnia], to use his influence to secure the widening of the corridor, and for other goals. That is why we cannot separate rights from responsibilities," Krajisnik said.

As far as the deployment of NATO troops in the territory of the Serb Republic is concerned, Krajisnik recalled that only the [Bosnian Serb] People's Assembly is empowered to adopt a decision on this matter. "The three representatives of the Serb Republic voted against, and the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted for their deployment," he said.

"We want peace, we want to find a solution, but no one has the right to sell out the [Bosnian] Serb state. Such a plan can only be adopted by the people at a referendum or possibly by the assembly," Krajisnik said in conclusion.

Serb General Claims French Pilots in 'Safe Place'

LD2111185195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1839 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 21 (TANJUG) — Two French pilots of a NATO plane downed on Aug. 30 near the Bosnian Serb administrative center of Pale are in a safe place, Bosnian Serb Army Gen. Dragomir Milosevic said Tuesday.

For the first time, a Bosnian Serb official thus confirmed that Cap. Frederic Chiffot and Lt. Jose Sauvignet are alive.

The downed plane was participating in NATO's air strikes against military and civilian targets throughout the Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic).

The NATO action, which lasted two weeks, came as a result of unsubstantiated accusations that Bosnian Serbs had shelled civilians in Sarajevo a few days earlier.

The Bosnian Serb side denied any responsibility in the massacre, in which more than 30 civilians were killed.

U.N. observers said that the fatal shell had been fired from the line of separation between the Muslim and Serb forces but were unable to assert the responsible side.

Hostages Part of Peace Accord

LD2211121495 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 0700 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] France hopes that it will obtain definite guarantees about the fate of its two pilots who have been missing in Bosnia since the end of August. All we have known since last night is that the two men are safe and in a safe place. This is why Jacques Blot, the French negotiator in Dayton, has asked that the release of the pilots should be an integral part of the peace accord:

[Begin recording] [Blot] So far, unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain fresh details concerning the fate of the pilots. This is why the issue of the pilots is mentioned in both the final document of the conference here and in the resolutions which are going to be adopted in New York. We have asked the various sides to do their utmost for the pilots to be returned without any delay. I think that this has become an absolute necessity for France.

[Correspondent Philippe Reltien] Has President Milosevic pledged to do something?

[Blot] President Milosevic has already done a lot. He has initiated a large number of search operations. His assistants who are in charge of this issue were here. Again, we were in touch with them about this issue on a daily basis. The president of the republic himself called Mr. Milosevic on several occasions. As you know, he is following developments personally. Again, we were not able to achieve any results here in Dayton. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Adviser on Peace Agreement

MS2211094295 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Telephone interview with Omar Sacirbegovic, adviser to the Bosnian Foreign Ministry, by announcer Jon Snow; from the "Channel 4 News" program — live; Snow in London, Sacirbegovic in Sarajevo]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] Joining us on the phone now from Sarajevo is Omar Sacirbegovic, a Foreign Ministry adviser and the younger brother of Mohammed Sacirbegovic, the Bosnian foreign minister. Well, we saw a bit of champagne being opened there in Sarajevo Omar Sacirbegovic, is everyone happy?

[Sacirbegovic] Well I believe for the most part people in this city and throughout the country are pleased with the results in Dayton. Of course for four years since the independence everybody in this country has wanted some kind of peace to be here, and it appears that we have achieved that the people of Bosnia are just looking for NATO to come in and make sure that indeed this peace agreement is cemented and implemented.

[Snow] But have not the seeds of a divided state been laid?

[Sacirbegovic] Absolutely they have, but by the same token you have five hundred years of multi-cultural coexistence, and I believe those five hundred years will in fact override the seeds that have been planted.

[Snow] Omar Sacirbegovic, in Bosnia itself thank you very much for joining us.

Belgrade Radio Interviews 'Happy' Pale Citizens

AU2111220695 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Report by Dragutin Spaic from Pale — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Spaic] The news from America has been received with much relief in Pale. During the live relay of Clinton's address to the world, Pale's streets were empty. Immediately after the relay ended, the streets got visibly livelier. This is part of the atmosphere:

[Unidentified voice] They have found the real solution, so there will no longer be any fighting, material goods will not be destroyed, lives not lost, and such. This is really humane.

[Second unidentified voice] I think that there is nobody who is not happy, both on our and the opposite side.

[Spaic] Are you satisfied with the results?

[Second voice] Well, this is not so important after so much time. After everything that has happened, it should all stop.

[Third unidentified voice] This makes me very happy. Let there be peace. We all need it.

Banja Luka People Rejoice at 'Victory,' Peace

AU2111210895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 21 November carries within its regular evening newscast a report by Milka Tosic and Velimir Bozic on the reactions of people in Banja Luka to the agreement reached in Dayton earlier today.

Several people in the street are interviewed, and sounds of celebratory gunfire can be heard in the background. One of them says that he was "surprised by the shooting; I thought someone was celebrating their saint's day, but I heard from other people that it was the end of the war. I cannot believe it."

Another one says: "It is victory, it is victory! There have been four years of war without any need for the war. However, it is good that we finally have freedom."

A woman says: "I have nothing else to say but that it is important that we have peace; we have had enough of war."

An individual identified as a university professor says that "the shooting that can be heard in Banja Luka shows that the people were expecting this war finally to end, so that no more of our young people are killed. I am particularly glad because classes have resumed at the university and some of my students turned up — I hope that the rest will also come, so that we can have classes in peace and they no longer might be called up to fight. This is what I expect from this peace."

Yet another one says that "if this really is peace, then I will be optimistic, but I am not much of an optimist. I will not believe anything before I see the maps."

LBO: Accord Gives 'Hope,' No 'Joy' to Bosniaks

AU2111200395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the peace agreement reached this evening in the U.S. state of Ohio, Salih Foco, deputy chairman of the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, issued the following statement for B-H PRESS:

Today's peace agreement does not bring joy to the Bosniaks, but rather remembrance and bitterness. The Bosniaks are the greatest losers and victims of this war and of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today the aggressor and the victim have been made equal.

The agreement, however, gives hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved as integral and multicultural. The agreement is also an announcement of the definite departure of the warlords from the political scene in Serbia and Croatia, as well as the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will make room for people and organizations that opt for peace, LBO deputy chairman Salih Foco said.

Ganic Expresses 'Relief,' Mourns for Refugees

AU2111194695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Immediately after the peace agreement in the U.S. town of Dayton had been reached, Ejup Ganic, member of the state Presidency and vice president of the Federation, gave a special statement for B-H PRESS.

He said that as of today hope and (uncertainty) were part of Bosnia's future. Today is a day of relief for many of our citizens, but it is also a day of mourning for all our citizens that have been expelled from eastern Bosnia, Posavina, and the [Bosnian] Krajina. My thoughts are now with the refugees from Srebrenica and all those citizens that have lost everything in this war, Dr. Ganic said.

He added that the protection of the property of citizens, regardless of where their property is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the prosecution of war criminals must remain the duty of the international community, particularly the United States.

Kljuic: Plan Creates Possibility of Reintegration

AU2111200595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the peace agreement signed [as heard] in Dayton between the states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, State Presidency Member Stjepan Kljuic has issued a statement for the state news agency B-H PRESS.

This nation deserves peace. It seems to me that we have preserved the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders and that is the most important thing for this generation of people, Kljuic said. I do not know all the details, but the establishment of central authorities leaves open the possibility of the long-term reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I hope that people will realize that they belong to Bosnia and that it is their homeland.

It is good that criminals and all those who have violated human rights will have to go to The Hague in accordance with this agreement, Kljuic said, commenting on the agreement reached in Dayton.

Muslims 'Sabotaging' Work of Bugojno Croats

LD2111204195 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 GMT 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A news conference was held in Mostar today in connection with the Muslim sabotaging of the interim Bugojno municipal council. Ivan Bender, speaker of the chamber of deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; Zdenko Cosic, secretary general of the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Vladimir Soljic, chairman of the Bugojno municipal assembly — who was elected to this post in democratic elections — and Ivan Miletic, chairman of the municipal council, spoke at this news conference. Ivan Kristic has a report from the news conference:

[Kristic] Speaking about yesterday's Muslim sabotaging of the Bugojno interim municipal council, Ivan Bender, leader of the Croat delegation and speaker of the chamber of deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, stressed at today's news conference in Mostar that the Croats, in their desire to overcome the problem of Bugojno and the problem of the municipal authorities, and as a precondition for the setting up of a grand county, agreed to this precedent.

In contravention of the word and spirit of the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the session of the Bugojno municipal assembly, instead of being convened by Vladimir Soljic, the democratically elected candidate of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was convened by ombudsman Vera Jovanovic.

Twenty-one deputies of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and six Croat opposition party deputies came to the scheduled session. Thus the Croats have 47 deputies in the Bugojno municipal assembly, while the Muslim Party of Democratic Action [SDA] have only 20.

As there are no tricks by which they can reduce the number of legally elected and verified Croat deputies, the Muslims did not want to come to the hall that was to have been the venue for the session. Although the winter in Bosnia is in full swing, the hall was not heated at all, and it contained no Croat symbols.

After a meeting between Ivan Bender, Mirsad Ceman, secretary general of the SDA, and ombudsman Vera Jovanovic, the Croatian flag was put in position, but the Muslim deputies did not turn up to the Bugojno municipal assembly.

The ombudsman stated that the Croat side had done everything that had been agreed, and a report on all this was sent to the Dayton peace conference in order for it to be seen who is truly in favor of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and who is sabotaging it.

Bugojno Mayor, Croats Compromise on Returnees

AU1711202295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 95

[Report by Refija Kulasin from Bugojno]

[FBIS Translated Text] Apart from Bugojno Mayor Dzevad Mlaco and Ivan Miletic, president of the municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] Bugojno, today's meeting was also attended by Hamzo Sinjak, representative of the Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Ivo Mrso, vice president of the municipal HDZ committee; and Stjepan Vukader, member of the Committee for the Return of the Croats to Bugojno of the extraterritorial Bugojno municipal council with headquarters in Livno.

Even though this meeting was realized primarily because of the apparent differences in the interpretation of provisions of (the Dayton) project and the objections of the Croatian side to the list of returnees compiled by the Bugojno municipal commission, and although the meeting kicked off in an atmosphere of certain misunderstanding, [words indistinct] optimistic and with a move that will definitely successfully close the process that has been started in Bugojno to mutual satisfaction.

Namely, following the objections of the Croatian representatives that the Bugojno lists did not include the people who had returned after [word indistinct] November, as specified by the Dayton project, an explanation by Mayor Dzevad Mlaco stating that this constituted an incorrect manipulation by the Croatian side and a tolerant attitude of the Bugojno authorities regarding the right of a 7-day visit to the town, regulated by the agreement on the freedom of moment, and complaints that the Croatian side was exerting pressure on its citizens who had freely signed statements for the return to annul them, a compromise solution was found. At the proposal of Mayor Dzevad Mlaco, the existing municipal commission for the return of citizens of Croat ethnicity to Bugojno was widened for the same number of Croatian representatives. Tomorrow, the commission will hold its first meeting and inspected the area.

Muslims, Croats Fail To Attend POW Meeting

LD1711190095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1506 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Nov (SRNA) — Captain Dragan Bulajic, chairman of the state Bosnian Serb commission for the exchange of prisoners, today confirmed that Muslim and Croat representatives last night failed to turn up at Sarajevo airport where they were to have held a meeting on the simultaneous release of all POW's.

"At the meeting, which was to have been held at the airport at 1800 last night, it had been envisaged that there would be discussions about the implementation of Point 5 of the cessation of hostilities agreement, which envisaged the simultaneous freeing of all POW's," Bulajic specified in a statement to SRNA.

According to him, the Croat side justified its failure to turn up by saying the weather prevented its arrival from Kiseljak by helicopter, while the Muslim representatives did not even see fit to inform the central commission of the reasons for its failure to turn up.

"The Serb side will continue to be patient and will persist in the implementation of the provisions of Article 5 of the cessation of hostilities agreement, something which U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke has been informed of personally," Capt. Bulajic stressed.

Herzeg-Bosna Official Views Hague Charges

AU2211124495 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Nov 95 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Soljic, "minister of defense and member of the Presidential Council of the HR Herzeg-Bosnia," by Jozo Pavkovic and Gordan Knezevic; place and date not given: "Political Indictments From The Hague']

[FBIS Translated Text] As the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is nearing its denouement, according to the information from Dayton, the methods of implementing the future peace agreement and the assessments of the successfulness of its implementation in the unstable Balkans are increasingly becoming the focus of the public's attention. The political situation and daily life in Herzeg-Bosnia have additionally been burdened by the Hague Tribunal's indictments against six officials of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We asked Mr. Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense in the Government of the HR [Croat Republic] of Herzeg-Bosnia, who, according to the government's rules of procedure, is also acting deputy prime minister and a member of the Presidential Council, to explain the views of the Herzeg-Bosnia authorities on the latest developments. Soljic is one of the four Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina who has been elected member of the Croatian Parliament from a special HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] list in the recent elections.

[VECERNJI LIST] The day before yesterday, the HZ [Croatian Community] of Herzeg-Bosnia marked its fourth anniversary in an exceptionally festive fashion. On the other hand, an agreement on strengthening the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has recently been reached in Dayton. According to the agreement, the Federation's institutions should soon assume the powers of the Herzeg-Bosnia institutions. What will the restructuring of authorities look like?

[Soljic] When we marked the fourth anniversary of the Croat Community, which later became the Croat Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a form of the Croat people's organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we became aware more than ever that without it there would have been no Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina either, and there would certainly have been no Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. Herzeg-Bosnia is often spoken about with a sneer. Even some people of whom we did not expect this also spoke in that manner. One should realistically assess the meaning of Herzeg-Bosnia in this region in the past and at present, and within Croat interests as a whole. Regarding the interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat state, the Croat leadership has determined that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the best possible solution, and that we should therefore fight within this framework for everything that is guaranteed by the Washington Agreements.

We Must Believe in Justice

[VECERNJI LIST] How will the part of the Washington Agreement that refers to confederal ties between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia be implemented?

[Soljic] Our participation in the work of the Croatian state assembly is also part of that, as the time has come for all the Croats in the world to have their representatives in the state assembly. The Croats around the world will not significantly affect the internal functioning of Croatia. They will primarily act as the link between resources and other potentials in Croatia and outside it. I would like to mention here the similar fate of the Jewish people, who could serve us as an example of good organization. History records us as a nation that has not had the kind of relations with the Jews that we should have had. Now that we are in a position to regulate these relations ourselves, I think, considering the similar fate and their experience, they will not have anything against sincere cooperation and mutual assistance. I consider important the Dayton agreement on the Joint Council of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, with which the Federation will economically and politically be closely connected with Croatia.

[VECERNJI LIST] How do you explain the fact that those who have been creating Herzeg-Bosnia, who have been organizing it and defending it from the aggressor, are now being accused of war crimes?

[Soljic] We cannot ignore the international community's institutions, such as the Hague Tribunal and others, which are undoubtedly of great value, but we must bear in mind that these institutions are used by the world power-wielders to express their will. The indictment against Croat leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be viewed in that context. This is clear from many inaccuracies expressed in the indictments and the timing of the charges. It is absurd to file charges against those who were defending themselves before they are filed against those who attacked them.

We must know that the world power-wielders know very well how to impose their interests, and the Hague Tribunal has not filed the charges against the Croats at the request and in the interest of the Muslims, but in the interest of the world power-wielders. They will also file charges against the Muslims when this suits them. The Croats should not worry, as our interests this time are more in line with those of the world powers than with interests of others in this region. We must know that we who are fighting for the Croat interests can be subjected to such accusations, and we must be ready for that, just as our defenders on the battlefields are ready to give their lives for freedom. We must believe in justice, and hope that it will not come too late.

Indictments Do Not Help the Federation

[VECERNJI LIST] In its insistence on the extradition of war criminals, the Muslim side has often mentioned the Croat side.

[Soljic] I do not see any reason for them to behave in this manner, especially because there are numerous documents about Muslim crimes against Croats. I think that one should not manipulate the evidence about crimes for political purposes. The evidence should be thoroughly examined before indictments are made, as it is difficult for someone who is innocent to clear his name after he had been indicted. I think that indictments should be made when they are less damaging for the future relations between the federal partners. The insistence on the indictments will not help strengthen the Federation. The Croats have accepted the Federation as the optimal solution, and in doing so they had to overcome many difficulties from the time of armed conflicts, but they have done this in the interest of peace and the settlement of the crisis, that is, at the cost of sacrificing some of their interests and their painful feelings.

[VECERNJI LIST] Has the new HVO [Croat Defense Council] commander assumed his duty?

[Soljic] Yes he has. The transfer of duty has already taken place.

[VECERNJI LIST] What will be the role of the forces for the implementation of the future Dayton peace agreement?

[Soljic] Even the arrival of such forces implies a certain level of our subordination as they are coming with the task of imposing a peace solution. As an organized nation, a nation that has passed many difficult tests in this war, we will know how to behave in the new situation and will know how to protect our interests. One should bear in mind the fact that these forces are coming here for a certain period of time, and that we have managed to survive here. Despite their superior position, we will cooperate and will do our best to make this cooperation as beneficial for ourselves as possible.

[Box, p 5]

About the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Regarding the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I do not think that there will be an interim period, a period without authorities, despite the fact that we will need to agree on many things and to form the federal structures of authority. If we form a government in which we are going to participate in the way in which we will be able to protect our interests and enable the future state to function, then there will be no problems. Our organized system in Herzeg-Bosnia, with which we have managed to secure a normal life to the people during the war conditions, is the proof that life will not be that bad.

[Box, p 5]

About Blaskic, Kordic, and Santic

I know General Blaskic as an extremely honest man, as a very able man, and I do not believe that he exceeded his powers. Everything he did, he did following orders, and it would be simple to check his activities. If the Hague Tribunal carries out an investigation, I expect it to drop charges and to apologize to Blaskic. The Muslim side did not have any objections to the appointment of Ivan Santic as deputy minister in the federal government, and the indictment against him is therefore incomprehensible. Kordic has recently been in constant touch with the Muslim representatives at all levels. Is that what war criminals do? General Delic is constantly cooperating with General Blaskic, and I have not noticed that he is behaving toward him as though he were a war criminal.

President Tudjman Comments on Dayton Peace Talks

LD2211121995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 22 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Before his departure from Dayton, President Franjo Tudjman answered Croatian journalists' questions. We will broadcast his answers in full.

[Begin recording] [Tudjman] This conference also brought to the surface what we have learned over the past two or three years of stubborn negotiating, which is that there are people who were not interested in peace, who wanted to prolong the war, either in order to retain what they have captured or in order to recapture the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition to all the efforts invested by the international community, under the auspices and leadership of the United States, the highest degree of unity has been reached with the European Union [EU], the main Contact Group countries, which are France, Germany, and Great Britain, and even with Russia. [as heard] On the other hand, there was no harmonious unity within the Contact Group itself but rather different approaches. The main issue, however, was how to achieve an agreement which all three sides would accept.

As you know, there was more readiness to accept the agreement on the part of the heads of the delegations—both the Croatian and the Serbian delegation, and partly even the Bosnian one. But there was more opposition among delegation members from Bosnia.

What has just been achieved here is real peace, a special agreement on peace, on one of the most complex crises of the contemporary world, and you must bear in mind that not a single peace conference has ever ended without compromises, even in cases where the victor's apparently real victory was total; and here, it is obvious, we had to reach an agreement that would satisfy all three sides, and this was not easy. This could not have been done without concessions by all three sides. Some people found it difficult to accept that they had to make concessions, especially those who, as I said at the beginning, wanted to continue the war in order to achieve their ultimate goals.

From Croatia's point of view, however, what matters in addition to all that has been achieved and signed and that is behind the signatures, is the role of the Croatian delegation. We can say that this has cemented Croatia's international reputation in all aspects of international relations. Not only the organizer and sponsor of the conference, the United States, but also all the Contact Group member countries, France as well as Germany, and on the other side, Russia, had to acknowledge Croatia's constructive role and expressed their readiness for further cooperation with Croatia as it is today—a factor without which the conference would not have been possible. The conference took place only once Croatia had changed the strategic balance in the region, and without which there would have been no agreement.

And when last night the conference not merely reached the crisis point but was in fact broken off...

[Unidentified correspondent, interrupting] It was announced that it had ended?

[Tudjman] Yes, it was announced that it had ended because the Bosnian leaders came up with additional demands, and since these had been discussed previously those running the conference refused to raise them again. And when this morning I was presented with the proposal that only Croatia and Serbia sign the agreement, I could not accept. Instead, I suggested a way out for both the conference chairmen and other protagonists, and my suggestion was accepted. That is how we now have what we have. And what we have, as I have already said, is the definite consolidation of Croatia's international position and also the fact—as I mentioned in my [11 November] address to the nation and which after the Dayton event I can state even more resolutely—in view of assurances and even commitment by the protagonists—that they are ready to help Croatia in all spheres of international cooperation and their bilateral relations with Croatia.

If you look at what has been achieved—and in any case you will read it because you are an integral part of the international media—I am sure we can all agree that the prevailing view is that Croatia has emerged as a victor both from all the previous events and from the current conference, and that, from the point of its national and state interests, it has achieved all that was possible. Of course, in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, within the framework of negotiations in which all three sides had to make concessions, we were not able to secure every single Croat interest; in other words, we were not able to get all of Bosnian Posavina.

[Correspondent] Was this the most difficult issue of the negotiations?

[Tudjman] This was the most difficult issue for Croatia, because we insisted...

[Correspondent] To the very end?

[Tudjman] Yes, to the very end, and understandably we were forceful in our insistence. But then the question was asked: What is it that you want? Every conference must have the results of war as its point of departure. In other words, do you want to cancel the outcome? You have lost Bosnian Posavina.

I must remind you that we did certainly defend Bosnian Posavina and that we not only sent Croatian troops there, not just volunteers but also Croatian Army troops, to defend Bosnian Posavina, and that as a result the whole of northern Croatia [as heard], including Kutina, Novska, Slavonski Brod, Pozega, Djakovo, Zupanja, etc, was subjected to shelling. In other words, Croatia did its utmost to try and defend Bosnian Posavina, but at that stage of the war we did not have the army or enough strength, so we could not defend it and were able to provide only enough assistance to keep Orasje. Between you and me, even from the military point of view, it is a miracle that we succeeded in defending Orasje, especially since the Serb side attempted to take Orasje at any price after our Operation Flash, when we liberated western Slavonia. Orasje was defended but, of course, with our comprehensive help.

So the question was: You have lost the war but are still creating a problem by asking for the return of Posavina, in which the Serbs have already been settled. What happens then with the demand for the Serbs to be allowed to return to the areas they left? And if you insist on having Bosnian Posavina back, we have the right to ask back all the areas you liberated in Bosnia following the liberation of Knin in Operation Storm.

As you can see, this is a complex issue where we could not secure support from the international community for our insistence on having the whole of Bosnian Posavina within the Federation. In other words, we had to make a concession to achieve peace and retain the results of our victories. This means that, under the present situation, the area of Orasje and the town of Odzak will be part of the Federation, under Croat authorities. Under present circumstances we have secured as much as we could.

On the whole, the results achieved in the sphere of the federation's structure and the central authorities are more important. In this sphere, full equality has been ensured for the Croatian people in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially in the federation. They will have their separate army and will be a completely constituent part in all aspects. This ensures the survival of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the other hand, the agreement to set up a joint council for cooperation between the federation and Croatia, which has already been initialed, ensures that this joint council—whose president will be the president of Croatia, and his deputy or the council vice president, will be the president, I mean the vice president, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which will consist of five members from each side—will review all issues concerning economic cooperation, coordination of international policy, military cooperation, and so on. So, in addition to the constitutional elements in the constitution of the federation and Bosnia, this safeguards not only equality, but also the strategic interests of the Croatian state, which is of considerable importance.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, can I ask you something else? None of us has had the opportunity to see the agreement. Does the agreement contain a provision on mutual recognition between all the three countries, or rather, all the countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia? Or, when should such an agreement be reached?

[Tudjman] There is a provision in principle on this issue. Also, in addition to the agreement on local Serbs, the Croatian and Serbian leaderships have already harmonized their views on the agreement on the complete normalization of relations.

[Correspondent] Should this happen at the Paris conference?

[Tudjman] In connection with the conference and the lifting of the sanctions [as received].

[Correspondent] Mr. President, there has also been talk about eastern Slavonia. Mr. Christopher said this was the fourth most important point that needed to be solved. Was it solved here, or in the field?

[Tudjman] It was solved here.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, there was a lot of speculation among journalists in Dayton on an alleged agreement on the tip of the Prevlaka peninsula. Was Prevlaka one of the topics discussed at the Dayton negotiations?

[Tudjman] It was a topic of discussion to the extent I said in my address to the nation, no more. In earlier talks, which we have been conducting for three years, the Serbs insisted that they too have the right to access to the sea because they are part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has access to the sea. Furthermore, the Croatian Army has taken control of the Dubrovnik hinterland. So, a solution for their right to access to the sea (?is being sought). But, as I said, this remains to be discussed further. Their demand can be acceptable for Croatia only inasmuch as it is in the interest of Croatia, considering the problem which arises from it, which is a threat not only to Dubrovnik, but to tourism in the southern Adriatic in general. [end recording]

Lauds Croatian Role

LD2211103095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman will return home this morning from Dayton. Before his departure from Dayton, Dr. Tudjman spoke with the Croatian journalists who covered the talks. He said that peace has been achieved in Dayton. To reach a compromise to satisfy all three sides was not easy and could not have been made without concessions by all three sides, the Croatian president said.

The agreement will finally consolidate Croatia's international position, President Tudjman said and went on to say that the overwhelming view was that Croatia has emerged from the conference as a victor and that from the point of view of Croatia's international interests, it has achieved everything that was possible to achieve:

[Begin Tudjman recording] What has just been achieved here is real peace, a special agreement on peace, on one of the most complex crises of the contemporary world, and you must bear in mind that not a single peace conference has ever ended without compromises, even in cases where the victor's apparently real victory was total; and here, it is obvious, we had to reach an agreement that would satisfy all three sides, and this was not easy. This could not have been done without concessions by all three sides. Some people found it difficult to accept that they had to make concessions, especially those who, as I said at the beginning, wanted to continue the war in order to achieve their ultimate goals.

From Croatia's point of view, however, what matters in addition to all that has been achieved and signed and that is behind the signatures, is the role of the Croatian delegation. We can say that this has cemented Croatia's international reputation in all aspects of international relations. Not only the organizer and sponsor of the conference, the United States, but also all the Contact Group member countries, France as well as Germany, and on the other side, Russia, had to acknowledge Croatia's constructive role and expressed their readiness for further cooperation with Croatia as it is today—a factor without which the conference would not have been possible. The conference took place only once Croatia had changed the strategic balance in the region, and without which there would have been no agreement. [end recording]

Lists Peace Accord Benefits

LD2211112295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Franjo Tudjman has arrived in Zagreb from the successfully completed peace talks in Dayton in the United States. The members of the state delegation at the talks in the Wright-Patterson base, Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Defense Minister Gojko Susak, returned with President Tudjman. [passage omitted]

President Tudjman had the following to say about the importance of the global peace agreement reached in Dayton:

[Begin Tudjman recording] We obtained peace, which is of inestimable value for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not only for us, but for Europe and the whole world. We will not suffer any more victims. In the economy, we can probably expect a two- or three-fold increase in income from tourism as early as this year. There will be a rush to Croatia in the economic sense. Even our people, uncertain as to what will happen because of the war, have been cautious so far, but all this will change now when restrictions on travel to Croatia will be lifted, when there will be no more danger of war for business people. This is of huge, inestimable importance. Think about the unhindered flow of transit traffic. From transit traffic alone, Croatia will probably earn half a billion more than before, not to mention tourism and everything else.

Croatia's international position is such that all Croatian institutions will be welcomed abroad, in the world. Croatia will reap the fruits of the Dayton agreement, in which it played one of the most important roles; it has gained not only recognition but also trust in all aspects.

All in all—peace. Peace above all. This means that we can go back to our homes, back to building and reconstruction, and not only to the economic, but also cultural and scientific development. The Dayton round of talks, the talks which lasted more than any peace talks in recent history, are of inestimable value for Croatia and the whole world. With its presence and its role—Croatia's role was decisive—Croatia really achieved results which will have an immediate impact this year and in the years to come. [end recording]

Ambassador Lauds U.S.-Brokered Peace Deal

MS2211102395 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Interview with Croatian Ambassador to the UN Mario Nobilo by announcer Jon Snow; from the "Channel 4

News" program — live; Snow in London, Nobilo in New York]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] We're joined now from New York by Mario Nobilo, who is Croatia's ambassador the United Nations and who says this is still a problem [referring to the problem of the Serb held area of Posavina corridor]. But ambassador those sort of problems you believe the weight of today's peace will make incidental, right?

[Nobilo] I think that we finally reach a comprehensive peace deal and the Brcko problem, the corridor problem would be resolved in coming months, it will not certainly be a stumbling block to the implementation of the this package. And the issue is how wide the corridor would be and we can work these details out down the road.

[Snow] So why is tonight different from any other moment that we've thought we had peace in our sights?

[Nobilo] Well it's the American leadership, the Croatian-Muslim alliance and their military gains last few months, the Nato air strikes, and the conflict which had finally matured to the point when the balance between Serbia on one side and Croatia and Bosnia on the other had been established.

[Snow] What about war criminals. Are you happy with the process that first of all is in play to bring these people to trial, and secondly will they really be handed over by the authorities in the region?

[Nobilo] The cooperation of every country, especially the countries in the region is one of the important elements of the whole package. The country's that would not cooperate with the tribunal will certainly be exposed to further international pressures. But there is a big difference everybody understands that the genocide, the ethnical cleansing that was intentional policy on the Serbian side and on the other two parties it was the side effect of the war situation in which they found themselves. So down the road we know how to treat this problem and certainly my country would cooperate.

[Snow] And very briefly, how important was it to lock these leaders away for their discussions?

[Nobilo] There have been hundreds if not thousands of different levels of meetings in Ohio over those three weeks and I believe that the isolations and the proximity of main actors were crucial to achieve a peace in such a comprehensive way in a complex situation in which we were facing.

Accord Said To Crown Tudjman as Power Broker

AU2211120095 Paris AFP in English
1126 GMT 22 Nov 95

[By Francoise Michel]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 22 (AFP)—The U.S.-sponsored Bosnia peace accord has crowned Croatian President Franjo Tudjman as the region's major power broker, and legitimised Croatia's spectacular military rout of separatist Serbs, diplomats said Wednesday [22 November].

"Croatia comes out ahead in all this," a western diplomat who did not want to be named said here. "It has retaken the (separatist) Krajina region, reinforced the buffer zone with Bosnia and the dream of a Greater Serbia seems to have ended."

The peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, have also allowed Tudjman to strengthen his position as a major political figure on the international scene. Diplomats here noted he was the only Balkan leader consulted by U.S. President Bill Clinton in the last-minute negotations which resulted in Tuesday's peace acccord.

"The Dayton agreement means peace," Tudjman said Wednesday upon his return here from the United States.

"This means that we will have no more casualties and on the economic front we can expect, beginning this year, two or three times more tourists than last year."

Even before news of the peace accord broke, Tudjman was hailing the talks as "very successful as far as Croatia was concerned."

Under the peace deal, Eastern Slavonia—the last Croatian territory in separatist Serb hands—would be placed under international supervision for at least a year.

The deal, according to a UN official, essentially amounts to a Serb surrender but prevents Tudjman from immediately reclaiming eastern Slavonia, which he had earlier threatened to do by force.

Nevertheless, Zagreb's agreement to normalize relations with Belgrade makes the eventual return of the separatist region to Croatian control more likely.

At the same time, the Ohio accord allows Croatia to strenghthen its role in Bosnia by reinforcing the Moslem-Croat federation.

The overall peace accord was in large part made possible by the Croatian army's territorial gains which started in May with a lightning offensive in Western Slavonia followed in August with a massive offensive against the Krajina Serbs.

Zagreb at the same time strenghthened its position in western Bosnia during a joint Croat-Moslem offensive in September that stripped the Serbs of 20 percent of Bosnian territory under their control.

These military operations, undertaken with the tacit approval of the international community, tipped the balance against the Serb separatists and boosted a peace plan handing 49 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Serbs and the rest to the Moslem-Croat federation.

The operations also allowed Croatia "to show Bosnian forces that any military action could not be undertaken without Croatian backing," a UN officer said.

Ironically, Croatia's military success was made possible by the deployment in 1992 of UN troops along the border with Serbia, a move that provided breathing space for the army to rearm itself and train.

Throughout the 43-month war Croatia also managed to escape international sanctions similar to those imposed on Belgrade despite 11 months of bloody conflict between Croats and Moslems in central Bosnia and well documented reports of summary executions of civilians in the Krajina region.

Dayton Talks, Possible Concessions Viewed

AU2211091995 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Tudjman Has Yet To Face the Most Difficult Challenges at Home"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of the three chosen opposing leaders in Dayton, Ohio, President Franjo Tudjman has spent the least time there, but still—directly or indirectly—he has signed the greatest number of agreements so far. Most of these concern relations between the Croats and the Bosniaks, starting with the first real extensions of the Washington agreement, the return of refugees, and the future cooperation between the Bosnian and the Croatian state, and later on even with that of Milosevic—either in the form of a statement confirming peaceful intentions, or by a far-reaching pen in [Hrvoje] Sarinic's hand—which is all bound up with the future of the occupied regions in Croatia. Compared with indirect negotiations between Milosevic and Izetbegovic, Tudjman has shown incredible diplomatic skill and proficiency over a relatively limited time, but what he has signed, supported or announced has caused little enthusiasm anywhere.

The fundamental Croatian-Serbian agreement on the international protectorate over the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem hardly deserves the support expected even in the ruling party, while it seems to be undoubtedly apparent that—at least for the time being—this skeleton that needs to be fleshed out, as American officials put it, has not brought about any overwhelming and general progress in impenetrable Dayton either. The unexpected indictments brought up in The Hague against some of the most eminent Herzegovina political leaders and officers have made things additionally difficult, and the emergency brake ineptly pulled by President Tudjman in the case of indicted General Tihomil Blaskic has not been welcomed either in the world, or by our neighbors. The Americans principally do not accept anything less than extradition. The Muslims—at least in lobby talks—will be again telling stories about the Croats' evasion of justice, while in the most hard-line circles in Herzegovina it will scarcely be possible to reassure the barons who claim that all those agreements with Izetbegovic and such international indictments undoubtedly bear witness to the fact that Zagreb and Tudjman have turned their backs on them.

After all, even conciliatory and generous [President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] Kresimir Zubak has mustered the courage to forward a severe letter to Richard Holbrooke, in which an ostensibly unimportant sentence should be underlined three times, where Zubak claims that the U.S.-proposed map is directly opposed to the interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, adding something that is obviously not only about disagreeable territorial divisions: Generally, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by combining different interests, have become a victim of these peace negotiations. Thus Tudjman is exposed to the political danger of being accused by precisely his most loyal followers, to whom he has been all too forgiving and yielding so far, of almost everything that the Bosnian Serbs are accusing Milosevic of: the treason of their state in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and turning his back on those who just obeyed orders, as the defense minister of Herzeg-Bosnia justifies the actions of indicted General Blaskic. And if, in addition to all this and to Zubak's protests at the relinquishment of the corridor, assumptions expressed by Italians about inevitable Croatian and Muslim territorial concessions (reportedly, Milosevic is not giving up access to the Croatian sea, and perhaps he will indirectly retain control over at least one part of Sarajevo) came true, the general dissatisfaction on the part of Croats could reach the critical level at which the most brilliant short-term victories would be reassessed as incontestable strategic defeats.

At this particular moment some of those unconfirmed stories can be heard more readily in Mostar than in Zagreb, where, during the president's absence, the principle of impervious silence is being most strictly observed, so it appears that the Republic of Croatia is the only one that has not divulged its diplomatic or political dissatisfaction. Zubak is threatening that he will abandon the negotiations, Milosevic is complaining that he has been tricked into accepting too radical documents, in Sarajevo one speaks about horrible pressure put on Izetbegovic, the Europeans are mad because the Americans do not want to disclose to them even the telephone numbers of the chief negotiators, judge Richard Goldstone is threatening to resign if his indictments become subject to international bargaining, Christopher obviously thinks that the trio locked up in Dayton is dragging out too much what they will have to accept eventually, and the U.S. Congress is horrified at the thought of spending money on U.S. troops in Bosnia, and is claiming that no such thing would happen even if everybody were to accept everything.

And in view of the current state of affairs, eventually nobody will be an absolute victor, or a completely written off loser, even though all of them will face a sort of political challenge: How to make the public back home accept as painlessly as possible what was most officially being referred to hitherto as an absolutely unacceptable concession? At certain turning points, even the continuation of war appears to be easier than any convincing self- imposition of peace, so it seems that Tudjman has yet to face the most difficult challenges at home.

Bosnia's Izetbegovic Arrives, Comments on Accord

LD2211125595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation led by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, has landed in Zagreb airport en route from Dayton to Sarajevo. Drazen Korda has a report:

[Korda] In a brief press statement President Izetbegovic said he believes the Dayton agreement will bring peace and rebuild Bosnia. Asked to assess the peace agreement, Izetbegovic said he is relatively satisfied, and went on to say:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] Of course, I am least satisfied with the result that we achieved for Posavina—that is the least positive result—and particularly Brcko, an issue that we did not manage to resolve. You know that with Brcko we risked a failure in negotiations. That happened two nights ago when the crisis came to a head. Then yesterday morning, I think it was yesterday morning—it was yesterday evening Zagreb time, I believe—a compromise was proposed to postpone resolution of the problem of Brcko in order to salvage the negotiations. [end recording]

[Korda] Noting that under the agreement Sarajevo remains undivided, President Izetbegovic said in reply to a question about what in the agreement gives him most satisfaction:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I am satisfied that peace has been achieved. Peace is more important than anything else for rebuilding Bosnia. I am satisfied, of course, that the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have remained in place, even including what in the beginning we did not hope would be included—the establishment of a common currency and a common central bank. I think that with regard to Sarajevo we have achieved a great deal, that is 80 to 90 percent of what we had demanded, and the lifting of the Gorazde blockade. I am personally happy that I am returning to Bosnia. [end recording]

[Korda] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirmed that he is remaining at the helm of the Federation; Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said everything now depends on the implementation of the peace agreement.

Srem-Baranja 21 Nov Talks Called 'Useful'

LD2111182995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Erdut, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—The goodwill and cooperation of both sides are the most important factors for the implementation of the Serb-Croat agreement on Sector East (Srem-Baranja region), signed on 12 November, Kofi Annan, UN secretary general's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, said today in Erdut.

After 90 minutes of talks with the negotiating team of the Srem-Baranja region, led by Milan Milanovic, Annan added that he had "informed the Serb side of the full guarantees which the United Nations and international community are ready to give once the 12 November agreement is implemented."

Milanovic assessed today's talks as useful, adding that "there was discussion on implementation of the agreement and the relevant resolution to be adopted by the UN Security Council."

"It is our hope that the resolution will be in the spirit of the agreement. After its adoption we will proceed to defining the annex for individual points," the head of the negotiating team stressed. [passage omitted]

Demand for Review of Zagreb Election Considered

AU2211100295 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Nov 95 p 3

[Gordana Grbic report: "Will the Election Be Repeated in Zagreb?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia is still waiting for the original election documents from abroad. Sent via DHL, the documents are still roaming the airports of European capitals, while the Electoral Commission is being "bombarded" with questions and even criticism by phone and in the press concerning the fact that there have been no official results even as late as 10 days after the election.

President of the Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Krunislav Olujic, issued an announcement informing the public that the Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia cannot officially confirm the results of the election without having had insight into original documents and without control of these documents. Since the election documents from some oversease countries have still not been delivered, the Electoral Commission is not able to officially confirm and make official the results of the election. The announcement of the president of the Electoral Commission says that as soon as the documents arrive, the Commission will make official the results of the election for the Chamber of Representatives.

While waiting for the complete original documentation from abroad, the three-member HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] team, headed by Vladimir Primorac, yesterday started to count the votes and check the election material from abroad, the greatest part of which is at St. Mark's Square [address of Croatian Parliament] after all.

The most frequent question, apart from the one about when the results will be made official, is when the members of the electoral committees will receive the fee they were promised (246 kuna) for working in the electoral committees on the day of election. President of the Electoral Commission, Dr. Krunislav Olujic, has been given firm promises from both the former and the present prime minister, Valentic and Matesa respectively, that the funds would be delivered to the Electoral Commission within a very short time. As soon as that happens, the money will be paid.

Within the legal deadline, which expires on Friday at midnight, the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS] filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court concerning the decision of the Electoral Commission to reject their objection saying that the election in Horvati was repeated unnecessarily. The Constitutional Court will thus be working during the weekend, too, since it is bound by the 48-hour deadline.

The Constitutional Court also received the demand of the Croatian Civic-Peasant Party [HGSS] for a review of the constitutionality of the Act on the County of Zagreb and the Act on the Changes and Annexes to the Act on the City of Zagreb. Apart from claiming that the content of the acts and the way they were passed are anticonstitutional, they are also demanding that the execution of all the actions resulting from these acts be temporarily halted, particularly the constituting of the Assembly of the City of Zagreb and the Assembly of the County of Zagreb.

The claims about these acts and the new territorial organization of the City of Zagreb and the "ring" being unconstitutional are nothing new. The opposition members have been disputing the constitutionality of this solution since President Tudjman said to the Government, at a Government session, that their priority task would be to unite the capital and the "ring".

During the three readings of the Act in the Chamber of Counties and the Chamber of Representatives fierce discussions were held, but all the opposition objections and arguments were refuted on behalf of the proposer, the Government, by minister of administration, Davorin Mlakar, while the new organization of Zagreb and its surroundings was, with firm party discipline, defended by the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Club of Representatives. President of the Legislative Commitee, Ante Klaric, was the only one who challenged the party discipline. He opposed the passing of the acts, which is probably the reason he did not get a mandate in the Parliament. The Act on the County of Zagreb was thus accepted with 38 votes in favor and 31 against, while five abstained from voting.

The proposal of the HGSS—the party founded immediately before the election by separating from the HSS—for review of the constitutionality of these acts was not the only one, though it is questionable whether the initative would have appeared at all if the outcome of the election in Zagreb and its surroundings had been as the creators of the changes had expected it to be. Before the election, immediately after the acts were adopted, A.S., lawyer from Velika Gorica, launched the initiative for the review of the constitutionality. The Constitutional Court has not considered this initiative yet, since no deadlines are involved in reviews of constitutionality, though the Court has rejected similar initiatives as unfounded before—that concerning the review of the constitutionality of the Act on the Election of Representatives to the Chamber of Representatives. If the Constitutional Court had made the decision before the local election in Zagreb had been held, it would have been either positive or negative. It would have had a certain weight, since, if unconstitutionality had been established, there would have been no local election in Zagreb.

The decision of the Constitutional Court concerning these initatives after the election has been held, after the opposition has achieved unexpected success, and after the statement of President Tudjman and the leadership of the HDZ saying that they would do anything to keep the power in Zagreb, will be expected with extreme anticipation. If it is established that the acts are unconstitutional, regardless of the arguments used, even if they are the ones the opposition representatives stated in the parliament, and the local election in Zagreb and the surroundings is annulled and repeated as a consequence, few will believe that it is not a result of political pressure—the same pressure due to which these acts were passed by the Parliament to begin with.

Economy Minister: Peace Will Reduce Tax Rates

AU2111160395 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 95 pp 7-8

[Interview with Croatian Economy Minister Davor Stern by Vesna Antonic on 8 November; place not given: "Exchange Rate of Kuna Is No Obstacle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The economy minister in the new — already nicknamed Matesa — administration is Davor Stern, who was minister without portfolio in the Valentic administration. So, this is a man with continuity, who is well informed about the situation and who is aware of all the difficulties he will have to deal with in such a sensitive field as the economy. The day after he took the hot seat as minister we talked to Minister Stern about the huge job awaiting him and his team.

At the very beginning of the interview he points out that a huge job lies before him, and it will take time to finish it, because it is a long-lasting process. He goes on to say that this government should be a government of continuity until the next elections, regardless of whether he stays in it or not.

[Antonic] What are your first impressions?

[Stern] Some things are good and some are bad. Good impressions are represented by my closest associates, the current system and the fact that part of the job is done. What is bad is the inappropriate structure and organization within the ministries, the job in front of us, and the problems that can be predicted, and that are not directly connected with the Ministry of Economy. Their solution will necessarily involve many more factors, while coordination will be exceptionally difficult, because in some cases the jurisdictions overlap. That is, the organization of the ministries is not functional. Such a situation has existed for a number of years, nobody has tried to solve it, probably because there has been no satisfactory solution, and not because nobody wanted to do it. One of the difficulties is that in the Ministry of Economy, which is exceptionally important for the functioning of the whole economic system of the country, in three years of existence four ministers moved in and out of it. This ministry has never succeeded in starting to live in the long term as a real ministry that has surveyed all the problems of the Croatian economy, but has continued to function in the way that was established at the Ministry of Trade, and at the Ministry of Industry and Energy. In short, that is what I found here on my arrival.

[Antonic] You have mentioned personnel. Is there going to be any rationalization?

[Stern] There can be no rationalization, because there is in any case not enough staff to do the job properly. I would even say that the staff structure is inappropriate. I do not know whose heritage that is, but since they are live people, we are surely not going to throw them onto the street. In fact, the point in question is a sociological problem for the experts, and one that exists in all the ministries. Nevertheless, the most important thing is that we are aware of all the problems, and that we face them, so that we can gradually solve them. The situation is such that it demands greater effort from all of us.

[Antonic] Will there be continuity with the economic policy hitherto?

[Stern] We will maintain the continuity of the macroeconomic measures that the former government very successfully introduced and carried out, but it will have to implement them through microeconomic moves, and, concretely, through care for every economic subject in Croatia, apart from those private ones that do not need help. As long as there are state-owned enterprises, that is, enterprises mainly owned by the state, under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Economy, we have to help them stand up, reorganize themselves, then become privatized, and remove themselves from our protection. We will have to invest maximum effort, but the basis for it has been made. A stable national currency and low inflation give us a firm stronghold and are a good beginning for economic recovery. The second question is how willing the people will be and to what extent the whole political atmosphere will be positive so that we create and do everything that we intended.

One Has To Learn About Privatization

[Antonic] You were talking about the problems in enterprises. As regards transformation and privatization, on the whole, small enterprises have been transformed, and the big, public enterprises have remained untouched. The only thing left for you is to crack this hard nut, which has to do with the situation in banking.

[Stern] We are aware of the present situation and we have surveyed the situation in the economy. I have noticed that warnings and alarm have been sounded from different places and meetings, claiming that the government is not aware of what is going on in the state. The government has a very good view of what is going on, and in the present situation none of us takes a rosy view. The situation is difficult, but it is absolutely soluble. Again I am getting back to the fact that everybody's help is needed and every well-intentioned and good suggestion will be followed up.

Big enterprises are the biggest problem, and I personally think that the way we used—to privatize small enterprises first—is a good model. Privatization is a special science one has to learn about, and through those processes in small enterprises within the framework of the Fund and the ministries of privatization and economy certain ideas are acquired on how such enterprises should be restructured.

The example of "Pliva" already shows a pouring from an empty bottle into a hollow one, that is, privatization through purchasing companies with non-existent capital, former social capital, manager's loans, commercial banks' long-term credits without a foreign currency clause, and without bringing fresh money into Croatia. At the same time the country has not received that positive impulse of fresh capital that could mean some kind of improvement for all of us.

The consequence of every reorganization is a decrease in the number of those employed, and all our big companies have had too many employees. We will not create social cases, but there must be some fund that will meet the needs of those people over and above the required number. We still do not know for sure which model we will apply, but it is a fact that one should take care about those people. Everybody should know that a foreign buyer will not buy a company with 4,000 employees, if he needs only 1,000. Nobody is ready to pay that "overhead," which is a burden, while those people can start nothing on their own. One must point out that there is a nonsense in our country called inappropriate interest rates. We have a stable national currency, and inflation of 1 to 2 percent, and we pay interest of up to 26 percent to the banks. There is no production branch that can stand such an interest rate. We are aware that our industrial output is not growing according to expectations, but at the same time trade is increasing because such a high interest rate can be paid from the quick capital turnover. At the same time, no industrial production, which freezes capital for six to eight months during the production cycle, has funds such as can stand that burden of interest...

Through cooperation with banks, that is, unless domestic banks agree to the transfer of cheaper foreign capital into the hands of domestic entrepreneurs, we will do that directly through foreign banks or the HKBO [Croatian Credit Bank for Reconstruction], but we will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed by domestic banks.

[Antonic] You are aware that there will be resistance in the banks...

[Stern] The resistance will exist, but it is none of our business. The banks themselves have brought themselves into a position they should not be in. They have become big capitalists with a heap of enterprises in their portfolio, and they cannot and do not know how to manage them, and they produce only losses. In the banks there is strong resistance regarding the recovery of such companies, because they claim that those enterprises have lost the value they in any case do not have. Because, if they do not have dividends, or if the dividends are negative, those enterprises have no value. Therefore, we are talking about an illusory category. We must become aware, particularly bankers must, of what we have. If the banks have invested their money badly, they have to bear the consequences, as happens all over the world. However, they keep such enterprises in their portfolio, and keep grabbing new ones on the basis of the credits given at the time of big inflation. The domino effect starts even in the banks themselves. They have large reserves, but they do not give up certain enterprises from their own portfolio.

We Have Capable People Abroad

[Antonic] How can we stimulate industrial production? Is there any chance of some kind of privilege?

[Stern] Recently, privileges have been popular. It is known that the former government, in one of its last sessions, made a decision by which it allowed those who return to import production equipment without any customs tariffs and taxes, which I think is a good move. We have many capable people abroad, who have learnt what capitalism is, but who face a series of problems when they return because they cannot find people who think the same way. If, despite the import of relatively cheap machines and all incentives we still have managers whose heads remain socialist-oriented, then there will be no success.

Some of our production enterprises claim that the high exchange rate of the kuna bothers them, and that this is the reason why they cannot produce and export. That is a pompous platitude. The strong kuna is a means of defense for the inept. And I can give you a list of enterprises that are satisfied with the exchange rate of the kuna, enterprises that run their business well and produce. The thing is that instead of looking for internal reserves, reducing production expenditure and increasing productivity, we have expensive production that is not competitive in the foreign markets. I am sure that the exchange rate of the kuna is not an obstacle, but that the point is in business efficiency, productivity, and the approach to work. Nevertheless, on the other hand, Croatia will, like other European countries, adopt measures with an aim to increase exports, like more favorable credit arrangements, imports insurance against commercial and non-commercial risks, and so on.

[Antonic] In what way will you stimulate economic growth?

[Stern] The basis for stimulating economic growth is a change in mentality, which is hardest to achieve, and which takes time, discussions, roundtables, education of managers and personnel, and the unity of all elements, I would say, of the ruling and opposition parties. Some of the opposition's promises that we heard during the course of the election campaign were ridiculous. If they were at least to tell us on what basis they make such promises, then we could talk. It is irresponsible to give promises without any realistic basis.

Growth will be stimulated also by the influence of the state on the banking system, then by a reduction in the tax and customs burden.

I must say that we have been working on adopting a new customs tariff that will be more appropriate to both Europe and Croatia. I should remind you that hitherto we have mostly relied upon the customs rates from the time that preceded the war and the process of transition and privatization, so we have been relying upon a production structure from around 1990/91, whose structure no longer exists in Croatia, but we still drag on with the same rates. Thus there is a lack of logic in that we protect production we do not have in our country, and at the same time we have low customs rates for the products that we also produce ourselves and that represent real competition to us. I think that these new customs rates will change that. In that way we will prevent smuggling and selling goods without lawful origin, that is, which have not been legally imported into Croatia. The prices in Croatia have to be brought to the same level as for the same product in neighboring countries, and then smuggling will lose its purpose, because nobody will deal in smuggling for a price difference of only 10 percent. That will also reduce interest in individual shopping abroad, on which our citizens spend not only their money, but also their precious time and energy.

Peace Necessary for Strategy

[Antonic] What about taxes?

[Stern] Talking about economic growth, if the situation calms down, probably expenditure for the army will be reduced and then the burden of taxes will also be gradually reduced, I hope next year. I should say that we have not bitten into the problem of tax evasion yet and that the reserves one can find there, could provide for sufficient budgetary funds to reduce all the taxes that burden the common man, and, to a certain extent, to ease his life in that way.

[Antonic] You are aware that in the first sessions of the Chamber of Representatives the question that has constantly been raised by the opposition, the question Prime Minister Valentic and his government have been asked, awaits you, and that question is the strategy of economic development.

[Stern] In a country with a situation such as that of Croatia, it is simply impossible to create a strategy of economic growth. Here it is a question of everyday survival. We are forgetting that four years ago the members of the government slept somewhere different every day, and that the session took place in cellars. Under such circumstances, it was impossible to talk then about the strategy of economic development.

The strategy can be elaborated, but in conditions of peace. Unfortunately, we have not experienced this so far, which means that we do what we can, and sometimes I have been really surprised at some parliamentary representatives who have said things as if they had not been aware where they actually were. Certainly, the people's representatives are people of highest quality, who should be aware that what they say could produce a negative effect with a part of the population. When they do not understand it, and do not want to understand it, they only make it more difficult for a government that is trying hard to improve the quality of life of the citizens in this country. We will come to our economic strategy, in fact, our government has it, the question is only whether, and to what extent, for instance, the construction industry will be stimulated, and shipbuilding reduced, or industry stimulated, and consumer goods production reduced. So, that is the strategy of economic development, but we still cannot give you answers to your questions because we still do not know what precisely is available, the observation sheet of the situation in industry in the liberated territories is not yet finished; we still know nothing about 5 percent of the territory; although it really seems very little at first glance, it is a large burden, and will be solved very soon, I hope. Apart from that, we have very unclear relations regarding economic integration. You know that Europe stopped us, and it would be much easier if we knew the framework of the European Union that we should fit into. It is the same situation with the neighboring countries with which we have to establish cooperation on the new bases. We wish it, we are working on it, but conditions are still not such as will enable us to pass a whole package of consistent measures that would appropriately cover all the sectors of the economy. I think that, in present conditions, it is impossible to create a uniform and integral strategy, because the world changes day by day and every strategy should adapt itself to it.

Stimulus Is Very Important

[Antonic] How can we attract foreign capital?

[Stern] In every way possible—through privatization, by investment of our returnees' fortune. The capital arriving in our country through banks, the present mediators, is also available, but it is too expensive, and it must be made cheaper. We should also use various forms of financial help that neighboring European countries can give us in the shape of commodity credits, but naturally not in a way that jeopardizes domestic production, and finally, the means of reconstruction and development which, directed in a proper way, will be properly used. The effect of a couple of billion dollars in several years will be such that we will surprise ourselves how far we can come and how many resources we have—the only thing we need is a bit of stimulus. And, after all, there is also the human factor.

[Antonic] What can be done to induce our people to return from abroad?

[Stern] We have been working upon the project to found the Agency for Promotion of Investment in Croatia, which will serve as an agent for returnees or foreign business associates so as to overcome numerous bureaucratic difficulties. And once again, we should influence people's consciousness so as to avoid what happens today, that certain local structures do not allow those people to return, considering them to be intruders. If some factory is situated at a certain place, it does not mean that the inhabitants of that place are its owners. That sectionalism, expressed by the desire to govern material assets, is dangerous, particularly for our people who return from abroad. Those who return are disappointed and they talk about it, and that is more harmful to us than everything else.

[Box, p 7]

If We Do Not Succeed, I Do Not Know Who Will

Some people already think that this government is some kind of transitional government, that it has no chances, that it will last only six months, and then some new people will come. I cannot see those new people. I do not say that we are the best and that there is nobody better than us, but if Prime Minister Matesa's government does not succeed, I doubt that any other will. These are big, manifold and multifaceted problems, and when those problems are dealt with, the social and political sphere will probably have to be penetrated. We have to solve all these problems together, bearing in mind that we find ourselves in our common country where we have to join forces in order to make this country the way we want it. If we are exposed only to criticism and politicking, our job will in no way be facilitated, Minister Davor Stern says.

[Box 2, p 8]

We Have To Know Who Is in Charge of What

[Antonic] We have asked Minister Davor Stern what the priority tasks of the Ministry of Economy are.

[Stern] It is essential to enable the Ministry in both the personnel and organizational sense, in order to deal with all the tasks, because our field of activity is very wide and we must have very capable personnel, who can deal with that process, as well as such a structure of the Ministry that can provide for the proper functioning and coordination of all the organization units and parts of the Ministry. We must bear in mind that we will have to cooperate with other ministries on defining jurisdictions in order to know precisely who is in charge of what and who is responsible for what. For that, we will involve ourselves to the maximum in attracting healthy foreign capital by speeding up the process of privatization and attracting foreign credits, by investments into production and tourist facilities, and most important of all, by introducing order into internal creditor-debtor relations. I have to point out that no economy can function in the circumstances when one side always takes and never pays, and the other side always gives and is never paid. First of all, the Ministry of Finance will have to deal with that, as well as the courts, where the majority of the contentious cases are filed, but because of the lack of personnel at the courts, the files have been lying around for a long time unopened, in drawers. We need to put all our effort into breaking this chain of debtors and creditors. Simply, we must allow the return of debtor relations as they were at the beginning of Markovic's Government [the last federal government in former Yugoslavia]. Since the state is a big debtor, it will have to set an example for the others.

Crvenkovski: Dayton Accord of 'Inestimable Value'

LD2111233295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2244 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—Stevo Crvenkovski, minister of foreign affairs of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], this evening assessed that the agreement on Bosnia in Dayton is of inestimable value, not only for the area of the former Yugoslavia but also for the whole Balkans.

"I believe that scope is now opening up for the resolution of the many problems that we have had over the past few years," Crvenkovski stated on [FYROM] state television this evening, and he stressed in particular the question of "transport and communications with Europe, and the creation of new scope for cooperation."

The Macedonian foreign minister described the long-expected agreement in Dayton as "without a doubt a big step that has again confirmed that everything positive can be achieved only through negotiations. We should hail the courage of all the leaders in Dayton in overcoming their differences in the interests of peace," Crvenkovski stressed.

At the same time he repeated that Macedonia would not place obstacles in the way of the mutual recognition of all the states in the area of the former Yugoslavia, and he expressed the hope that this would happen soon. [passage omitted]

PFP Viewed as Strengthening Balkan Security

AU2111171895 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 17 Nov 95 pp 16-17

[Article by Todor Atanasovski: "Without Euphoria and Triumph"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] recently successfully passed the test for association in the "Partnership for Peace" [PFP] program and found itself in NATO's anteroom. I do not know if our readers remember that on these same pages we discussed NATO and its role in the formation of the global military and political order, and collective security in the post-bipolar period. We mentioned then that it should come as no surprise if FYROM finds itself in NATO before some countries that have been waiting longer. This "forecast" was based on the following: First, on the vital position that our country has in and for the Balkans, as well as on the prospect of peacekeeping operations, and second, nobody would be "particularly damaged" by the possible acceptance of FYROM, particularly not the territories that are faced with big confrontation in Europe and in its southeast region.

The Republic of Macedonia's association with NATO can only be contradicted by big state political doctrines, in which some countries in this region so much persist. By examining international relations, however, more precisely the clear attitude of the United Nations and the actors that dominate the sphere of collective security involving Macedonia, and not only Macedonia, we can acquaint ourselves with the future Balkan constellation. It is evident that the Balkans is awaiting a new order and establishment that is quite different from the one known in the past. It will not be established easily and quickly, and it depends on the Balkan subjects and on their ability to overcome their historic burdens and turn themselves toward a future without wars and forced divisions. We, the people in the Balkans, would be attaching too much importance to ourselves if we were to think that the "Partnership for Peace" was invented only for us in the Balkans, although with the latest wars in the region we have demonstrated ourselves to be different.

The "Partnership for Peace" appears to be a completely new political formula, if we look on it as a program, political relationship, or milder form of overcoming contradictions in the first and most difficult stage of establishing a new world order following the elemental social and economic changes (the collapse of real socialism, and the fall of one of the major military blocs). It is probably an attempt to avoid the military conflicts that threaten whenever there are great shifts of power in the world. All the major wars in history were waged for redivision of the already divided world and always on a new level of social, cultural, and material development. Despite its characteristics, particularly the ideological nature of the confrontations, which concealed rather than revealed its true causes, the nearly half century of cold war could not be outside this law. It found expression in several hundred wars in smaller regions of the world and in the large colonial territories. Since the cold war was actually a "war" in terms of volume and tolerable limits, it was followed and is still being carried on in a bid for redivision of power, but this time it is taking place in circumstances of superarmament, as a result of which it is far from enough for the "winning" side, if we can put it thus, to have military power, or power in general, but it needs a new global strategy and, above all, an acceptable policy.

In the cold war, the "adversary" was not defeated militarily, and so the old relations between winner and loser cannot be applied here. There are no peace agreements or reparations, and no submission to the will of the winner. Even the small-scale wars that followed the first steps into the new era more or less ended without a winner and in a totally untypical manner. The nature of war itself in the new conditions is not our subject today—we do not have enough space to engage in such a debate—and therefore we will go back to the "Partnership" and to its essence. The plan is completely political in nature, and yet it is associated with the United States and its new strategic position, and the new strategy in the new conditions, and NATO as a military alliance for the defense of the Western Alliance. The military elements of the partnership are not ignored; on the contrary, they are quite emphasized.

Last year (August 1994) the renowned U.S. historian and politician Henry Kissinger expressed reservations and criticism about U.S. policy on the "partnership," but this does not mean that we have to accept his judgments automatically. I think it is good to take these views into account as well, if for no other reason than for the sake of adopting a realistic attitude free of euphoria toward the agreement and toward everything that is happening to us, particularly in relation to the country's security.

Kissinger understands "Partnership for Peace" as a specific grouping and, of course, different from NATO and the European Union, which is more than true and indisputable, but also "contradictory to them" in several aspects. Kissinger actually fears a possible "progressive erosion of the Atlantic alliance..." perhaps because in "partnership" he sees its thinning out. This and similar fears have appeared before. On one occasion the talkative German Defense Minister [Volker Ruehe] expressed himself very clearly on, for instance, how he imagined Russia in NATO—"like an elephant in a china shop," taking into account all the management difficulties that could occur in such a military and political collective.

In any case, "partnership" was approved by the NATO Council, and after the announced Russian association—today (as Kissinger says) "Partnership for Peace" has represented itself as an actual fact and it is not too late to stop it from being diluted in the Atlantic alliance. It is not difficult to see that Henry Kissinger points to protection of the Western alliance from "partnership." If this is really true or not, we have to wait and see. So far we have not had any more serious situations that could put "Partnership for Peace" to the test. The occasional strong conflicts, particularly in the political movements in the center of Europe (the "Visegrad" countries and the spreading of NATO) demonstrate the Russian attitude toward the "partnership" with preconditioning for joining. This attitude is quite relevant, because partnership is mostly accomplished in the countries of the former USSR, to whose "legacy" Russia aspires.

Henry Kissinger is very much reserved in speaking to U.S. President Bill Clinton when he says that "Partnership for Peace" is not connected with the security, but with the reconciliation, that is to say that "Partnership for Peace" is connected with our (NATO-United States) military power with the aim of creating something that has never been done before in the history of the nation-state on the European continent, that is for the sake of uniting the new free and independent states upon their own free will into Europe, instead of having new and various divisions in Europe.

Following his discussions with Bill Clinton, Henry Kissinger concludes that "in our more educated time, the use of military power for the sake of uniting the state (by its own free will) would be considered contradictory within the framework of these terms." He sees this project in all its size and space, because it encompasses the entire northern half of the globe and the countries of the Western alliance, all the countries that were in the USSR orbit (and sometimes in the area in between—the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Russia, which is designed as the "ankle" in this unity. I would here like to add that this is at the same time in correlation with the "rest of the world," if we take into account the megaproject for the new postbipolar world order.

The relation on which the "Partnership for Peace" is based, at least for now, is NATO and every country separately that wishes to be in the project. Henry Kissinger emphasizes this fact. The second fact is that this project is in the process of overcoming postbipolar contradictions and problems and that it is adapted to the European environment. The relations in other territories, for instance, have not been defined here.

I do not know if this elaboration on the "Partnership for Peace" project is indispensable, for Henry Kissinger says that it is a hybrid of Wilson's concept on collective security, on the one hand, and of Henry Wallace's "ideology" of 1940, that was presented by his successor Strobe Talbot, who is considered to be the architect of the "partnership." However, we are interested in knowing the importance of our access, particularly in reference to the security of FYROM, and in this connection, whether this access is of any importance for the future order in the Balkans, this internal powder keg.

I will immediately emphasize that NATO's and its Council's attitude toward the Republic of Macedonia stress its particularities, the exceedingly important geographic and strategic position of FYROM. This attitude was apparent in the especially fast association of our state with the European components of collective security, immediately after the formal obstacles had been removed that impeded the European association from functioning following the assessments contained in Badinter's Commission on the eve of the Yugoslav wars.

We have the right to understand this act as support for the United Nations, a united Europe, and the relevant factors with the most dominant positions in the present situation and in the present relationship of the forces in the world to the political doctrine and strategy of President Gligorov. First—assessment and recognition of FYROM's exclusive geographic and strategic position is no reason for euphoria and triumph. It is more important for us to become aware and to behave decently, with dignity, and responsibility, in accordance with the mentioned position. Second—appreciation for the doctrine and strategy with the "Kiro Gligorov" trademark can make us proud, but it must also be an impetus for us not to glorify party and leaders' successes. It is more than clear in the Balkans that there is no going back now. Regarding the new order in the Balkans, it is obvious that it will be easier with the countries that were not in the "orbit of the former USSR".... (Let me use Kissinger's vocabulary). A "Balkans" program, however, apparently exists. Perhaps it is a rough "sketch," but it is obviously all-encompassing and FYROM is objectively in the center. It is the smallest country, with the least military power, and a modest economy, but it is certainly in the center of the Balkans. This reality obliges FYROM to think seriously about the future order in the Balkans. On the basis of its historical experience and known and affirmed peaceful and active policy, FYROM could substantially help to formulate the program for the reestablishment of the Balkans, making room for its own interests that are not contrary to the interests of any other Balkan states, either in Europe or in the world community, as well as its own peaceful policy. Speaking about the future order of the Balkans, our country, making use of its position in the "Partnership for Peace," must act with more assertiveness, because nobody has felt the consequences of the hegemonistic big state doctrines like the Macedonian nation. Our contribution can be important and very useful. The Republic of Macedonia should pledge the following: —Demilitarization of the Balkans, that is, for the future Balkan constellation to be at the lowest possible level of armament; —The philosophy that the "Balkans belongs to the people of the Balkans" is unacceptable, because it is almost a century since the beginning of the eastern crisis, and with the Balkan wars, two world wars, and particularly the present Yugoslav wars, the Balkan states have shown that they are not able to manage their policies in a reasonable way.

There is no doubt that accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the "Partnership for Peace" means a step forward in strengthening our defense and general security. In spite of this realistic assessment there is no possibility to relax because a "partnership" cannot eliminate overnight the existing and real dangers and threats. The relations around us are charged with difficulties, particularly the relationship toward FYROM as a state of the Macedonian nation. Nevertheless, our country's membership in the "Partnership for Peace" enhances the quality of our security in the region—and will help prevent the war spreading to our region and stop aggression. Since our security is closely associated with the resoluteness of the peace efforts and operations in the region, the inclusion of the Republic of Macedonia in this program has a favorable impact on the success of the efforts of the United Nations.

Of course, "partnership" cannot be an ideal formula for the relations and problems with which the international community is confronted following the major social, political, and military upheavals, particularly because this "partnership" operates in a new space between the major centers of power. This does not, however, detract from the importance of the event, particularly for the Republic of Macedonia and its security.

Poll on FYROM's Future, NATO Membership

AU2011174095 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by Gordana Risteska: "Macedonia Awakens—in the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the 45 years that Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] spent as a constituent republic of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which we and the world considered to be "something in between" the East and the West, and after five transitional years in which the Republic of Macedonia has been trying to adapt its political and economic system to the Western pluralist and free-market model, which is actually the trend in most countries of the former communist bloc, an exclusive poll by DATA PRESS for NOVA MAKEDONIJA entitled "Citizens About Macedonia's Place in the World," has answered the questions of whether Macedonia is closer to West or East Europe and where they see Macedonia's future.

The telephone poll carried out by DATA PRESS—which encompassed the opinions of 1,200 people living in nine Macedonian towns who are between 18 and 50 years of age and are from nearly all social categories and different national and ethic affiliations—suggests that nearly half the Macedonian citizens see their country, now and in the future, more as an integral part of West Europe than of the eastern part of the old continent.

So, 49.83 percent think Macedonia is already in the West, 20.67 percent think it is closer to the East, and 29.50 percent said that they did not know.

The greatest percentage of people (42.83 percent) answered that they see Macedonia's future in the West.

It is interesting that a high percentage (21.33 percent) feel that Macedonia should remain independent and should not join any alliances.

It is also indicative that men, mostly those between 18 and 29 years of age, as well as those over 50, are more optimistic than the women of the same age, and thus 58.22 percent of men and 41.88 percent of women still consider Macedonia as, so to say, a "small Europe," while, in the future, they see it being integrated into Europe (men—8.97 percent, women—37.01 percent).

There is nearly no difference between the sexes who are inclined to think that we are in the East (men—20.84 percent, women—20.45 percent).

There is the assumption that, by placing Macedonia in the West or in the East, the people actually know more about the values of the Western model that has been established for decades than about the characteristics of transitional societies, successors of the former eastern communist model that are yet to reach the West.

In this case, the "Western dream" of half of Macedonia probably means that the country is seen or wishes to be seen as, economically and politically stable; far from an ideological monopoly, and therefore pluralist; far from a planned economy, on the way to conquering market economic values; technologically modern and computerized; with citizens not as a mass but as individuals with individual rights, freedoms, and responsibilities; leaning on traditional moral values, among which includes the family; socially secure, with a decent average salary and lifestyle, employed or at least temporarily unemployed; with an education system that is compatible with the level of the developed world; and with unrestricted possibilities for personal and creative initiatives.

This is, more or less, the idealized picture of Europe and the West.

Those who think that we are closer to the eastern part of Europe (20.67 percent) see, or would like to see, Macedonia, as a country, with more or less undeveloped capital; which is less secure and in political chaos; without moral values; legally insecure, exposed to crime; with an economy incapable of simple production; socially insecure and divided, regardless of the employment scale; and without prospects for the younger generations. Normally, this is the real picture, with some exceptions, of the former communist countries in transition.

Regarding those who place Macedonia in the West, it is possible to see their support for the basic directions and the general policy of the present authority, that is for President Kiro Gligorov, who is directly responsible for the country's foreign policy.

On the other hand, it is possible to assume that the feelings of those who have a pro-Western orientation date from Ante Markovic's time, which they remember as a time of general and the first real well-being.

Those who prefer to see Macedonia in the West probably do so for a reason that is not without significance—security. This could be seen in the answers to the following question: "How do you see Macedonian membership in NATO?" Up to 60 percent believe that the country should find its place under the "defensive" umbrella of the Western military alliance, while 23.50 percent are against such membership.

We could say that men are more concerned with security and a greater percentage of men favor Macedonia's membership of NATO (men—61.30, women— 58.77 percent). This view is particularly shared by the generation over 50 (64.02 percent).

It is interesting that men aged 30 to 49 are the most numerous group in opposition to membership of the Western "defensive" umbrella, while 21.17 percent of young people between 18 and 29 do not have an answer to this question.

As for those who are in favor of joining NATO, they belong to all categories: The highest level is among the retired (67.65 percent), but also the unemployed (54.62 percent). The highest level of opposition was registered among the private owners, while the lowest level was among students, who were also the group that had the highest level of indecision on NATO membership.

The Vlachs, for instance, are divided exactly 33.3 percent for joining NATO, the same percentage against NATO, and also the same percentage not having an opinion on joining the alliance. The Serbs in Macedonia come immediately after the Turks; that is, 44.44 percent of them are against NATO.

Private owners (70.59 percent) say that we need NATO for better security. In this category, the largest percentage are male Romanies (100 percent), Albanians, Turks, Vlachs (66.67 percent), and Macedonians (57.40 percent). Conditionally speaking, they live in Titov Veles, Stip, Gostivar, and Skopje. It is indicative that the hishest percentage of people without an opinion on joining NATO live in Kumanovo.

A high percentage of the Macedonian citizens (49.00 percent) are in favor of joining the European Union, 34.50 percent oppose this, while 16.50 percent do not know.

At first sight, it seems illogical that a low percentage of Albanians (30.08 percent) doubt Macedonia's readiness to join the European family of states and nation, knowing what the Albanian political leaders are opposed to. The poll does not pretend to answer whether this means that the Albanians disagree with their leaders or whether they simply know the situation better, taking into account the number of economic migrants from the ranks of this nationality and what it means when one says "European" or "non-European."

Major Dailies React to Kwasniewski Victory

WS2111165795

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 21 November major Warsaw vernacular dailies published editorial reaction to the election of a new president of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, a candidate of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist newspaper of record, publishes on page 2 a 400-word commentary by Chief Editor Dariusz Fikus entitled "What Kind of Future." The editor refers to Aleksander Kwasniewski's election slogan "Let's choose the future," which, in the editor's opinion, helped Kwasniewski win. Fikus points to the fact that Kwasniewski "wants to be a president of all Poles" and sees this as a positive approach, perhaps "a goal not so easy to achieve because of society's polarization." Kwasniewski will have to convince many people and groups that need not have apprehension about him and the formation he represents. It would be bad if Kwasniewski were president of only "the half" who voted for him. Fikus emphasizes that it is necessary to build bridges and to seek consensus between different electorates, people who bitterly remember the past and the younger generation for whom the modern, painful Polish history is not an argument in the elections. Such a consensus, continues Fikus, is possible only then when all doubts, even the "slightest, which surfaced around the candidates during the elections are dispelled. The future may be built if all insinuations about the past are explained, from the distant past and those quite recent." But the consensus must be about the fundumental state issues, which should not be affected by an unstable partisan, parliamentary state of affairs. Only then will there be a good future.

The direction of Poland's development was decided several years ago, writes Fikus, adding that Poland's future is membership in NATO and the EU: It is in continuation of reform at a faster pace, the evolution of self-government, privatization, a strong currency; in maintaining the independence of the Central National Bank and the media; in reform of the social security system and the health services; and in a new and wise constitution. Determination in striving for these goals should be present in the activities of the new president, and the opposition should not block the solutions to these most important problems for the country, concludes Dariusz Fikus.

NOWA EUROPA, a daily dealing mainly with financial issues, carries a 300-word editorial on page 2 by Chief Editor Andrzej Krzysztof Wroblewski entitled "A Test for Everybody." The journalist begins by saying, "If the president, who won with such a narrow margin, wants to be a president of all Poles, he must look for accord with the people of the center and not with the cement types who form his own party." This will be the toughest test for him, says Wroblewski. The world of business, which approved Kwasniewski as well as Walesa—and in some surveys even prefered Kwasniewski—reacted to Kwasniewski's election nervously. The stock market in Warsaw plunged yesterday, altough the leftist SLD/PSL coalition has governed for two years already, and the presidential elections do not bring much change. Wroblewski ponders the question of whether this situation was due to the businessmen's lack of psychological strength or, rather, to the market reaction to the political change.

A black scenario, according to Wroblewski, would be growth of the "red web," and even worse the "state web" in the form of state control and regulations hampering the free-market economy. But a good scenario also is possible, which he calls "self-limiting counterreformation." We have to give our young system a chance, concludes Wroblewski.

TRYBUNA, a left-leaning pro-SLD daily, publishes on page 1 a 250-word commentary by Chief Editor Dariusz Szymczycha underscoring the influence the left orientation has gained in the past five years. He cautiones, however, against "triumphalism" by his party and calls for decent treatment of President Walesa. In "Poland for all," everybody has a place. Unfortunately, the Polish primate spoke words far removed from tolerance and dialogue, states Szymczycha, who adds that he does not expect an apology but wants to believe that democracy will mean in Poland respect for people who differ in political views.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, a centrist independent daily, publishes a 250-word front-page editorial entitled "Poland B." Chief Editor Tomasz Wolek quotes a sarcastic statement delivered by a Kwasniewski campaign member, who said that the "Lech Walesa electorate belongs to Poland B." Wolek describes this electorate as people from large cities, educated employees from universities and students, qualified workers and entrepreneurs, the intelligentia and women. These people, he continues, are the locomotives of progress, of the democratic and market reform, a cultural avant garde of the 21st century, for which the next presidency has only five years. That is not long, concludes Wolek.

GAZETA WYBORCZA, the paper with the largest circulation of the leading dailes, publishes a brief 150-word front-page editorial, signed with the name of the paper, entitled "Appreciation." It evokes the past 15 years of Solidarity and Walesa's presence on the political scene, thanking Walesa for all he did for Poland.

Leading Politicians on Outcome of Elections

WS2111152295

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 21 November the major Warsaw vernacular dailies carry roundups of reaction by major politicians to Aleksander Kwasniewski's victory in the presidential elections and its aftermath.

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist newspaper of record, carries on pages 1 and 2 a 700-word report by Kazimierz Groblewski entitled "Where Will Walesa Go." The author quotes Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chairman of the Center Accord, as saying that Walesa "will want to remain on the political scene somehow. I think this will greatly enfeeble the Solidarity camp." Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] predicts that the outgoing president "will most probably attempt to establish a political camp to alter the current situation. The enfranchisement referendum scheduled for 18 February 1996 and the passing of the constitution, yet another battle, lie ahead. If the communists lose the referendum on the constitution, their mandate will be questioned. This may lead to earlier parliamentary elections next fall." Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski from the Presidential Chancellery confirms this theory: "The chief objective is an attempt at forming a camp that would provide a counterbalance for the left. Lech Walesa sees this as a post-Solidarity camp including a wide range of groups, from the Freedom Union to the KPN, through the Christian-National Union [ZChN] and Solidarity."

The same daily carries a separate 700-word report by "M.D.Z." on page 2 under the title "The Right Does Not Intend To Go Into the Streets; Not To Burn Effigies." The report includes Jan Olszewski's statement that he will "lay foundations for a movement that will reconstruct Poland" and his invitation to cooperate with all those "who are willing to accept the reconstruction program presented by the former prime minister in the course of the presidential campaign as well as the citizens' draft of the constitution." ZChN Chairman Ryszard Czarnecki agrees that the right "must currently form an anticommunist camp." Czarnecki says it should be built around Lech Walesa. "We should build a modern right and carry out professional marketing activities. Radicalism will not do us any good. We have to be a strong opposition group, but we should not burn Kwasniewski's effigies," states the ZChN leader.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, a centrist independent paper, carries on page 2 a 1,000-word report by Wojciech Saramonowicz and Igor Zalewski entitled "Kwasniewski Candid or Just Pretending." Among the quoted politicians is Ryszard Bugaj, chairman of the Union of Labor [UP], who voices his skepticism "about the feasibility of establishing a wide opposition bloc." He points out that "in parliament, UW [Freedom Union] and UP can cooperate only on political issues. The differences of opinion on social and economic issues are to great. The KPN does not want to cooperate with UP by definition. Besides, the opposition is focused on the government rather than the president. A lot depends on the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. If the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] attempts to take over all of the presidential ministries, the unity of the coalition may be threatened."

GAZETA WYBORCZA, a left-of-center independent daily, carries a similar, 1,000-word report on page 4 compiled by "AN," "KRZEM," "DOM," WZ, "WUKA," and the Catholic News Agency under the title "Poland After the Elections." The article says Sejm Deputy Speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the SLD expects that "Aleksander Kwasniewski, in line with declarations made during the campaign, will now open up to groups from outside the SLD. I specifically mean intellectuals who could become members of various presidential councils." Speculating on the future composition of the government, Cimoszewicz says: "I have heard the rumor that Professor Bronislaw Geremek of UW might be offered the post of foreign minister. I do not know anything about this. On the one hand, no move aimed at dialogue will surprise me; on the other, I would find such an offer astonishing, particularly in view of Prof. Geremek's most recent political decisions. I mean here the way UW behaved before the runoff. There is also the question of the extent to which such offers would be accepted by the other party." The article goes on to quote former President Wojciech Jaruzelski, who states that, "apart from a few troglodytes, no one in Poland is against democracy, a market economy, freedom of speech, and the legitimacy of the state. The differences are strictly technical: faster, slower, shallower, or deeper. The issue at hand is how far historical costumes will stand in the way of agreement. Kwasniewski is an advocate of eliminating all divisions." Speaking of the president's influence on the National Bank of Poland, the National Radio and Television Council and the appointments of new judges, Jaruzelski "advises" the newly elected president to practice great moderation and calmness in his assessment of these institutions.

Janusz Piechocinski, deputy chairman of the PSL Parliamentary Club, says that his party "did not burn any bridges" in the campaign and has now become "a mediator of agreement between various political forces." He outlines his party's policy for the immediate future: "The PSL must now defend itself against the domination of the SLD, which, after all, has the largest parliamentary club, its own president, and its own prime minister. The PSL will try to keep the victors from putting on triumphant airs. It is highly probable that Aleksander Kwasniewski will extend an invitation to UW and UP to cooperate, telling them: 'Either you help me or I will reach for people from my own party.'"

A final comment is contributed by Sosnowiec Bishop Adam Smigielski: "Those who voted for Aleksander Kwasniewski are not enemies of the church. Their choice was not due to a rejection of Christian values. They were seduced by an illusion." "The choice Poles made on Sunday means the rule of one party, and that poses a threat for the church," warns the bishop.

TRYBUNA, a leftist daily, carries a 1,500-word report on page 2 by "DS, DP" entitled "TRYBUNA's Poll." The paper cites Roman Jagielinski of the PSL, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, who comments on the condition of the governing coalition following the elections. He evaluates it as "good." "As Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski has announced, he will not dissolve parliament, then, I am convinced, he will not attempt to break up the coalition." The deputy prime Minister says the PSL is "intent on staying within the coalition until the constitutional term of the parliament expires."

Wojciech Jaruzelski, apart from sustaining the views expressed in the aforementioned GAZETA WYBORCZA report, states: "I am happy with the results of the elections. A very important and good thing has taken place for Poland."

Warsaw SZTANDAR, an independent daily, carries a 1,200-word report by "(anko, ara, kf, gw, pg, iwa, md)" on page 5 under the title "A Projection for the Next Five Years." One of the contributors is Maciej Janowski, head of the Mazowsze chapter of Solidarity, who, acknowledging the fact that the elections were democratic, does warn that the union will "quickly check what is underneath Mr. Kwasniewski's 'wrapper.'" "I personally do not have the slightest doubt that Mr. Kwasniewski represents the interests of his party's 'apparatus.' I do not know when Solidarity will go out into the streets, but it will certainly do so." He concludes by saying that Lech Walesa "will continue to play a major role."

Walesa's Staff To Challenge Election Results

LD2111142395 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1321 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 November—Deputy Jerzy Gwizdz, the head of Lech Walesa's National Electoral Staff, today submitted the following statement to PAP:

"In connection with reports on numerous cases of fraud by electoral commissions dominated by Aleksander Kwasniewski's supporters and in the wake of obvious misleading of the electorate by false statements in Aleksander Kwasniewski's personal documents, Lech Walesa's National Electoral Staff is going to take legal steps aimed at explaining these matters, which undoubtedly are significant for the presidential election results announced yesterday.

It is improper for the President of the Republic to be elected with extra ballot papers added to the ballot boxes and not by the votes of the electorate and to be reproached with giving more than one false statement, as, for example, in the personal questionnaire signed by him, which is in possession of Lech Walesa's National Electoral Staff."

Catholic Radio Questions Kwasniewski Election

LD2211120295 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1113 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Torun, 22 Nov—The Catholic Radio Maryja [based in Torun] appealed today to its listeners, asking them to submit their election protests designed to annul the presidential elections due to the fact that Aleksander Kwasniewski provided untrue information about his education. The action follows the appeal of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] Solidarity National Commission issued yesterday. The listeners were given addresses of local radio offices, Solidarity regional offices, and Lech Walesa's election staff offices, where they can obtain printed protest forms to fill in and send on.

An example of an election protest was read out on Radio Maryja programs. The protest gives as the reason for demanding the annulment of the presidential elections the fact that Kwasniewski included in the announcement about his candidacy untrue information on his education. Father Robert Stasiak said on Radio Maryja that the action is being conducted in response to the appeal by the NSZZ Solidarity National Commission, which was addressed to all Catholic radio stations. He said that about 600,000 protests are needed.

Solidarity is saying that, by giving untrue information about his university education, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] candidate "could have influenced the outcome of the election." During the campaign, emphasis was made on Kwasniewski's education to show in this way his superiority over Lech Walesa.

Solidarity To File Protest on Election's Validity

WS2211130195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by "PAD," P.W.R.: "Walesa's Campaign Staff and Solidarity; Election Protests"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *There were numerous cases of electoral commissions rigging the elections. In addition, voters were misled by the information that Aleksander Kwasniewski has a higher education. For these reasons Lech Walesa's national election staff will file an electoral protest. The same will be done by "voter Marian Krzaklewski" on behalf of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity [NSZZ "S"].* [passage omitted]

Also, the Presidium of the NSZZ "S" National Commission, which held a session in Gdansk on Tuesday, decided that union Chairman Marian Krzaklewski would, as a voter, file a protest against the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski to the office of president. "S" argues that inclusion of false data regarding the candidate's education in his official biography presented before the elections was a violation of the law on presidential elections.

According to the "S" chairman, a consequence of presentation of Kwasniewski as a person with a university diploma was an election campaign during which it was emphasized that by virtue of his education, Aleksander Kwasniewski had a considerable advantage over Lech Walesa. Results of opinion polls conducted by public opinion research organizations showed clearly that, according to voters, one of the main requirements presidential candidates should meet was having a good education. "For this reason, Aleksander Kwasniewski was presented as a well-educated person and an open-minded European who has an edge over Lech Walesa, who does not have a higher education," Krzaklewski argues. [passage omitted]

"Invalidating the elections on the grounds of providing false data on Kwasniewski's university studies does not seem possible to me. However, I do hope it will be ultimately proved that the president-elect has only a high-school education. Thus Lech Walesa would win a moral victory," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by a close aide of the incumbent president.

Signatures Being Collected

LD2211162895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1526 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 22 Nov—Since yesterday, Solidarity has been collecting signatures under the citizen's protest against the election of Aleksandr Kwasniewski for president of the Polish Republic. According to the Solidarity National Commission press office, the protest, which is to be submitted to the Supreme Court on Thursday, has already been signed by several hundred thousand citizens. A PAP journalist has learned that, in Bialystok Province alone, 50,000 signatures were collected. Printed forms ran out in Katowice Province, and people were queuing up in Gdansk to collect the forms.

The protest includes a motion to declare the presidential elections void because of a "serious violation of the law by Aleksandr Kwasniewski as a candidate for the post." According to Solidarity, false details concerning education given by the Democratic Left Alliance candidate in his application for registration misled the electorate, which had a direct impact on the election results. [passage omitted]

Lack of Support Costing PSL Ministerial Posts

LD2111145995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Danuta Waniek and Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, members of Aleksander Kwasniewski's election staff, said at a news conference that the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] will not be favored in the allocation of ministerial posts that are in the domain of the president-elect. They said that the PSL made its own decision about that by not supporting Aleksander Kwasniewski in the presidential elections.

They also said that Aleksander Kwasniewski will give up the posts he holds before the inauguration.

On Saturday, Kwasniewski is to resign as chairman of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], and the National Assembly Constitutional Commission will elect its new chairman on 5 December.

Stock Market Plunges After Kwasniewski Election

WS2211121595 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 21 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "KB": "The Warsaw Stock Exchange Plummets After the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The stock market reacted nervously to Aleksander Kwasniewski's victory in the presidential elections. The shares of nearly all listed companies depreciated—some to the lowest admissible levels—and the shares of 16 companies plunged to the lowest values in a year.

"Our exchange always reacts nervously to certain events," Wieslaw Rozlucki, president of the Warsaw Stock Exchange, said regarding the results of the recent session. He does not think, however, that the election of Kwasniewski poses the danger of a crash. "Declarations issued by the leftist candidate do not give any grounds to fear for the future of the Polish capital market," he added, appealing to investors for more restraint in their assessment of political developments.

The stock exchange dealers claim the next few sessions will show whether Rozlucki was overly optimistic. Everything will depend on how the small investors will behave: whether they will "run for their lives" and start selling out or follow the example of the "sharks," whose emotions have long since yielded to shrewd calculation.

Oleksy Confident of Finding New Ministers

LD2111171495 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1634 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Nov—Asked about appointments in the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries, whose heads have submitted resignations, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said today that he will have candidates for ministerial posts soon, even within a week or 10 days.

The prime minister does not agree with the view held by the foreign minister that there is no place for nonpolitical experts in the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party government because the minister himself "has played such a role" in this government.

Commenting on the suggestions from his adviser Andrzej Drawicz that Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Andrzej Olechowski, or Bronislaw Geremek would be good candidates for foreign minister, the prime minister emphasised their professionalism, knowledge of the world, and great authority, but, as he stressed, "this is not an overriding condition when choosing a minister."

"This is not a government crisis but a simple change of ministers," Oleksy said. He added that he regrets the resignations being "so sudden, so quick, and so decisive." He gave assurances that his cooperation with these ministers was good.

May Come From Outside Coalition

LD2111135095 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1240 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Nov (PAP)—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy told journalists today after a meeting of the government coalition that possible appointments to the posts of foreign minister and internal affairs minister do not "automatically" have to come from the ranks of the [government] coalition. He added that the president-elect will definitely resign as chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], and that who is to replace him will be discussed on Saturday at a meeting of the SdRP Supreme Council.

Oleksy said it is too early to say whether the people who could possibly take over the posts in the two ministries will come from the coalition. He added that he is to have a conversation with National Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski this afternoon.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych said after the meeting of the coalition that "the will to continue the coalition was confirmed." In his opinion, the fact the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] did not support either of the candidates before the second election round will not have an impact on the functioning of the coalition. He admitted, however, that this is a subject of discussion. He stressed that appointments to the Presidential Chancellery are the president's matter. When asked whether the PSL had any expectations in this respect, he said: "I personally do not have such expectations."

Franciszek Stefaniuk, deputy chairman of the PSL parliamentary floor group, who took part in the meeting, said that the atmosphere after the presidential elections was discussed. He said that personnel issues were not discussed. "Both sides expressed their opinion on the further functioning of the coalition in accordance with the coalition agreement signed earlier," Stefaniuk said.

Possible Future Presidential Aides Reported

WS2111145595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 21 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by "AN": "Kwasniewski—One Day After Victory; A Few Hours Rest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski took a rest near Warsaw yesterday.

Incumbent Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, deputy chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, will probably replace him as the party's chairman. Kwasniewski announced this in Zielona Gora last week.

It is not known whom Kwasniewski will invite to work with him in the President's Chancellery. So far he has only said that he will offer posts in the Presidential Palace to his closest aides who were members of his campaign staff: Danuta Waniek, Krzysztof Janik, and Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

Danuta Waniek gave assurances yesterday that Kwasniewski had not offered posts in the Chancellery to anyone yet: "We are waiting for the State Electoral Commission to announce the official results. Besides, the incumbent president will continue to work for another month."

Waniek is hoping that over this month the "atmosphere" surrounding the relations between Walesa and Kwasniewski will be "decent."

"Due to the respect for Lech Walesa, regardless of the fact that he is our political adversary, he must be given a chance to leave peacefully and with dignity, in a way suitable for the president of the Polish Republic," Waniek told the POLISH PRESS AGENCY.

Kwasniewski Hailed as 'Predictable' Politician

MM2211085295 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 17 Nov 95 p 4

[Article by Sejm Deputy Jerzy Szteliga, head of the Aleksander Kwasniewski Opole Election Committee: "Why Kwasniewski?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reasons are self-evident. Kwasniewski will not run about brandishing a tomahawk, nor will he consent to have the law made subject to the whims of one of his advisers. As president, he will not build up his political backup force by leaning exclusively on people from his own political camp, but, as he has demonstrated repeatedly in the past, for instance in the case of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, which is headed by Bronislaw Geremek, by offering the chance of cooperation to people from a seemingly altogether different political orientation. Thus, it will be a presidency that will create opportunities for action for people who can demonstrate that they are competent rather than fall back on their past credits.

Another hallmark of Kwasniewski's presidency will be that, unlike Walesa, who resorts almost exclusively to his power to veto any new initiatives, he will make use of the opportunities to initiate new legislation, thereby influencing state policy in real terms rather than through slogans. Contrary to what the other presidential candidate claims, opposed as he is to the left-wing orientation, the constitution currently in force offers the president many opportunities to realize his election promises. The thing is that he himself should want to make use of these opportunities and also be capable of making use of them.

The inevitable propagandist thesis that is being propounded in the attacks against Kwasniewski is that he is now attempting to obliterate the past, exonerate those who were really responsible for all kinds of former abuses, and completely whitewash those who actively participated in the workings of the apparatus of totalitarian force. But Kwasniewski has declared often enough that the perpetrators of all those crimes must, and will, be brought to justice, while those whose only "fault" was to believe in a philosophy that has eventually proved to be faulty and to lead nowhere should on no account be rejected and despised.

Kwasniewski is a predictable politician, which gives him a welcome advantage over his rival. This quality is of considerable importance not only on the domestic scene but also in the international arena. The thesis that Kwasniewski's election to the presidency will endanger Poland's international relations seems to be completely groundless.

President Walesa May Set Up Foundation

WS2211123995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by "PAD": "Reviewer of Lech Walesa; Partially in Warsaw, Partially in Gdansk"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *President Lech Walesa arrived in Gdansk on Tuesday at noon. He wants to stay with his closest family for a couple of days and rest. He is not going to give any interviews. Next week he is going to visit a few regions, those in which he lost to Aleksander Kwasniewski.* [passage omitted]

Success in Two Years' Time

He has not thought about coming back to the Gdansk Shipyard and working there. However, he does not rule out that this will happen.

As a former president, he wants to stay in Gdansk for some time. "This is where my family lives. After so many years of absence, I want to help people in Gdansk as well." He also wants to be in Warsaw: "I will certainly open an office in the capital city." He is thinking of setting up his own foundation, which would be similar to those established by former U.S. presidents. "'A Free Poland' would probably be a good name," he says.

He does not want to form his own party: "This would be a bad idea." He is counting on the parties of the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition to reach an agreement and start cooperation, which would result in the establishment of a joint election bloc. Then it would be possible to expect a victory in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 1997. "We will have the government and the prime minister, which will be a counterbalance to the post-communists."

The first such agreement has already been reached in Gdansk. "There will be more. There may only be problems with Mr. Jan (former Prime Minister Olszewski—PAD). The Freedom Union will probably decide to participate in this common work." [passage omitted]

Gdansk Activists Seek To Form Political Bloc

WS2111153495 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by Jaroslaw Popek from Gdansk: "Alliance of Six Groups; Beginning of a Parliamentary Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of six post-Solidarity groups want to form a bloc the purpose of which will be to win the parliamentary elections. Yesterday, Gdansk activists of the Center Accord [PC], Freedom Union [UW], Christian-National Union [ZChN], Conservative Party [PK], Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, and Solidarity ["S"] issued a joint statement.

"After the presidential elections, Poland has found itself in a dramatic situation. If we look at the entire country, the reason for the success of the left wing was the inability of the post-Solidarity groups to create an efficient political counterbalance to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party. In the Gdansk region, the result of the elections is different (...). We declare the will of acting in favor of a joint electoral agreement, which would enable us to win the next parliamentary elections. Self-government elections in our region proved that this is possible," the statement reads.

Participating in the meeting in the main office of the Gdansk UW were, among others, Bogdan Borusewicz, Donald Tusk, and Jacek Taylor of UW; Aleksander Hall, Franciszka Cegielska, and Jan Kozlowski of the PK; Waclaw Balinski of the PC, Jerzy Grzywacz of the ZChN, and Bogdan Olszewski of "S."

The statement is a declaration of the Gdansk activists of these parties.

"Agreement is difficult, but it is the only real chance to break the SLD's monopoly on power," said Sejm Deputy Borusewicz.

The signatories would like to maintain the different characters of their parties. They do not want to form a new party. They do not know yet whether the movement will be headed by Lech Walesa. "Walesa has proved that he has the power to attract people. However, now he must be given time to think," said Hall.

"Walesa must answer to himself in which direction he would like to go," added Olszewski.

Solidarity Leader Urges Bloc With Walesa

WS2111145695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by B.I.W. and P.W.R.: "Union Wants To Form Platform Bloc; Solidarity and Walesa on the Same Axis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Marian Krzaklewski told RZECZPOSPOLITA that the elections proved the existence of two major forces aside from the postcommunists: Solidarity ["S"] and Lech Walesa. The union will want to put into effect its platform and persuade Lech Walesa's electorate to accept it and consolidate. Such a bloc should be headed by Lech Walesa. Important phases will be the referenda on enfranchisement and the constitution.*

Krzaklewski believes that the primary reason Aleksander Kwasniewski won the elections was the inability of politicians from the independence camp to field one joint candidate, which the national "S" congress had urged. There are signals from the Silesia-Dabrawa "S" region that "the union will have to return to the political scene as a leader of the reform camp, whereas center-right leaders should think about what they did during the election campaign."

The "S" leader believes that it is advisable to form a bloc that would prepare Walesa's electorate for enfranchisement and constitutional referenda. This is because people may negatively assess the forces that are currently in power and put mistakes right. "The axis of this consolidated tactical bloc, based on one platform," should be Lech Walesa and "S," as a trade union and a social movement grouped around its platform. "Lech Walesa was chosen by the people as a potential leader of such a movement. His electorate was only slightly less numerous than that of Aleksander Kwasniewski. He was burdened with five years of mistakes—not only his mistakes, but also the mistakes of all of the subsequent governments, ministers, politicians, and unsuccessful political and economic moves," said Krzaklewski.

The "S" leader believes that setting up party structures would be tantamount to "carving the skin on a wounded bear, a still strong but wounded bear." Of course, the movement would get these circles ready to consolidate before the parliamentary elections.

Right now the union is trying to show that it will not want any confrontation with authorities—in fact, the authorities will lead to a confrontation with "S." According to Krzaklewski, the union will have to become a more active defender of employees because employees' rights and the rights of many people will be jeopardized as a result of the "postcommunists' dominating all of the power centers in Poland" and as a result of the pressure exerted by lobbying groups linked to them. The authorities, Krzaklewski believes, despite declarations on dialogue and a platform that is good for the people, do not have any specific intention to implement the "S" platform. They will "neglect" negotiations with "S" before making key economic, social, and political decisions; consequently, the union will have to react. "In this configuration, the slogan 'No mercy for 'S'' keeps reappearing, and Mr. Kwasniewski has not given it up. They will provoke the union and force us to determinedly defend employees' rights," Krzaklewski believes.

The "S" leader would like to arouse interests in his platform also among those people who voted for Aleksander Kwasniewski "for other than ideological reasons. Perhaps the fact that they supported Kwasniewski was a reaction to the vagueness of the political scene, to the quarrels in the independence camp; maybe by voting for a new president they expected changes. I think that 50 percent of Kwasniewski's electorate are people who cannot be criticized."

"S" lawyers are checking if there are legal grounds to undermine the election results because false information about one of the presidential candidates was disseminated. In the buildings where the elections were held, posters with information about the candidates, as well as all other brochures on Aleksander Kwasniewski, contained information that he has a higher economic education. This was denied by the leadership of the university where he studied.

Marian Krzaklewski stated yesterday that we are witnessing "an illegal campaign of the government against mass enfranchisement." The government is advertising the National Investment Funds program as the Mass Privatization Program. It is also saying that people will get shareholder certificates, whereas in reality they will buy them (the 1990 Privatization Law provides that every citizen will receive an enfranchisement certificate free of charge). According to Krzaklewski, the purpose of all this is to persuade the people that there is no need to carry out the process of mass enfranchisement because it is already under way (in February a referendum on this issue is to be held).

Civil Defense Upgrade Needed for NATO Entry

WS2111160995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 19 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by "DW": "Security. 'Partnership for Peace' Requirements; Civil Defense on Our Way to NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In NATO states, the formations ensuring the security of civilians are just as important as the Army. The condition of Polish Civil Defense [OC], however, is so bad that it may stand in the way of our joining NATO. "They will not accept us into the alliance unless we solve the problems of civilian protection," warn Polish OC officers.*

The OC has been underfunded for years. In the NATO states, $10-15 per capita is spent annually on the protection of civilians, whereas in Poland that figure for 1994 was a mere 8 cents, and for 1994 7 cents. These amounts are insufficient even to maintain current resources—each year approximately 20 percent of equipment perishes, mainly medicine and chemicals.

The "Partnership for Peace" project obliges the Polish OC to adopt Western organizational models. "Even though we are willing to implement them, Poland is not yet prepared to do that," says Colonel Janusz Baginski, head of the OC Staff.

In the NATO countries, "national committees" consisting of representatives of the relevant services are responsible for protecting civilians in times of war and natural calamities.

"In Poland, no one body is responsible," claims Baginski. Fire prevention, for example, falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In times of war and natural disasters, the chief of the OC takes over. In addition, there is the Team for Emergencies and Crises at the Office of the Council of Ministers and the National Security Office [BBN], subordinated to the president of the Polish Republic. Conflicts arose, for example, during the calamitous flood in Kielce Voivodship last September, when the BBN representative who came to inspect the disaster site wanted to issue orders to military units.

The state administration takes far more power from the local governments than the "national committees" in NATO states do.

"Excessive centralization is the distinctive feature of Eastern OC systems," claims Michael Braham, director of operational planning at the Canadian OC. Local governments in Poland cannot protect civilians on their own because they only follow instructions issued by the central administration, which does not always provide adequate financial means.

Thus far, we have received computer software from NATO; next year we will adapt the methods of warning against danger and signaling for help to Western standards. If there were a failure at the Czech nuclear energy plant in Dukovany and the southeastern parts of Poland were contaminated, relief units from Germany would most probably get stuck on the border. No one knows what documents the relief workers should show, who is to be held responsible for any damage they might cause, or who is to notify them in the first place.

Delegation Visits Swedish Military Plane Maker

WS2111142795 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 16 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by Ryszard Rogon: "To Sneak a Look at 'Gripen'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Early in November, a delegation of PZL WSK "Mielec" SA, our biggest aviation company, paid an official visit to the Saab plant in Sweden. Aside from the company's director, Wieslaw Pastula, the delegation consisted of experts in many aviation domains. This triggered positive reactions among the hosts, who expressed very favorable opinions on the expertise and professionalism of our engineers.*

The guests were first of all shown the production lines where the multifunction Gripen is assembled. Constructed as part of the JAS project (Swedish acronym for a reconnaissance fighter plane), the plane is most often described by experts as the plane of the 21st century. Some of these planes are already being used by the armed forces of our northern neighbors; as many as 140 planes have been ordered in all. Right now planes whose numbers begin with 20 are undergoing the last tests in the factory.

Early in October the factory presented for the first time another Gripen, a two-seater called JAS 39B. This version will be used both in training and in combat tasks. The machine is especially fit for dangerous and complex missions that require two-person crews.

Saab is determined to transfer almost the entire production of the Gripen plane to our country. This decision has been approved by the Swedish Government. The approval was necessary because the project would entail an investment of millions of dollars.

This might be an opportunity for our air forces, which, aside from the Gripen planes, would receive as early as 1996 Viggen planes along with the entire infrastructure needed to use them. The avionics of modernized Viggen AJS 37 planes is the same as in the Gripen planes. The Swedish partner also is ready to provide the necessary training.

Recently, Saab representatives have become very active in the field of marketing. They set up a company with a British aviation firm, thus gaining more markets for its products. In addition, intensive talks are under way on the possibility of selling the Gripen planes to the Hungarians. The final decision on this issue will probably be made next year.

The Swedes do not conceal the fact that, if the plane were manufactured in Mielec, the production costs would be reduced quite substantially; it would cost between 22 and 25 million zlotys. It would thus be one of the most modern and cheapest combat planes in serial production in the world.

Minister Delivers 1996 Budget Report in Sejm

LD2211152395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 22 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, who presented the budget bill in the Sejm today, said that the budget for next year is to be a budget of both economic growth and political compromise. The deputy prime minister pointed out that this is the third draft budget, taking into account the Strategy for Poland program, which was prepared by the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] government coalition. Over to Stanislawa Stec, our parliamentary reporter:

[Stec] The draft budget presented here will, according to Grzegorz Kolodko, help maintain a high rate of economic growth and curb inflation. At the same time, the government is promising an improvement in living conditions, increased individual incomes, and an improvement in the efficiency of public services. This requires a correct allocation of budget funds. They are increasing in real terms but are not sufficient to cover all of the needs, the government says. Hence the need to choose priorities.

The following have been chosen as the priorities: public security, education and universities, the restructuring of the countryside, reform of the health service, housing construction, and culture.

According to the government draft budget, the budget deficit is not to exceed 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product—that is, the value of everything we shall produce and manufacture. This is to help curb inflation down to 17 percent. In the opinion of Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, the condition for curbing inflation is a correct monetary policy, particularly the maintaining of interest rates at a level that will not increase inflation. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko said that his government expects from the National Polish Bank [NBP] solutions on how to limit inflation rather than forecasts.

NBP President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz said that the objectives described by Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko cannot be achieved solely through the use of banking instruments but that an appropriate economic policy is needed.

The SLD parliamentary floor group has supported the budget bill and is prepared to defend it. The PSL parliamentary floor group also accepts the budget, although not without reservations. In its opinion, this budget is a compromise between needs and possibilities. [passage omitted]

Control Over Trade in Military Technology

95EP0193A Warsaw PRZEGLAD RZADOWY in Polish No 49-50, Jul-Aug 95 pp 142-146

[Article based on materials from the Department of Export Controls of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations: "Monitoring of Trade in Arms and Military Technologies"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Since the late 1980's the problem of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a fundamental element of international politics on a global scale. Hence the growing importance of the Polish system of control over foreign trade in advanced products and technologies designed for both military and civilian purposes. Today we will describe what is being protected and how. [passage omitted]

Poland is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and in late 1994 it joined the Australia Group. Our country has long been a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and Polish experts participated in drafting the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which we shall soon ratify. Under the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Polish activities in the nuclear domain have been subject to inspection. [passage omitted]

To the countries of the former Eastern bloc, including Poland, pursuing a nonproliferation policy and applying effective export controls is nowadays a prerequisite for access to modern products and technologies. Only by adhering to the principles of such policy can Poland enjoy a good name in the world of international business and count on major foreign investments. The influx of high technologies is of huge importance to a developing economy. Only an effective monitoring of the exports of Polish-made goods and technologies in accordance with world standards will facilitate for Poland access to the most up-to-date foreign goods, technologies, and technological thought, which in its turn will contribute to improving the quality of our domestic products and by the same token will assure for Polish producers broader access to international markets. Membership in the above-named organizations assures credibility and affords the possibility of influencing the nature of international regulations concerning export controls.

In the opinion of specialists at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is in Poland's interest, for reasons of national security, to strengthen the regimen of nonproliferation of nuclear arms and to introduce total prohibition against the use of chemical weapons in Europe. Moreover, in view of the efforts of Polish diplomacy to have our country admitted to the political and economic structures of the West—especially to the European Union and NATO—it should be borne in mind that their member countries belong to antiproliferation organizations. The European Union follows its own common and uniform regulations governing export controls, to which we must adapt ourselves as an associate member, and in the future a full member.

The participation of our country in international trade in high technologies (especially the so-called sensitive ones) depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of our own system of monitoring trade in these technologies and their utilization.

Domestic System of Monitoring Foreign Trade in Goods and Technologies

Work on creating a national system of monitoring foreign trade in goods and technologies in Poland was begun in March 1990. Several months later the Ministerial Council accepted a model of the Polish monitoring system, which was followed by an exchange of diplomatic notes with eight Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] countries. In these notes the Polish Government declared that it would introduce that system and undertake cooperation with other countries. The legislative process began in December 1991. On 2 December 1993 the Sejm passed a bill concerning the guidelines for detailed controls of foreign trade in goods and technologies, in connection with international agreements and commitments. The text of that bill was published in DZIENNIK USTAW, No. 129, 24 December 1993, and the bill itself took effect on 25 March 1994.

That legal act charged the minister of foreign economic cooperation with the duty of creating and applying a monitoring system that would prevent unlimited exports of goods and technologies having dual (civilian and military) applications, comprised in international agreements. Owing to its legal settlement of that issue, Poland was deleted from the restrictive list of Cocom. Our country became, by the same token, obligated to monitor the utilization of advanced technologies and certain raw materials and products—to verify whether that utilization is consonant with their declared purpose, and also to monitor the exportation, transit, and reexportation of these items.

Under our national monitoring system, government agencies must cooperate with producers, exporters, and importers. These groups are expected to be familiar with the regulations in force and voluntarily respect national policy, being aware of the advantages ensuing from such cooperation.

Here the interest is mutual: The government thus implements the premises of foreign policy and economic strategy, while the enterprises and firms are provided with access to modern technologies and Western capital and can expand the exports of their products. Owing to an efficient operation of this system, the country is gaining the confidence of its international partners. Also not unimportant is the fact that this monitoring is performed internally by enterprises under the supervision of the government rather than by foreign experts.

Besides, such actual monitoring has to be exercised by all users of "dangerous" goods and technologies—not just by firms and enterprises but also by research and development centers, institutes, universities, etc.

The pillars of the Polish monitoring system are:

1. Export monitoring, which verifies the consonance between the conditions of the export of goods and technologies and the requirements of international agreements and obligations;

2. Import controls, or registration of the goods and technologies subject to special foreign trade controls;

3. Reexport controls, which verify the admissibility of the exports of goods and technologies for which import certificates have been issued

4. Transit controls, intended to prevent illegal transfers of goods and technologies across Polish territory.

The agency coordinating the system for monitoring trade in goods and technologies is the Department of Export Controls at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. This department handles the monitoring of exports and imports of goods and technologies, issues certificates and permits for trade in these items, manages the related database, directs monitoring teams, cooperates with export control agencies in other countries, and organizes training activities. In this domain, the following other ministries cooperate with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation: Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, National Defense, and Industry and Trade. Other cooperating agencies are: the Office for State Protection, Border Guards, the Main Customs Office, and the State Atomic Energy Agency.

At enterprises, the CEO or chairman (in the case of joint stock companies) is responsible for adherence to the guidelines for monitoring trade in "sensitive" items. These guidelines must be incorporated into the charter of the enterprise. In addition, the related rights and duties of discrete employees must be defined in detail, as must be the organizational structure and operating procedure of the monitoring team.

Special monitoring of foreign trade applies, as we read in the Law of 2 December 1993, to:

—Goods and technologies comprised in agreements and commitments concerning national security;

—Chemical substances, microorganisms, viruses, bacteria, and toxins, as well as equipment and technologies which can be used to manufacture chemical or biological weapons;

—Goods and technologies essential to the nuclear fuel cycle and serving to produce nuclear explosive devices;

—Missile technologies;

—Goods and technologies subject to special controls pursuant to international commitments; this does not affect dangerous substances and their wastes.

Detailed monitoring lists were published in a supplement to MONITOR POLSKI, No. 19 of 1994, and they are available for inspection (in several languages) at the Department of Export Controls, Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation.

Polish legislation does not, however, define the geographical directions in which shipments of goods and technologies are subject to additional controls. The guidelines contained in the international nonproliferation agreements define the situations and conditions in which shipments may be rejected and provide for the exchange of information on countries and objects of special risk.

Several kinds of documents are used for monitoring trade:

—the application for an import permit or an import certificate, which the applicant entity files, together with attachments, with the Department of Export Controls, Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation;

—the import permit, which is an official decision issued by the Department of Export Controls and intended for the Polish customs services which admit a given item to the Polish customs territory;

—the official certificate, which is transmitted to foreign export monitoring offices and serves as official assurance that the goods shipment or technology it precisely describes is intended for importation into Polish territory, that its importation is under official monitoring, and that its re-exportation may occur only with the consent of the Department of Export Controls;

—the delivery confirmation certificate, which is an official confirmation, issued by the customs office, that the importer has presented credible proofs of the delivery of the goods or technologies described in the import certificate and their importation into Polish territory.

An entrepreneur who is interested in exporting an item on the monitoring list submits to the Department of Export Controls, Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, an application for an export permit, whereupon the export permit, when granted by the Department of Export Controls, is submitted to Polish customs services; it authorizes the exporter to export outside Polish territory specified goods or technologies.

The import certificate and the permits for the importation or exportation of goods and technologies are not issued to:

—individuals or legal entities not engaging in legitimate business activities;

—persons sentenced for violations of the law on the guidelines for trade subject to special controls; and

—entities which the special monitoring system has found to be in violation of the provisions of said law.

Another reason for refusal to issue such documents or for revoking those already issued may be the interests of the national economy, considerations of national security and national defense, or restrictions ensuing from international obligations.

[Box, p 144]

Legal Foundations for Monitoring Foreign Trade in Goods and Technologies

—Law of 2 December 1993 on Guidelines for Special Controls of Foreign Trade in Goods and Technologies in Connection with International Understandings and Commitments (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 598, No. 192, 24 December 1993).

—Executive Order of 23 March 1994 of the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Concerning Lists of Goods and Technologies Under Special Foreign Trade Controls (MONITOR POLSKI, together with Supplement, Item 148, No. 19, 25 March 1994).

—Executive Order of 5 August 1994 of the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Concerning the Formats of Monitoring Authorization Blanks and Adherence to Requirements for Trade in Goods and Technologies under Special Trade Controls in Connection with International Understandings and Commitments (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 460, No. 95, 9 September 1994).

—Executive Order of the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Concerning the Information To Be Contained in the Records of Monitoring of and Adherence to Requirements for Trade in Goods and Technologies under Special Controls in Connection with International Understandings and Commitments (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 461, No. 95, 9 September 1994).

—Executive Order of the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Concerning the Procedure for Keeping Records of Foreign Trade in Goods and Technologies under Special Controls in Connection with International Understandings and Commitments (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 462, No. 95, 9 September 1994).

—Executive Order of the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation Concerning the Formats of Applications for Import Certificates and Permits for the Importation, Exportation, and Transit of Goods and Technologies, the Documents That Should Be Appended To These Applications, and the Formats of the Import Certificate, the Delivery Confirmation Certificate, and the Permits for the Importation, Exportation, and Transit of Goods and Technologies under Special Controls in Connection with International Understandings and Commitments (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 463, No. 95, 9 September 1994; and DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 668, No. 131, 5 December 1994).

Iliescu Delays Decision to Run for Presidency

AU2111173095 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 18 Nov 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "President Ion Iliescu Will Not Decide Whether To Run for the Presidency Before the Local Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu will decide whether to run for a new presidential term only after the local elections scheduled for the beginning of next year. "I am in no hurry. There is no need for me to rush things. This would only cause unnecessary tension," he told the head of the Romanian state to the MEDIAFAX news agency. First of all, he added, Parliament will have to pass the laws regulating the local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, namely, the Law on Political Parties, as well as the Electoral Law. The Law on the Political Parties, which contains stipulations regarding the founding and functioning of political organizations, has already been passed by the Chamber of Deputies. As to the new Electoral Law, this bill has not been debated yet by any of the legislative chambers. "Let us get the local elections over first, and then we will talk about the candidacy," President Iliescu concluded.

Official Views 'Territorial Dispute' With Ukraine

AU2111151895 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Nov 95 p 6

[Interview with PNTCD Senator Valentin Gabrielescu, by Mihaela Iordache; place and date not given: "It Is Clear That There Is a Territorial Dispute Between Romania and Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Iordache] Mr. Valentin Gabrielescu, in your capacity as member of the Senate's Foreign Policy Commission, would you please say something about the Romanian-Ukrainian talks on the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two states. What was the cause of dissension?

[Gabrielescu] It is clear that there is a territorial dispute between Romania and Ukraine, which has its roots in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This dispute must be resolved in a friendly manner in the peace treaty between Romania and Ukraine. Therefore, we argued very strongly that Ukraine should be admitted in the Council of Europe. The instant everyone voted for Ukraine's admission to the European Union [as published], the Ukrainians were very worried that we would vote against that act. The reason for this concern was that, as members of the same European organization, the discussions between our delegations will be more frank. It seems that during the latest discussions in Bucharest, the Ukrainians got a bit upset and made some surprising statements. I do not give up hope that they will return to their better feelings because the problem of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is not just a problem between Romania and Ukraine. It is a problem that concerns the whole of Europe. Now, as members of the European community, they have to behave accordingly. If I were foreign minister, I would not give up on this provision in the treaty referring to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This is a long term act and if this government is going to conclude a treaty that is not satisfactory for Romania from this viewpoint, the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] will not ratify an unsatisfactory treaty. For the time being, the negotiations have been suspended and a new round of talks will follow.

[Iordache] How do you view the latest accusations from Bulgaria against Romania?

[Gabrielescu] In Bulgaria there is propaganda that Romania allegedly has territorial claims. That is not true. The territorial issue between Romania and Bulgaria was solved once, by treaty, and an exchange of population took place. Nevertheless, it is true that in our country various publications contain maps that include the Quadrilateral [southern part of Dobrogea]. These publications reach Bulgaria and certainly the Bulgarians do not like them. I believe that we should avoid this, that is, we should not stir things up when we have no chance of winning. We have enough problems as it is, we do not need any others of this kind.

PDAR Asks Vacaroiu Government To Step Down

AU2111150995 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Nov 95 p 7

[Article by Aura Titiriga: "PDAR Pulls the Vacaroiu Cabinet's Seat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agrarian leader Victor Surdu asked yesterday for the resignation of the entire Vacaroiu Cabinet "not through a censure motion, but through an act of honor." The reasons that the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] sent the press this proposal are the following: the defective antinational policy, in all its aspects, and the government's fiscal policy of systematic devaluation of the leu [national currency]. "The dismissals should start with the current minister of agriculture, who would do better not to appear on television with statements ordered by the prime minister and other members of the government" said Victor Surdu. The alternative proposed by the agrarians is a government of sacrifice that would include all political forces of the current spectrum, led by the diplomat Teodor Melescanu [foreign minister].

"The position of finance minister would suit Nicolae Vacaroiu and a post of secretary of state in charge of economic-financial issues in the Ministry of Agriculture should be set up for Florin Georgescu [current minister of finance]" said Victor Surdu in conclusion. Considering that it will honor the invitation to attend the proceedings of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] National Convention, the PDAR will tell "clearly its viewpoint regarding the PUNR ruling." In case the PUNR continues to remain on the side of the current executive, the PDAR representatives will examine at their own congress, which will be held in December, the situation that has thus been created within the BUN [National Unity Bloc].

Regarding the three PDAR candidates that will compete for the position of the country's president, another candidate, Mr. Petre Stefan, leader of this political formation's Bihor branch, has been added to their number.

SRI Commission To Investigate PUMA Scandal

AU2211092195 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Marcela Feraru note: "Virgil Magureanu Sent the Documents on the PUMA Affair to the Control Commission of the Activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

The Commission Will Start Its Own Inquiry Parallel to That of the Defense Commission

Yesterday, the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], Virgil Magureanu, sent its documents on the PUMA affair [a corruption case involving the purchase of 12 South African PUMA helicopters by IAR-Ghimbav Brasov] to the Parliamentary Control Commission of SRI Activity. According to statements made by Senator Vasile Vacaru, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission, the SRI has yet to draw a conclusion in this matter, but it seems that all facts point to the same "main" culprit, namely, the former Romanian trade attache [in South Africa] Benone Ghinea.

On the basis of these documents, the SRI Commission will start its own inquiry, parallel to that of the Defense, Public Order, and National Security Commission [chaired by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party—PD], by hearing certain persons not yet designated. On the other hand, some of the Defense Commission members said that the SRI should not become involved in this case; at best, it may fall within the competence of the External Intelligence Service [SIE]. In this respect, one can foresee a conflict breaking out between the two parliamentary commissions, one led by a representative of the opposition, Petre Roman, and another led by Vasile Vacaru, a representative of the authorities. [passage omitted]

Thaler: FRY Cannot Be Sole SFRY Successor

AU2111171395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Report on a news conference by Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler in Ljubljana on 21 November, by Nadja Pengov—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pengov] Slovenia is watching the peace talks in Dayton attentively and strongly supports the efforts to achieve peace. We are also watching carefully the talks on the succession of the disintegrated Yugoslavia which run parallel, and for that reason we have intensified contacts with the ambassadors of the Contact Group members over the past 10 days. According to the foreign minister, we are also active in Zagreb to prevent it from offering too much to Belgrade in a moment of haste and for the sake of the short-lived interests.

[Thaler] No country, not even the so-called Federal Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia and Montenegro, can demand sole succession. The country known as FRY must ask for membership in the United Nations and consequently also in numerous other international institutions.

[Pengov] Our country continues to strive to become an associate EU member. Spain, as the EU chairman, is trying to obtain the consensus of all 15 countries. Fourteen countries are in favor, while Italy is still opposed.

The stance of one of the members of the Option-Takers [Italian refugee] organization in Trieste, which proves that some of them would agree to settling the matter with a just compensation from a special bank account to which Slovenia has already paid more than $20 million, deserves special attention, according to Thaler.

[Thaler] Such a tone of discussion is increasing the possibilities of reaching a solution for the problem that Italy has unearthed so unfortunately and to remove the matter from the agenda and concentrate on more important issues, naturally, if there is interest on the Italian side.

[Pengov] Slovenia is pleased with Rome's stance that it is interested in maintaining good relations. It also hails the signals for cooperation in the defense sector. Foreign Minister Thaler hopes that a meeting of the foreign ministers of Italy, Slovenia, and Spain could be organized soon.

As for our ambassador in Rome; The embassy is currently managed by a charge d'affaires and the truth is that a temporary absence of an ambassador can be seen as a unique message in diplomatic practice. However, the minister said that the ambassador was expected to travel to Rome by Christmas.

Parliament Approves CEFTA Membership

AU2211100195 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Report on the session of the State Chamber in Ljubljana on 21 November by Sonja Znidarsic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The bench of the Slovene Peoples' Party warned that as a consequence of our country linking itself to CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] the conditions for our agriculture, which would supposedly be greatly affected by the liberalization, would deteriorate. Zoran Madon quoted the information that after our entry into this integration the agricultural production in Slovenia would drop by 30 percent. Alojz Metelko even proposed that agriculture be excluded from the agreement until all ambiguities are clarified.

Democrat Tone Persak also partially concurred with the above statements, however, he primarily demanded from the government that any dilemmas and objections connected to such important issues be discussed and clarified in the parliament, prior to the commencement of serious talks.

Regardless of all objections, the majority of the deputies was of the opinion that the membership in this integration would be useful for our economy and that we would gain more than lose from this link. For that reason they supported the CEFTA membership and thus gave a green light for the signing of the agreement. This will happen in Ljubljana on Saturday [25 November] evening.

Parallel to this the State Chamber also passed a conclusion, ordering the government to prepare as soon as possible the platform for the negotiations on new bilateral protocols on trade with agricultural produce with individual CEFTA members. It should brief the State Chamber about it, as well as about the progress of the negotiations.

Let us also add that by joining CEFTA, Slovenia will become a full-fledged member with all rights and obligations, among which is also the right of veto. This instrument is a safety mechanism that will prevent the passing of any proposals that would be contrary to the interests of our economy and, of course, agriculture. [passage omitted]

Party's Demand for Early Elections Viewed

AU2111191895 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Report by Sandi Frelih—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We can only speculate about the reasons for the Christian Democrats' demand for early elections. The party itself justifies it with the fact that the situation in the sphere of economy and foreign affairs is not getting any better but on the contrary worse and the time has come to set things anew. To put it succinctly, they are accusing the prime minister of hesitation and inability to decide for a no confidence vote in the economics minister or appoint the ambassador to Rome, where the latest proposal of a candidate does not suit the Christian Democrats at all. Allegedly, there is no agreement on how to chair the parliamentary foreign affairs commission within the coalition, while the chairmanship of the defense committee is also questionable.

On the other hand it is also true that directly prior to the meeting of the party's executive committee which made the above decision, the highest representatives of the coalition parties held talks yesterday at which Lojze Peterle did not utter a word of this proposal. Prime Minister Drnovsek learned of their initiative through the media. By the way, Peterle is in Austria today.

The leadership of the State Chamber could not understand the proposal for early elections either. The lawyers explain that such a decision is exclusively in the hands of the prime minister. He could bring it up following a confidence vote and on the occasion of the passing of a law causing the dissolution of the parliament. Even a possible departure of the Christian Democrats from the government, of which they make no mention in their proposal, in principle would not provoke a government or a parliamentary crisis.

As the initiator does not wish to take a clear stance we can only guess about the initiative for the early elections . This could merely be a propagandistic ploy or a hastily taken decision, as was the case when Peterle resigned from the post of foreign minister. The head of the coalition has not made any comments yet. However, it reflects strangely on the relations within the coalition that the prime minister is being warned publicly about certain irregularities in the test operation of the mobile telephone network.

Official Examines Slow Privatization

AU2111144195 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 7 Nov 95 pp 13-18

[Interview with Romana Logar, director of the Agency for Payment Operations, Audit, and Information, by Stanislav Kovac; place and date not given: "Rop Versus Logar"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kovac] How is the cooperation of the Agency for Payment Operations, Audit, and Information with the government commission for the prevention of the depletion of public property proceeding?

[Logar] We received three invitations to the sessions of the government commission which we could not attend due to the obligations we had planned earlier. However, we did receive several initiatives from the government commission that were jointly entitled the initiative for the realization of inspection of legality in the husbandry of public property after 31 December 1992. These initiatives refer to the companies in which audits have already been carried out where the depletion of public property was established and where, on the basis of the audit results, we also filed reports on suspected economic offenses and criminal actions. For reasons unknown to us, these companies have not been transformed since the audits, although we completed some of the audits in 1993. Let me quote the case of Planika, to which we issued an auditing report in 1994. In more than a year and a half, Planika did not manage to carry out property transformation. We can ask ourselves why the property transformation did not take place.

[Kovac] How do you interpret the phenomena that your agency is supposed to revisit the companies that have already been audited and where depletions have already been established?

[Logar] From the viewpoint of an inspector who carried out the audit and invested many efforts into it, this is really an insult. An inspector is expected to return to a company to see how the actions that he had discovered some time ago are continuing. In the meantime, the incumbent authorities did more-or-less nothing to prevent these actions. As early as 1993, we warned that the property transformation required special knowledge and that prosecutors and judges alike should acquire this special knowledge and specialize within their profession, because the property transformation is a unique process to which all other branches of authority should give priority. Because the ruling coalition showed no interest in retrieving at least some of the capital that changed owners abroad, it also could not be expected that it would do everything to successfully remedy the depletions at home.

[Kovac] Even if the judicial services had completed the legal procedures within the shortest possible time and if at least the perpetrators of the most prominent examples of economic crime had ended up behind bars, a new management could have been appointed in those companies that would have delayed property transformation and continued depleting public property even after 31 December 1992. Where do you see the main reason for having to repeat audits in the already audited firms after a couple of years?

[Logar] Had we completed at least one legal process and not forgotten to issue the verdict (Elan), we would have definitely prevented the continuation of such activities. When absolutely nothing happens to the one who forgot to issue the verdict with a prison sentence and when the Justice Ministry does not even bother to comment on it in public, then everything is clear. The government, that is, the Ministry of Economic Relations and Development, which is responsible for the process of the property transformation, should have, on the basis of our warnings that depletion was also occurring after 31 December 1992, drafted systemic rules that would, after the completion of the audit, have compelled companies into a faster property transformation. These companies would have had to carry out the program of property transformation immediately after the audit. The outermost deadline for the realization of the autonomous property transformation should also be defined, for example, three months. The Agency for Privatization, too, should give priority to the companies that have already depleted the public capital. With such systemic rules of the property transformation in force it could not have happened that a company would not have privatized itself for more than two years since the completion of its audit. And now we are again receiving requests to carry out inspections. This is one of the main system flaws that is slowing down the process of property transformation. [passage omitted]

[Kovac] The government representatives have lately claimed the opposite to what you are saying now, namely, that the reasons for the slow pace of the privatization lie precisely in the realization of audits and in the denationalization process?

[Logar] Denationalization and audits have definitely had an impact on the duration of the realization of the entire property transformation, however, this is also influenced by other factors. The example of Planika, put forward earlier, to which the government commission is also pointing out, suggests this, too. Had all the companies that have had audits completed, and there were 769 of them by mid September this year, already carried out programs of property transformation we would have had a lot more privatized companies today. We must also take into account here that the programs of property transformation were also approved for the enterprises that were not covered by the audit, and that we have fewer privatized companies than we have carried out audits. [passage omitted]

[Kovac] Recently, however, the government commission has pledged publicly that the government will "go to the end" in the prevention of the depletion of public property!

[Logar] The statements that the government will "go to the end" in the prevention of the depletion of public property are misleading statements for the public, aimed at demonstrating that a law-governed state nevertheless exists and that the executive authorities will enforce a speedier enforcement of legal norms. Here, the ruling coalition overheard the proposals we made at the extraordinary session of the State Chamber in July (and supported by the views of the legal experts) that the lack of readiness of the domestic enterprises to unveil what happened to the public capital in their affiliated companies abroad could constitute a criminal act of the unauthorized withholding of funds. Such actions could also be "solved" within the framework of the international legal assistance. Also, our institution does not have enough personnel for the realization of repeat audits, that is, inspection visits during which it may be established that some companies also deliberately operated to the detriment of the new owners (at least the institutional ones) after 1 January 1993. The random frequent changes to the law on our agency result in the departure of our trained personnel, that is, it prevent us from hiring new inspectors. In the realization of our tasks until the end of the year, we will give priority to the completion of envisaged audits, 150 of them. Only in this way will these companies start their property transformation as quickly as possible. The realization of the majority of initiatives calling for inspection visits by the government commission would also require the reassignment of personnel and cause a bottleneck in the realization of planned audits, and this would stall the process of property transformation.

[Kovac] Recently, the president of the state commission stated publicly that the commission would try to prevent the depletions of public property by coordinating the work of the institutions that are authorized to prevent and discover depletions, and that the commission would coordinate the collection and verification of information on irregularities in the companies. Is your institution not the one that, since 1992, the Law on Property Transformation of Enterprises actually allows to obtain information pertaining to the possible depletion from all incumbent institutions and also from citizens?

[Logar] Our institution receives requests and initiatives from disillusioned workers, trade union representatives, and other citizens, urging us to do something in this or that company every day. The initiatives are very varied, ranging from warnings about deliberate bankruptcies and the reduction in companies' value to unlawful property transformation. We forward all the anonymous initiatives to our branches. However, by the end of the year, we will give priority to those companies in which we have not yet carried out audits, on the basis of demands and initiatives issued prior to 5 May 1993. As I have mentioned, these companies cannot carry out independent privatization before the completion of the audits. That is why, in terms of personnel, we are concentrating on these companies until the end of the year. All other demands can be realized over the next six months, during which time the property transformation will still continue. The same applies to the initiatives of the government commission.

[Kovac] The second role of the commission is supposed to be the coordination of all institutions that deal with the prevention of the depletion of public property. Does your institution not coordinate the cooperation with other state institutions that concern themselves with the prevention of the depletion of public property on the basis of the Law on Administrative Procedure and the Law on Property Transformation of Enterprises?

[Logar] The official duty of our agency is to send audit reports to the Crime Department, the Foreign Currency Inspection, the Agency for Payment Operations, the Prosecutor's Office, and the public attorney. The Agency for Privatization, which the government commission allocates a special role, should have evidence of completed audits and give priority to those companies in which the revision has been completed. I believe that the worst solution is to transfer public capital to the Development Fund, which, at least from our viewpoint, has not proven itself to be any better a manager than the earlier managements. Korze's fund [the Development Fund] and the Agency for Privatization should be given shorter deadlines for the realization of autonomous privatization, while the management should remain within the domain of a company. In my opinion, both institutions lack people who could judge the appropriateness and expert knowledge of the management off the cuff and appoint new ones. I do not know how the government commission envisages preventing the depletion of public capital by transferring enterprises to Korze's fund and replacing the management. Let me only quote the contents of one of the government initiatives for the realization of the audit. In it, we are being warned that unlawful activities continued via a company abroad. Therefore, the government commission is urging us to try and prevent the depletion of public capital abroad, while we have been warning the government and the ruling coalition about the suspected harmful erosion of capital unsuccessfully for at least three years. Unfortunately, even the latest changes to the law dealing with foreign partners, which were supposed to respond to the initiatives put forward at the extraordinary State Chamber session, do not increase the supervision of the erosion of capital abroad and do not allow for the identification of the depletion of social capital that has resulted from the change of ownership abroad. We will continue to be helpless in the face of information that a certain company impoverished domestic companies via an affiliated enterprise abroad and via its daughter companies. [passage omitted]

[Kovac] On the basis of the information collected, the government commission is supposed to take a standpoint on the depletion of public capital in a company and decide whether it makes sense to transfer the company to the Development Fund, whereby the depletion is supposed to stop with the change of management. Would it not be possible to solve the problem of the depletion after 1 January 1993 systematically and uniformly for all companies, rather than merely identify depletion in individual enterprises, as the government commission is supposed to do?

[Logar] I doubt that the Development Fund, as a sort of administrative office, could deal with all these matters effectively. If the government truly had wanted to intervene in the depletions in the period after 31 December 1992, it would have had to resolve the identification and removal of harmful and unlawful actions that occurred after this date systematically and a lot earlier, instead of forming the commission. The irregularities after 31 December 1992 cannot be remedied in the same way, that is, directly on the public capital, but solely through the current business results, in compliance with the accountancy standards and the law on business enterprises. We could also resolve problems by paying greater attention to the supervisory committees of the privatized enterprises in their initial period of work. During the first inspection of the final statement of accounts of all privatized enterprises, the commercial auditors should disclose to the new owners whether privatization had been carried out in compliance with the instructions of the privatizaton agency, what happened to our audit findings, and whether the capital diminished in the period from 31 December 1992 until the entry of the privatization in the court register. The other possibility is that, through tax control, we give "priority" to those enterprises in which we suspect that commercially harmful acts reduced the tax basis and, as a result, often the business results and the capital after 1 January 1993. Only in this way would it be possible to remedy the depletions that have taken place since 31 December 1992 in the current legal setup. Unfortunately, neither the government nor the deputies sought appropriate systemic solutions. Instead, the government has set up a commission that is warning about suspected irregularities and illegalities in individual companies.

Federal

Kontic Calls Accord 'Final Victory for Reason'

LD2211173695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1715 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Nov [as received] (TANJUG)—The peace agreement which has been reached in Dayton represents a final victory for reason and state wisdom over the forces of gloom and the destruction of human reason, Radoje Kontic, federal prime minister, has told TANJUG.

"Accepting the Dayton agreement as a whole, the federal government assesses that it is of vital importance for peace, stability, and the normalization of relations, not only in the area of the former Yugoslavia but also beyond, in the Balkans and Europe," the Yugoslav prime minister said. He added that the federal government has been insisting, since the beginning of its term of office, on a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, along with just and equal treatment of all parties involved.

Radoje Kontic's statement goes on to say:

Proceeding from such an orientation, we have supported all peace plans offered by the international community, not because we believed they were ideal, but because they offered a civilized, political solution of the Yugoslav crisis. It has been confirmed that the federal government was entirely right in insisting in August 1994 on its support for the Contact Group plan, with all the consequences that this entailed.

Thanks to such a policy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was accepted by the international community as the factor of peace, stability, and cooperation in the region; the continuity of its stands and activities represents the key contribution to the overcoming of all obstructions to the peace process. What is impressive is that the Dayton peace talks were successfully completed thanks to the Yugoslav delegation led by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What is also impressive is that the right of the Serb people living outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to their own identity and equality has been guaranteed, within Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the international recognition of the Serb Republic, as a constituent entity equal to the Muslim-Croat federation.

The federal prime minister said that the Dayton peace agreement represents not only the end of war options, casualties, suffering, and material destruction, but also the strengthening of mutual trust among the Balkan nations and their orientation toward the achievements of the civilization and economic prosperity.

Kontic's statement also stresses:

"We rightly expect that the international community, and in particular the UN Security Council, will guarantee the full and consistent implementation of the agreement reached, which implies complete impartiality and equidistance [ekvidistanca] from all sides.

"We also expect that the unjust sanctions introduced by the international community against the Federal republic of Yugoslavia will definitely be lifted without any conditions or delay. This would represent the expected recognition of the contribution which our country has made to the final conclusion of the peace agreement.

"The Federal republic of Yugoslavia will, as it has done hitherto, direct maximum efforts toward the realization of the peace agreement, and expects its own full reintegration into the international community and equal participation in the reconstruction of the region of the former Yugoslavia, because only in this way will it be possible for it to make a valid contribution to the normalization of relations in the Balkans, and thereby in Europe as well," Kontic concludes his statement on the acceptance of the peace agreement in Dayton.

President Lilic Issues Statement on Agreement

AU2111215695 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 21 Nov 95

[Statement by Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 21 November; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have certainly awaited such good news with great impatience. I can easily call it good news as I believe that this is how it is seen by a great majority of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and certainly also the majority of the members of the Serbian and Montenegrin people both on the territory of the FRY and beyond, and I am sure on the territory throughout the world wherever people with good will live.

I think that this is really the right news and that regardless of all difficulties that appeared over the last two days—as the journalists have defined them, the two dramatic days—particularly this last day when in the last half hour it was not known what is happening there in Dayton. I think that we may be satisfied and that we can send and convey congratulations to our delegation which has really persistently fought for the interests of the Serbian people, and above all to send congratulations to President Slobodan Milosevic who so successfully led the negotiations in Dayton.

It is certain that we have to convey due respect, due esteem, and great gratitude to the U.S. Administration and certainly the President, Mr. Bill Clinton who invested maximum [word indistinct] authority to have the Dayton negotiations finally end, although there have been significant attempts at calling them into question and returning to the war options by those people who are used to waging war on this territory. This has never been our goal and (?it is good that all has ended this way).

It is sure that as regards the FRY, we have many reasons to be satisfied today. We have many reasons to be satisfied tomorrow and in the coming days and to turn with optimism to these tasks that, I deeply believe, are going to await us on the country's economic recovery, on the country's development, and on the international plane. Conditions have been created for sanctions on the FRY to be lifted. I think that this is no longer an uncertain question and if not tonight, then that will happen tomorrow. It is certain that this will create conditions for the FRY to finally come back to the place that belongs to it, to return to all forums and institutions of the international community, and this represents a common basis for the FRY to step toward such a significant and important goal as democratic, economically developed, civic FRY.

We certainly must be satisfied with the fact that with the very act of signing the agreement which is to take place tonight—it has still not been signed, but we have no reason not to believe that it will be so—with the fact that we managed to preserve peace on the territory of the FRY, and I would like to say that I think that this is really so and that with the very act of signing the agreement we managed to protect the sovereignty of the FRY. This is certainly something that [words indistinct].

What must follow as an extremely important and complex task is not to let anybody who would want to use some new behavior and new activities to disturb what was signed in Dayton tonight. I believe that we shall succeed in that and persevere in the way we managed to persevere over all these years in realizing the policy that we [word indistinct] together.

Most Political Parties Hail Peace Accord

AU2211123695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on page 2 of its 22 November edition carries several reactions of the Yugoslav political parties to the signing of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton.

Milomir Minic, secretary general of the Socialist Party of Serbia, is of the opinion that "the agreement in Dayton was a great and historic triumph for peace." "The significance of the peace agreement," he continues in his statement for TANJUG, "is that it contains solutions that resolve the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in a lasting and just manner, restore peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and lift the sanctions against our country." He does not forget to add that the plan "represents the most convincing victory of the policy led by President Slobodan Milosevic."

At yesterday's news conference at which he toasted the Dayton peace plan with champagne, Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, said: "The details of the peace agreement are not very important because I deeply believe that the peace will change things radically and that one day new people will come to the head of all three peoples. I believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina will again become a wonderful ethnic rainbow once the refugees return home." He praised the fact that "a stop has been put to the deaths, misfortune, and misery of the millions of people" and stressed the need to realize the agreement as quickly as possible. Speaking about internal affairs, Draskovic said that the priority task for Serbia was to "immediately embark on radical internal changes—primarily privatization."

As BETA agency reports, Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic stated that the party had received the news about signing the peace accord "with relief, because it marks the end of a tragedy to which this nation has been subjected for long four years." According to Djindjic, the agreement was signed "thanks to the relentless persistence of the mediators, that is, the United States." As he said, "the difficult tasks" such as "normalization of life, return of refuges, and the political and economic changes in the entire region that would prevent such wars from ever repeating themselves" still remained to be solved.

The Democratic Party of Serbia in its statement hails the end of the war but warns that "it is inevitable to respect the minimum of interests of the warring sides to achieve a lasting peace. For the Serbs this minimum of interests represents the sovereignty of the Serb Republic and the possibility of its more substantial linking with Serbia." The statement says that "time will show what the fate of this 'unnatural community' will be," adding that "now that the state border between the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been officially proclaimed, the priority task has become to strengthen the links between the FRY and the Serb Republic, because of this border and despite it."

In stark opposition to the prevailing positive reactions to the agreement, Serbian Radical Party President Vojislav Seselj, according to BETA, exclaimed that "the biggest betrayal of the Serbian nation has just been committed."

According to Seselj, Serbian President Milosevic "sacrificed all Serbian national interests and accepted all the demands put forth by the traditional enemies of Serbia and their Western mentors and allies." "Slobodan Milosevic sacrificed the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the most brutal way and also the Republic of Serbia, however with a somewhat delayed impact." "The Serbian nation has suffered a great tragedy, a great historic defeat, and much will have to be done to remedy the consequences of this defeat within the foreseeable time," Seselj concluded.

Milan Gajevic, member of the caucus of the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro, hailed the peace agreement reached in Dayton as "an outstanding historic event and the best Christmas greeting to all people of good will."

The president of the Civil Alliance of Serbia was equally ecstatic about the news on the peace agreement: "I cannot conceal my excitement over the fact that this truly means the beginning of our revival and, above all, the end of killing and suffering of people, which we have witnessed in Bosnia all this time."

Other parties such as the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, the Reformed Democratic Party of Vojvodina, and the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak are also reported to hail the signing of the agreement.

Finally, the paper also carries an opinion by Ivan Stambolic, former president of the Presidency of Serbia, who in a telephone statement to BETA agency assessed that the agreement "will be implemented with difficulty." "I do not know exactly what this agreement contains, however, its concept will be difficult to implement."

Yugoslav Army Welcomes Accord, Ready to Help

LD2111194995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1832 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—At the moment when the persistent striving of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at bringing a peaceful end to the war has been crowned by a peace agreement, we would like to stress that there is great pleasure and relief among members of the Yugoslav Army, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, the Yugoslav Army's chief of the general staff, said in connection with the reaching of the peace agreement in Dayton.

We are pleased, he said, because reason has finally prevailed among the people on the territory of former Yugoslavia. I sincerely hope that the hostilities during the four years of civil war are a strong warning that something like this should never happen again. In this war our people suffered huge casualties, destruction, the loss of their centuries-old homes, but they have managed to preserve and defend their existence as a nation. Peace on the basis of equality will facilitate the protection of legitimate interests, social development, and overall development.

The Yugoslav Army welcomes the huge contribution made by our negotiating team in the Dayton peace negotiations. It expresses its commitment and readiness to contribute to the realization of the agreement, in line with decisions made by the state leadership.

Serbia

Milosevic Makes Statement on Dayton Agreement

AU2111190295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1735 GMT 21 Nov 95

["Special" statement by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic; in Dayton on 21 November—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Citizens of Yugoslavia, I am sure that we have made you genuinely happy by reaching peace at the peace negotiations in Dayton. They lasted long, but I think that the result is undoubtedly suitable to these negotiations.

To the citizens of the Serb Republic, I wish them a successful Serb Republic, and I wish them peace and cooperation with the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Today the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has finally ended. This is not only because this agreement has been reached in all elements of the peace plan, but also because the exact border between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation has been established, so that a military action with the goal of any kind of territorial change would no longer have any sense and would undoubtedly and exclusively be treated as a terrorist act.

Therefore, the war has ended. It is time now for everybody to turn to peace, building, and economic recover.

Over these last few days, we spent much time specifically on the issue of maps. I think that the maps are much—and I would say almost incomparably—better than the Contact Group maps.

Let me start from the west. The territories of the municipalities of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo have been returned to the Serb Republic in return for lost territories. Then, going to the central part, compared with the Contact Group plan, we keep Ozren and Doboj, Modrica, Derventa, [Bosanski] Brod, Samac, and Brcko, and, as for the eastern part, we keep Visegrad, Srebrenica, Zepa, so these maps, in my opinion, represent a fair solution.

There is no doubt that all sides had to make serious concessions. However, it is certain that all concessions that have been made cannot be compared with the result reached. It is peace, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but peace in the entire region. The entire region now has the possibility of turning to its own development.

Finally, I wish to tell you that the UN Security Council resolution, which will end all economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has just gone into session. This resolution is complete, that is, sanctions are to be suspended immediately and, after a certain time, formally lifted. However, there are no differences in the regime between suspension and lifting. Only a certain procedure connected with easing tensions and calming war conflicts in Bosnia is involved.

I expect that our entire country, now freed from the fetters that so disturbed our economic and social development on the whole, will now set off on a road of major economic recovery and successful development. Our next goal is successful economic and cultural development, integration into Europe and the world, equality of nations and people in the region, and equality and cooperation in the interest of all.

On behalf of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I wish to send cordial greetings from Dayton, Ohio, to all of you, to all citizens of Yugoslavia.

Government Statement Hails Peace Agreement

LD2111210495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—This evening, the Republic of Serbia's Government assessed the peace agreement in Dayton as a document of historic importance for Serbia and for the FRY, and the Serbian nation as a whole.

The text of the government statement reads:

"At a meeting this evening presided over by [Prime Minister] Mirko Marjanovic, the Government of the Republic of Serbia examined the state, economic, and social aspects of the peace agreement reached in Dayton, USA.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia welcomes the successful conclusion of the peace talks and considers the peace agreement reached in Dayton, USA a document of historic importance for the Republic of Serbia and for the FRY and the Serbian nation as a whole.

This peace agreement marks a great victory for peace in the region of the former Yugoslavia. The agreement is confirmation of the peace-loving policy of Yugoslavia, which it has been advocating from the beginning of the conflicts on the territory of the former SFRY following the secession of certain republics. The peace agreement, which respects the interests of all sides, marks the end of war and the return of peace to these lands.

The peace agreement creates all the preconditions for the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole to once again become a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation, and makes possible the full normalization of relations between the federal units of the former SFRY and a secure and peaceful life for the citizens in the territory of each of them.

The suspension and lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as one of the elements of the successful conclusion of the negotiations, allows Yugoslavia and Serbia to reintegrate into the processes of international exchange, to intensify economic growth and development, and makes possible the realization of democratic, economic, social, and cultural priorities of the country.

With the lifting of sanctions, conditions for satisfying the vital needs and increase in the standard of living of the widest segments of the population are created. This will also contribute to the solution of difficult humanitarian problems, especially to the care of 750,000 of refugees who have found refuge in our country.

The successful conclusion of the negotiations—with the mediation of the Contact Group and its leading members, the United States and Russia, has strongly confirmed the constructive role and contribution of the Yugoslav delegation, led by President Slobodan Milosevic, and its persistent support for the observance of the principles of equality and the respect for the legitimate interests of all the warring parties, as preconditions for the achievement of a lasting and just peace.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia considers that in the achievement of the peace agreement Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Republic of Serbia, played a decisive role, which was acknowledged and confirmed by all the international players, as well as the participants in the agreement.

During the negotiations President Milosevic defended the national, state, political, and economic interests of the state and the whole Serb nation in their entirety. By recognizing the Bosnian Serb Republic as a constituent entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community has taken upon itself the guarantees and responsibility for the equality and security of the Serb nation and for safeguarding its national identity.

The peace agreement enables the return and inclusion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia into the international community as equal and active entities dedicated to peace, democracy, progress, and cooperation.

During the period that is behind us, the Serbian nation and all citizens of Serbia gave enormous sacrifices, and were subjected to blockade, pressures, isolation, and an unprecedented media campaign, but—led by the consistent policy of peace that was followed persistently and with state wisdom by Milosevic—they succeeded in preserving their dignity and their faith in themselves and their ability to defend peace, stability, and the basis of development in such conditions.

That is why the Government of the Republic of Serbia expects that in the period of implementation of the peace agreement the Serb nation and all the citizens of Serbia, believing in the fulfillment of just historical aims, will invest even greater efforts aimed at overall development of the Republic of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their integration into European and world developments on an equal footing.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia will do everything in the coming period to enable the favorable political and economic climate, created by the peace agreement, to be translated into measures that will enable rapid economic growth and development, promotion of international economic relations, and affirmation of the country on the international stage."

Plavsic Hopes Serbs Not To Be 'Limited'

AU2211120295 Belgrade NTV Studio B Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Nov 95

["Exclusive" statement by Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, to the Studio B "News at Seven" program via telephone link with Banja Luka on 21 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka is celebrating the signing of peace in a truly wonderful way. Serbs are celebrating, shooting, there is a fireworks display; what can I say, I think that everyone is happy. Of course, there is also a lot of sorrow for those who were killed, but I hope—of course, I do not know the details—that we will know what these people died for.

I have to say that the exceptional achievement of our long struggle is that we have separated from our enemies. I suppose we shall live alongside each other, not together, and establish more normal relations; however, this had to happen. The war actually started there where peace was now signed. I cannot [word indistinct] about this. The United States prepared everything so that war would break out, so that Yugoslavia would disintegrate, which we did not want. That is why it is fair that peace was negotiated in the United States. They now need peace, Clinton needs peace for the elections, so they have now established peace. I do not know who did the actual signing, but I want to tell them that [words indistinct] they are the same people who started this terrible avalanche of war in the region.

We stand before a new stage in our lives. I hope that we shall not be limited in the sense that Serbs will not be allowed to independently build the land which they forged in blood on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I hope that everything will be in our hands and that we shall show the world that we are capable of heading a democratic state—which is what everyone doubted—but believe me, all our democratic mechanisms functioned throughout the war.

Assembly Speaker Hails 'Historic' Achievement

LD2111180395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1716 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—Dragan Tomic, speaker of the People's Assembly of Serbia, gave the assessment this evening that the achievement of a peace agreement in Dayton marks a great and historic day.

In a statement to TANJUG, Tomic stressed that this is "a victory for all those who wholeheartedly fought for peace in this area."

"The war has definitively been brought to an end and all citizens living in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have been guaranteed equality, legitimacy, and sovereignty," he added.

The assembly speaker stressed that "the sincere and consistent policies conducted by the Yugoslav leadership, led by [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic, have confirmed that it was only by political means and negotiations that this historic moment could have been arrived at." [passage omitted]

"I believe that this is a happy day for our country—Yugoslavia and Serbia—because this agreement confirms the sovereignty of our country and international recognition of the Bosnian Serb Republic. It brings to an end the three year tragedy stemming from the war, and now all workers and intellectuals can direct their energies toward development and prosperity," Tomic concluded.

Political Parties Hail Dayton Agreement

LD2111225695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2247 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 21 (TANJUG)—Serbia's ruling Socialist Party said on Tuesday that the Dayton peace accord for Bosnia incorporates solutions that bring a durable and just end to the Bosnian crisis, restore peace to former Yugoslavia and lift the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro).

The accord was reached at Dayton, Ohio, USA, earlier in the day.

The party's general secretary Milomir Minic said in a statement to TANJUG that the peace plan was "the most impressive victory for the policy of peace pursued by President Slobodan Milosevic."

The peace accord has given international recognition to the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska, as an affirmation of the just struggle of the Serb people in former Bosnia-Herzegovina for freedom and equality, Minic said.

Montenegro's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists said that the agreement had made it possible to begin the process of eliminating the consequences of civil war.

This process will need time and considerable help from the international community, said Milan Gajevic, member of the party's innermost leadership.

Opposition Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic said that the biggest gain for all was that the Dayton accord had "put an end to further killing, destruction, creation of refugees, misery and suffering of millions of people."

Speaking at a press conference, the leader of Serbia's biggest opposition party said that the most important thing now was for international forces to be deployed without delay to Bosnia-Herzegovina to ensure the implementation of the accord.

Opposition Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic welcomed the accord and told TANJUG he hoped that this was the last war in the Balkans and that all future regional disputes would be dealt with by peaceful and political means.

The Serbian Citizens' Alliance said that the accord was the first chance for four years of normalising life in Bosnia-Herzegovina and throughout former Yugoslavia.

"We expect the departure of those who bear the greatest responsiblity for our tragedy and the arrival of those who have something to do in peace," the party said in a statement.

The New Democracy Party welcomed the report of the Dayton accord and invited the international community to make a more active effort to create conditions for the repatriation of refugees and help rebuild the war-devastated areas.

The Democratic Party of Serbia stressed the importance of strengthening ties between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska "at a time when the interstate border between Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been officially recognised."

Leader of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina Andras Agoston invited "Serbs, Croats and Muslims in three states in former Yugoslavia to start a new race, a race for Europe."

Montenegro

Bulatovic Hails Agreement with Croatia on Prevlaka

LD2111230095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2202 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 21 Nov (TANJUG)—Setting out his initial impressions following the successfully concluded negotiations in Dayton, Momir Bulatovic, president of Montenegro, stressed this evening "that we are now entering a new civilization-based stage of development, and that ahead of us lies peace, the normalization of relations between the former Yugoslav republics and a period of economic development."

In a statement to a Montenegrin TV current affairs program, Bulatovic said that in the last 72 hours the talks had really been on knife-edge and that the problem which was supposed to be resolved was almost unprecedented in the history of foreign relations. [passage omitted]

Replying to a question in connection with the problem of Prevlaka, the Montenegrin president recalled that during the negotiations in Dayton our delegation had a series of constructive talks with the Croatian delegation and especially with President Tudjman.

"What was at issue was the securing of the legitimate rights of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic to have an outlet to the sea and, at the same time, the resolution of the problem of Prevlaka. We fully agreed on a complete package which will be realized when the talks are resumed in Paris, or at the official signing of the peace agreement," Bulatovic said.

"It should now be said that all my numerous critics who for years have been pestering me, in particular, over Prevlaka, can be disappointed."

"I believe that Montenegro will be fully satisfied after the conference in Paris with the resolution of what is, for Montenegro, a very important question. This matter is part of the process of the comprehensive normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, which is in the interests of both sides, and is part of the overall peace process which we have carried out in Dayton," President Bulatovic said.

Opposition Says Army Fears Secession

AU2111191495 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 p 7

[Interview with Slavko Perovic, president of the Liberal Union of Montenegro, by Luko Brailo; place and date not given: "If We Tried To Secede —Serbs Would Attack Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "In the past five years we have become a big and powerful movement, which is committed to the project of an independent, democratic, and prosperous state of Montenegro. For example, in January 1990, when the Liberal Union of Montenegro [LSCG] was formed, there were around 50 of us, and nowadays several thousand people come to our meetings, which no other party is capable of doing in Montenegro today, particularly not the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS]. In the past period we have been admitted to the Liberal International Organization, which is an exceptional acknowledgement for the LSCG. In the other hand, in the work of the Parliament of Montenegro our arguments are the domineering arguments which leave a strong impression, because all our prognoses about the destiny of the poor Montenegro under the leadership of Momir Bulatovic [president of Montenegro] have come true, so that even those who were once our bitter enemies now compliment us for our consistent and courageous conduct in all these years. I am convinced that they have begun realizing the futility of the outdated ideas they enthusiastically advocated until recently. That is a big, new quality which is being created in Montenegro," we were told by Slavko Perovic, president of the LSCG, the most influential opposition party in Montenegro. [passage omitted]

Principles Lead Out of Hell

[Brailo] The examples of the inequality of the position of Montenegro in relation to Serbia in the present "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" are numerous, starting from political to economic problems. For example, Montenegro cannot proclaim a state of emergency on its territory, Montenegro transfers its competences on the federal level, whereas Serbia does not adapt its Constitution to the federal one, and so on.

[Perovic] The present authorities accept the moves of Belgrade as though under some sort of inertia, as if they were hoping it were not the reality, but only a bad dream. That is a remainder of the old, communist model in which, allegedly, everything can be achieved with tricks and deceptions, and it is clear that the method should be completely different. We can get out of hell only by strictly obeying principles. In that sense, Bulatovic maybe dreams that he can fool Milosevic and the like, but that is his part of work, not ours, we do not deal with that. [passage omitted]

Bulatovic in Dayton

[Brailo] Since you have been admitted in the Liberal International Organization, your party has had most international contacts on the territory of Montenegro. How do foreign diplomats react when they visit you as the most influential opposition party, and how do they view the program of the LSCG, and the idea of the creation of an independent state of Montenegro?

[Perovic] I have an impression that international political factors have started recognizing the tendencies toward independence in Montenegro, as well as the fact that if Montenegro is drowned in Serbia that does not contribute to the solution of the problem of the entire region but only complicates it. Also, a new diplomatic view of Montenegro is being created, which finally states that Montenegro was the first victim of Greater-Serbian aggression in 1918, and that at that time the world shut its eyes before the destruction of the Montenegrin state, church, dynasty, and the Montenegrin national name. A belief is emerging which recognizes that we are not Serbs and that our rights have to be respected.

[Brailo] Now in Dayton will the world recognize all that has been caused by the Greater-Serbian aggression in the course of the past decades, particularly in the last few years? Is the idea of Greater Serbia experiencing its end, and what do you expect of the Ohio talks?

[Perovic] The idea of Greater Serbia has been destroyed by the recent events in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that project can now only be preserved through the still considerable military strength of Serbia. Therefore I believe that one of the crucial goals in Dayton will be the attempt to put Serbian military power under absolute control. In that sense I am an optimist, although it is still early for final assessments.

[Brailo] And Montenegro in Dayton?

[Perovic] It is clear that the most tragicomic figure is that of president Momir Bulatovic, who is present there. However, in the atmosphere of Dayton it is perfectly clear that he does not represent anybody there, neither himself nor Montenegro. He is but a marionette in the hands of Slodoban Milosevic, and in Dayton that can clearly be seen in his six-year history, both his personal and ours as the people of Montenegro.

Montenegro Has a Chance

[Brailo] Seven independent Montenegrin associations, with the PEN center of Montenegro at their head, have asked the negotiators in Dayton to secure statehood for Montenegro. The LSCG holds the same opinion, whereas the Social Democrat Party [SDP] and the People's Party have asked President Bulatovic to protect Montenegrin interests in Ohio?

[Perovic] All these years the LSCG has advocated the mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav republics, with the respect of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] orders. In our opinion, that is the basic principle that has to be respected. Former Yugoslav society had to disintegrate to gain freedom and to try to establish democratic structures and create democratic forces.

[Brailo] However, it is a big question whether Momir Bulatovic will say anything in Dayton, since before leaving for Ohio he said that Slobodan Milosevic was the main figure, and that in Dayton he had "a special role?"

[Perovic] I will tell you something that is very indicative. A few days ago, BBC broadcast a program on the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Britain. When the journalists asked Mr. Bulatovic how he had felt when as the chairman of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [SKJ], namely when it was already clear what sort of hurricane was ahead of us and which horrors were to happen on the territory of [former] Yugoslavia, he commented on the whole situation in a truly unusual way. He said that his parents were very happy that he had managed to preside over such a congress and such an important meeting at such a young age. I believe that tells everything about Dayton as well.

Base in Valdanosa

[Brailo] Let us turn to something quite different. News has reached us that on the territory of Montenegro there are 40 to over 60 thousand soldiers, including officers of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], that the rate of the militarization of the Montenegrin territory amounts to 25 percent, that the Army of Yugoslavia has the right to around 150 locations in Montenegro, that in the vicinity of Ulcinj they intend to build a new base for the Yugoslav Navy, and so on. What is the LSCG's attitude on that?

[Perovic] That news or rather facts are true, and we noticed that a long time ago. The LSCG demanded an emergency parliamentary debate on the issue of Valdanosa, a lagoon near Ulcinj, on the very border to Albania, where Belgrade intends to build a new military base. On the other hand, our expert analysis, done by the people who deal with military issues in the LSCG, shows that that base, and in general the enormous militarization of Boka and of the coast, just like that of the entire Montenegro, are by no means done for the sake of defense from somebody who would possibly want to attack those territories from the outside. Our estimations say, and that is actually the biggest proof, that Belgrade has realized that Montenegro will have a secessionist crisis and that we will try to secede. It seems that all that contingent of people, all that is being done for the Navy in Boka and in Ulcinj has only one purpose—in one moment, when it is deemed necessary, to turn those cannons not in the direction of the sea, but to the land of Montenegro.

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